Illicit firm behavior : collusion, exclusion, and shadow-economic activity by KARLINGER, Liliane
M-.3
m
M ii ia t e t t t lA u i iM  à l j i n m M Î t
f  0 </^ _-r
,RL
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE 
Department of Economics
Illicit Firm Behavior: Collusion, Exclusion,
and Shadow-Economic Activity
Liliane Karlinger
Thesis submitted fo r  assessment with a view to obtaining 
the degree o f  Doctor o f  the European University Institute
Florence
December 2005
*
'1
s
\

u U T T C T J lT O Ï T l lînCTWfîTfTn fïïii* r
WT^ff
LIB
3 3 8 . 8 0 1 5  
1 KAR
European University Institute
3 0001 0047 4166 8
EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE
Department of Economics ISTITUTO UNIVERSITARIO EUROPEO
O 8 DIC. 2005
BIBLIOTECA
Illicit Firm Behavior: Collusion, Exclusion, 
and Shadow-Economic Activity
Liliane Karlinger
T h e  Thesis  Com m ittee consists of:
Oriana Bandiera, London School o f Econom ics  
Pascal Courty, European University Institute  
M assim o Motta, Supervisor, European University Institute  
Patrick Rey, University o f Tou louse  I
vmm
JÌ& lf if if« äaiiUüiüÜ i ;¿¿ i ; j ■inrfc’ i
W H T|HT-.f!>J|j!J ili|¡M»tH»Wfjl i!..j;t!!.l;'!">.l»W4?J»f;.«ii>il!ffll
Illicit Firm Behavior: Collusion, Exclusion, and 
Shadow-Economic Activity
Liliane Karlinger 
European University Institute
December 2005
ÜHUmHIHUüUMIWWWWWM
dm<di linrthhhiiiii M UBtm itiihtitiKhhl i -
I
Tliis dissertation is dedicated to my Dad, and to Nicola.
IMHHim IU1. t, I t—mrmmmwimmimmm
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This thesis would not have been possible without the support of many people. Any attempt 
to give full credit to each of them is bound to fail, but that does not discourage me from 
giving it a try. My wannest thanks go to Massimo Motta, for challenging me with so many 
new and exciting ideas, some of which I finally managed to understand; for encouraging me 
to pursue my research, when I badly needed encouragement; for never putting me under 
pressure, when pressure was the last tiling I needed. I am also indebted to Patrick Key, who 
supervised me during my visiting stay in Toulouse, and who was kind enough to continue 
offering his support long after I had left Toulouse. I have not yet mentioned those who 
make sure everything runs smoothly at the Economics Department of EUI, Jessica, Martin, 
mid Manuela, to name a few (those who had to suffer most from my silly questions and 
never-ending problems), and who made EUI that unforgettable experience to me. Finally, 
mid with all my heart, grazie to Vincenzo, and gracias to Fernando, and thank 3011 to all our 
friends of Via Sant’Orsola, for opening the doors o f their home - and o f their hearts - to me, 
no matter what time of the day or night. And yes, thank you Nicola for telling me about 
this fabulous place in Florence and encouraging me to apply, back then in Vienna, when I 
was not even dreaming of ever l>euig accepted to this program, and to Katha and Ingrid, 
mid Nicola again, for remaining faithful friends despite the many years I spent abroiid. 1
11
mmmmm mmmmmmmmmmmrnmm

Contents
I Introduction vi
II Chapters 1
1 Can Finns M ak e Them selves Better off by Ignoring Information on Their
C om petitors? 1
Introduction........................................................................................................................ 1
The m odel...........................................................................................................................  7
Comparison to the Green-Porter m odel........................................................................  13
The sustainability of co llu sion ..............................................................................  13
Length of pimislunent and value of co llu sion ...................................................... 20
Welfare Im plications........................................................................................................ 23
Conclusion...........................................................................................................................  21
Appendix A: P roofs...........................................................................................................  20
2 Exclusionary Pricing and Rebates in a N etw ork Industry 32
Introduction........................................................................................................................  32
The s e tu p ...........................................................................................................................  30
Two benchmark price regim es........................................................................................  40
Uniform linear p r ic in g ................................... : .....................................................  40
in
IHMMMNUUIIIlim wm WPWimUH»lMIWmWMWU»UUIHWW»WUIIIlUU
a a J ü -- ¿ f  j -* ^  • jj.
CONTENTS iv
Tliird-degree price discrim ination..........................................................................
Rebate schemes (Second-degree ¡nice discrin iiim tion)................................................
Welfare A n a ly s is ................................................................................................................
Concluding remarks .........................................................................................................
Appendix A: P roofs............................................................................................................
Appendix B: The case of full discrimination among b u y e r s ......................................
Appendix C: Unifonn two-part tariffs.............................................................................
Miscoordination E quilibria......................................................................................
Entry Equilibria.........................................................................................................
Conclusion...................................................................................................................
Welfare Analysis ......................................................................................................
43
51
GO
Gi
G8
81
8G
8G
88
100
103
3 T h e Underground Econom y Across Countries: Evading Taxes, or Evading
C om p etition? 1 0 5
Introduction...........................................................................................................................  105
The M odel............................................................................................................................... 110
Description of the C a m e .........................................................................................  110
The F irm s......................................................................................................  110
The Tax A u th ority ......................................................................................  113
Solution of the G am e.........................    114
Equilibrium in the Product Market (stage 2 ) ...........................................  115
Equilibrium at the Entry-Stage of the Game (stage 1 ) .............................. 117
UUMI n r n i *
MMMMi
CONTENTS v
Comparative Statics ...................................................................................... 119
D iscussion..................................................................................................................... 120
Empirical Evidence............................................................................................................... 125
Description of the D ata................................................................................................125
Regression R esu lts ......................................................................................................129
Robustness .........................................  152
Conclusion........................................................................................................................... 155
Appendix A: Proofs...........................................................................................................  111
Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics and First-Stage Regressions....................................110
Appendix C: Robustness Checks......................................................................................... 151
ipiff m ii|i ijBiMMMtllJlPJ
Part I
Introduction
v i
JttÀ—
bb u h u m i w m bh ¡im u im iM iiiU Hm
\11
Every day, firms have to make numerous decisions: winch price to charge, wliich quantity 
and quality to offer, which production teclinology to use, whether to make an investment or 
not, and the like.
When making these decisions, the linn’s interests may come into conflict with society’s 
objectives. Therefore, numerous laws and regulations try to bring firm behavior in line with 
social welfare. Cases in ¡xmit are the labor law, environmental regulation, product and safety 
standards, and o f course competition policy.
Yet, these regulations can resolve the conflict between linns and society only in ]>art: 
First of all, firms may simply ignore or consciously break the law, in particular if law en­
forcement is inadequate. Second, in many economic environments regulation is difficult and 
jXTforce incomplete. Such twilight zones leave scope for undesirable, yet legal firm behavior.
Illicit linn behavior is a featme of everyday life, and challenges public policy to strike 
the right balance between economic fnxxlom and needful intervention.
Various strands of economic- literature highlight different aspects of the multifaceted 
problem of illicit firm behaiior. A vast literature in industrial organization deals with market 
¡xjwer, and what firms do to procure it, either by teaming up with their competitors (in the 
form of mergers, cartels, or tacit collusion) or by squeezing them out of the market (e.g. 
tlirongh exclusive defiling contracts, predatory pricing, or foreclosure).
Market power is problematic whenever it discourages consumption and/or leads to inef­
ficient production. Apart from such deadweight losses, market power can raise distributive 
concerns: higher profits for firms have their comiterpart in lower consumer welfare.
nw w m uim n iiHHMnMNHmiMi.KmiMinrin
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Chapters 1 and 2 of tliis thesis want to contribute to tills literature. Chapter 1 deals 
with ” tacit collusion” , i.e. the silent coordination of price setting among firms. Chapter 2 
addresses exclusionary behavior, i.e. a dominant firm engaging in practices which axe aimed 
at deterring entry by a more efficient firm.
Finally, Chapter 3 speaks to the literature on shadow-economic activities, i.e. economic 
activities which are concealed from public authorities to avoid the payment o f taxes and 
social security contributions, and to avoid compliance with certain legal standards (e.g. 
labor market regulations, trade licenses).
The shadow economy raises two major concerns: First, undeclared economic activities 
reduce the tax base, which undermines the financing of public goods iuid social protection. 
If tiie government reacts to the erosion o f the tax base by raising tax rates even further, the 
economy can get trapped in a vicious circle.
Second, firms operating in the underground economy generally do not have access to 
public contract-enforcement institutions and to credit markets; thus, these firms tend to 
be confined to inefficient small-scale operation, with adverse consequences for aggregate 
productivity growth.
The three chapters of this thesis are self-contained and can be read independently. In 
what fallows, I will briefly describe the central research question and the main contribution 
of each o f these chapters.
C hapter 1  analyzes the mechanisms at work when firms try to weaken competition by 
tacitly coordinating prices in an oligopolistic market. A key assumption in many studies o f
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tacit collusion is tliat firms can perfectly monitor each other. However, the fact that there 
are indeed industries where, because of prevailing business practices, firms are not able to 
observe their rivals’ behavior directly, challenged economic theory to shed light on the crucial 
role of information in sustaining tacit collusion (Stigler (1901), (heen and Porter (1981)).
The conventional wisdom based on tliis literature is that ’’more information is always 
better than less” . But then, we may wonder why firms in such markets do not try to 
improve transparency in one way or another. Obviously, there arc many obstacles (legal and 
incentive-wise) to direct information excliange among firms, but firms might for instance 
jointly set up an independent information agency at the beginning of the game wliicli has 
the only purpose of collecting and disseminating information about pricing behavior. Ex 
ante, every firm should agree to create such an agency, knowing that it will reduce ex-post 
incentives to deviate, thus helping to sustain the collusive outcome.
However, there are only few practical examples of such ’’ information agencies” , and most 
of them are not even sponsored by the firms. I will claim that there might be good reasons 
for this apparent lack of such agencies: Even if such mi agency was costless mid provided 
reliable (though imperfect) information alxnit comiietitors’ Ixiiavior, its presence may not 
facilitate collusion in any way.
In more teclmical terms, I aualj'ze the scope for tacit collusion when the outcome itself 
is not publicly observable, but instead firms directly receive noisy public signals about the 
actions played. At first sight, it may seem that the better firms can observe each others’ 
pricing beharior, the more likely it is that tacit collusion can be sustained. I find that tliis
mm
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is indeed true if the probability of low-demand states is high.
On the other hand (and tliis may come as a smprise), if the probability o f negative 
demand shocks is low, there are actually cases where tacit collusion will be more difficult to 
sustain (in the sense that firms wall have to be more patient) than without any information 
on rivals’ behavior. The reason is that in order to take advantage of the information that 
becomes available, firms need to soften the tlireat of punisliment, which may increase the 
temptation to undercut the rival, thus creating severe incentive problems.
Hence, the effects of increased observability on the industry under consideration are 
ambiguous. My central result is therefore that if, for a given discount factor, collusion would 
be sustainable without signals but not when signals are taken into accoimt, then firms are 
better off if they ignore the signals and punish whenever one firm has zero profits.
C liapter 2 (co-authored with Massimo Motta) deals with rebates, i.e. discounts ap­
plicable where a customer exceeds a specified target for salt's in a defined period. Such 
discounts have been suspected by competition authorities o f helping dominant firms to arti­
ficially foreclose business opportunities for their competitors (see Gysclcn, 2003). However, 
the economic, rationale underlying such practices is not yet well understood.
The purpose of Chapter 2 is to explore the exclusionary ¡x>tentinl of rebate arrangements 
in the presence o f asymmetric buyers and network externalities. Our work is closely related 
to the literature on anticomixïtitive effects of discriminatory pricing by limes and Sexton 
(1993, 1991), and on exclusion through exclusive dealing contracts by Segal and Whinston 
(2000).
1xi
We consider an industry composed of an incumbent firm and an entrant, both supplying 
a network good, where the entrant has lower marginal cost o f production than the incumbent. 
The good is sold to in+1 different buyers, m identical small buyers and 1 large buyer.
For buyers to derive ]>ositive utility from consmning a Finn’s network good, tliis network 
must reach a certain minimum size, where a firm’s network size is the sum of all sales that 
tins fmn makes. We assmne that the incumbent disposes of an installed base, and so its 
network has readied tliis ininimmn size alretvdy, while the entrant’s network has size1 zero at 
the outset. In order to reach the minimum size, the entrant has to attract the large buyer 
plus at least one small buyer.
The central result of tliis chapter is that rebates may allow the ineiunbent to break entry 
equilibria where the incumbent could not have done so under miiform flat prices. For a wide 
range of parameter values, only the iniscoordination equilibrium survive« when rebates can 
l>e used. Exclusion is more likely to be feasible if the efficiency gap lx;tween the twro firms is 
not tcx> wide.
The reason is that the inciunbent has an installed base that prorides its network with the 
minimum size, so it can serve all buyers wiio wTant to buy from it, no matter how many (or 
how few) they are, wiiile the entrant can only serve its buyers if it attracts at the least large 
buyer plus one small buyer. Thus, if the large buyer decides to patronize the inciunbent, 
then the small buyers have no other dioice than to buy from the inciunbent as well, and 
vice versa: If the small buyers prefer to buy from the inciunbent, then the large buyer will 
be forced to do so as well, even if he ¡Hefei's to buy from the entrant. Nowr, rebates allow'
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the incwnlxmt to play the two groups o f buyers off against each other, which prevents them  
from coordinating on the more efficient supplier, and so entry will fail.
C liapter 3 addresses the shadow economy, i.e. economic activities which are concealed 
from public authorities to avoid the payment of taxes and social security contributions, 
and to avoid compliance with certain legal standards (e.g. labor market regulations, trade 
licenses). Unrej>orted activities are a universal feature o f economic life, and assume con­
siderable proportions even in the industrialized world, where they arc estimated to range 
between 8 and as much as 28 percent of official GDP.
It has been observed that the size of the underground economy (as a fraction of overall 
economic activity) varies considerably across countries, which has motivated an extensive 
literature investigating the canses of this particular form of regulation failure: The burden 
of taxes and social security contributions, extensive labor market regulation, as well as 
ineffective law enforcement and corruption, have Ixen discussed at length to explain cross­
country variations (see Sdineider/Enste (2000), Jolurson et al (1908), Lemicux et al (1991)).
Wliile acknowledging that all of these factors do play an important role in determining 
the size of the undergroimd economy, there are good reasons to believe that tliis list is not 
exhaustive. In particular, these factors do not explain the substantial variations in the share 
of the underground economy that have been observed not only across countries, but even 
within a single country, i.e. within the same legal and institutional framework. A wcll- 
doemnented example is the South of Italy, where the share of the undergroimd economy is 
twice the national average (Do Itita/Camusi (2003)).
tmm
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In tliis chapter, I present a novel rationale for the variations in the share of the un­
derground economy vliich can explain both inter-regional and inter-sec toral differences and 
sheds new light on cross-country evidence: the intensity o f market comjxitition among firms.
The reasoning is as follows: A firm which operates in the underground economy can buy 
its inputs, in particular labor, at a lower price (by avoiding pajToll taxes, not complying with 
safety and health standards, etc.), thereby reducing its variable cost relative to a firm in the 
official economy. The underground firm can pass on its savings to consumers, which will 
reduce market prices, and as a result its competitors’ profits fall. Thus, the official firm is 
put at a competitive disadvantage, and may have to choose between operating underground 
as well, or going out of business. The keener is comj>etition, the higher is the pressure to 
reduce costs, and the more likely are underground activities to spread in the industry.
I present cross-country evidence on the impact of entry and competition characteristics on 
the size of the underground ec onomy in various OECD, transition and developing countries. 
While the reliability of data on the underground sector is a controversial issue, my regression 
results indicate that more intense competition is indeed correlated with a higher incidence 
of shadow-economic activity, thus lending sup]X)rt to my model predictions.
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Chapter 1
Can Firms Make Themselves Better 
off by Ignoring Information on Their
Competitors?
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Introduction
One of the major achievements o f the theory of inclnstrial organization has been to 
uncover the mechanisms at work when firms tty to outflank competition by tacitly colluding 
in an oligopolistic market. Today, the factors that facilitate such tacit collusion, like high 
concentration, firm symmetry, high frequency of orders, and multi-market contacts, are well- 
understood.
A key assumption in most of these analyst« is that firms can perfectly monitor each other. 
However, the fact that there are indeed industries where, because of prevailing business 
practices, firms are not able to observe their rivals’ behavior directly, challenged economic 
theory to shed light on the crucial role o f information in sustaining tacit collusion.
hi Ins seminal j>aper of 19G1, Stigler first analyzed the case of a Ilertrand-typc oligopoly
1
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INTRODUCTION 2
with stochastic demand where each firm ’s prices are unolpservable to its competitors (i.e. 
each firm can grant secret price cuts to its customers). Stigler (1964) concluded that without 
observability o f prices, collusion will in general be more difficult to sustain, but can still arise 
if the cartel provides the right incentives.
Following Stigler’s (1961) approach, Green and Porter (1981) developed their model to  
show that if firms choose quantities (rather than prices) and can only observe the prevailing 
market price (but not firm-sjxxific or industry supply), then episodes of lùgli industry output 
(above the collusive level) need not be the result of a collapse of collusion, but should rather 
be interpreted as part of the firms’ equilibrium strategies to ensure tacit collusion in a non- 
cooperative framework.
Stigler’s (1961) and Green-Porter’s (1984) work inspired a growing literature on firm 
behavior under non-oljservability of competitors’ actions. In ¡particular, Abreu, Pearce and 
Stacchetti (1986) analyzed optimal punishment strategies in oligopolies with imperfect mon­
itoring, shoving that every symmetric sequential equilibrium payoff in the Green-Por ter  
model can be supported by sequential equilibria having an extremely simple intertemporal 
structure.
Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994) identify conditions for the folk theorem to apply 
in repeated games in winch players observe a public outcome (e.g. the market ¡price in 
the context of the Green-Porter model) that imperfectly signals the (unobservable) actions 
¡played (e.g. the quantities set by individual firms).1
1Not-e that it is crucial that the signal be publicly observable, because the signal serves two distinct 
purposes here: on the one hand, it provides information to the agents (which could be achieved by a private 
signal as well), but on the other hand, it also allows firms to coordinate their behavior on the signal's
IMHI tKNfflBUnil JUUWUWPUWPW
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The conventional wisdom based on this literature is tliat ’’more information is always 
better than less” . But then, we may wonder why firms in such markets do not try to 
improve transparency in one way or another. Obviously, there are many obstacles (legal and 
incentive-wise) to direct information exchange among firms, but firms might for instance 
jointly set up an independent information agency at the loginning of the game which has 
the only purpose of collecting and disseminating information about pricing behavior. Ex 
ante, even- firm should agree to create such an agency, knowing tliat it will reduce cx-post 
incentives to deviate, thus helping to sustain the collusive outcome.
However, as we will see soon, there are only few practical examples o f such ’’ information 
agencies” , and most of them are not even sponsored by the firms. I will argue that there 
might be good reasons for tliis apparent lack of such agencies. My claim is that even if 
such an agency was costless and provided reliable (though imperfect) information about 
comiietitors’ behavior, its presence may not facilitate collusion in any way.
In more technical terms, the purpose of tliis chapter Is to analyze the scope for tacit 
collusion when the outcome itself is not publicly observable, but instead firms directly receive 
public signals about the actions played. Tliis model siiecification seems more appropriate 
for the type of industry that we are interested in here, namely a market where firms set 
prices (rather than quantities), and neither prices nor aggregate market demand are publicly 
disenable. Moreover, there is no voluntary information exchange between firms (let alone 
explicit agreements on behavior), but firms still tend to have at least partial insight into
realizations (which is not the case for a (noisy) private signal, as then tlie state of the world will no longer 
be common knowledge among the agents, making it difficult or even impossible to coordinate their actions).
aINTRODUCTION 4
their competitors’ behavior.
Tliis information Incomes available without any effort on the firm’s part. Examples for 
such ”exogenously provided” information include:
• Cartels: The idea that cartels would act as ’’ policemen” enforcing collusive outcomes 
is already highlighted in Stigler (1964). One case in point would be the Joint Executive 
Committee as analyzed by Porter (1983), which primarily gathered quantity and price 
information in an attempt to identify deviations by members. However, tliis evidence 
dates from a period before the Sherman Act was passed; today, cartels fire outlawed 
in most countries, and hence current examples are rare.
• Governmental or Consumer Information publications: Government authorities may 
decide to publish contract sjxxifications or invoice prices in an attempt to ’’make the 
market more transparent” . Examples arc US railroad grain rates in the 1980’s (sec 
Fuller, Ruppel and Bessler (1990), Ruppel and Fuller (1992), and Schmitz and Puller 
(1995)) and the Danish ready-mixed concrete market in the early 1990’s (see Albmk, 
Mollgaard and Ovcrgaard (1997)). Most of the time, however, tliis tyjxi of information 
will Ire provided by consumer protection agencies wiiich compare ¡nice offers for many 
industries and make tliis information available to the general public.2
• New trading technologies: The internet is thought of having changed the informational 
structure and trading practices in many markets (see for instance, Klemperer (2000) 
on internet sales versus dealer sales o f cars).
2see Mollgaard and Ovcrgaard (2000), p. 3 f., for examples including telephone services, health and car 
insurance, pension schemes, home-theater hardware etc.
■MiiKiwmuuMuiiuunnfiPWBBBBnnr ■m
INTRODUCTION 5
Note that in the examples given above, the price information becomes publicly observable, 
i.e. each firm in the industry now has some idea about the (previously unobservable) decisions 
taken by its competitors.
In the following, we will try to understand how such an industry compares to one in 
which prices are completely unobservable. At first sight, it may seem that the case of partial 
observability is just an in-between case which probably shares its properties with the two 
polar cases o f perfect observability and complete unobservability.
However, I will sliowr that tins is not necessarily the case: in particular, there is no 
monotonic” relationship l>etw'een the degree of observability and the sustainability o f tacit 
collusion. Instead, my results point to the fact that a model o f partial observability will gen­
erally have very idiosyncratic features that are not trivially' implied byr the wrell-understood 
models of perfect observability' and complete unobservability'.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 1 introduces the model; in Section 1, I 
compare my model to the Grccn-Portcr one in terms of sustainability' of collusion, length of 
punislimcnt and value of collusion. Finally', I discuss some policy implications in Section 1 
and conclude in Section 1.
Rem ark
An obvious alternative to having information being supplied exogenously' w ould be to let 
the firms themselves unilaterally' ’’ spy'” on each other. The following examples will illustrate 
tins ¡joint:
• Poaching competitors' tuorkers: in each company', there are key' workers who have sensi-
INTRODUCTION 6
tive information about this company (accountants, controllers, etc.). Competitors can 
try to make very attractive offers to these worker's (in terms of wages, promotion etc.) 
if these workers will in turn provide the relevant information to their new employer.
• Corruption: there are government authorities who have suj>erior information comijared 
to the market participants (e.g. tax authorities, competition authorities); firms can 
try to bribe them to receive information about their competitors.3
• Mergers: a firm can merge with or buy other firms that have relevant information about 
comi>otitors. Such firms can be e.g. upstream suppliers o f competitors or downstream 
distributors. Alternatively, suppose there is a call for tenders regarding sliartis o f 
a firm’s competitor. Then, the firm might not even be interested in buying these 
shares, but could still participate in the tendering procedure in order to obtain access 
to confidential documents which will be distributed to potential buyers during the 
tender.
Nowr, one would expect that if information is obtained through unilateral efforts, the 
insights would be private knowiedge o f the ’’spying” firm (in particular, if there is room for 
mistakes or ambiguities in what the "spying” firm can observe, then the firm that was ’’spied 
on” would not knowr what conclusions its rival arrived at). Unfortunately, the proixrties o f 
repeated games with imperfect monitoring and privately observed signals are not yet wrell
understood; one way to resolve the coordination problem in such a model is to allow for
3For an insightful analysis of the relationship between oligopoly and corruption, see Ades and Di Telia 
(1999)
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communication between players, as shown in Kandori and Matsushima (1098) and Compte 
(1998).
As was mentioned above, tliis chapter mainly focuses on tacit collusion, winch excludes
explicit communication and coordination between firms. Hence, I will restrict attention to
the case of public signais (i.e. the first type of information flowrs as illustrated above) and
defer the case of private signals for future research.
The model
In the exposition of the model, I will closely follow Tirole’s 1988 treatment of the price­
setting variant of Green-Porterys model in terms of notation and line of reasoning. I consider 
an infinitely repeated duopoly game where twro symmetric firms, Si and Sj, produce ix'riect 
substitutes at constant marginal cost c. The firms choose prices every period, and consumers 
can perfectly observe these prices so that they will all buy from the low-price firm. The latter 
assumption may seem somewhat strong, given that firms cannot observe each other’s prices. 
IIowrevcr, it will approximately hold in situations where the buyers are large firms searching 
the market for potential input providers, or private households considering an important 
purchase (like a car, a home, a holiday trip) and shopping around for the best offer.4
Demand for the product Is stochastic; with probability p/, demand will Ije zero in a
4Recently, a new strand of literature evolved, studying oligopolistic markets where consumers can only 
imperfectly observe sellers’ prices. One interesting result of this work is that increasing market transparency 
may not be unambiguously beneficial for consumers (see Nilsson (1990) for a search cost approach, Mollgaard 
and Overgaard (2000) and (2001), and Schultz (2001) for a product-differentiation approach, and Klemperer 
(2000) for an auction-theoretic approach). Assuming instead perfect observability for buyers has its analytical 
advantages, as it allows us to abstract from these issues on the consumer side of the market and focus solely 
on firm interaction.
THE MODEL 8
given period (” low-demand state” ), and with probability 1 — pi, demand will be positive 
(” liigh-deinand state” ). Realizations are assumed to be iid over time.
For the high-demand state, denote the monopoly (or collusive) price by pin and the per- 
period monopoly profits by IIm. I assume that demand is split if the two firms charge the 
same price. Tims, in a jxiriod o f high demand, each firm’s profit under collusion will be 
Ilm/2 . Next-jxiriod’s profits are diseoimted at rate <5.
If a firm dot's not sell auditing at some date, it does not knowr a priori wiiether this is 
due to a lowr realization o f demand or to Ins comi>etitor charging a lower price. Each firm 
can how-ever observe its own profits; thus, it is always common knowiedge that at least one 
firm realized zero profits (because then either demand is low, lienee the other firm realized 
zero profits as well, or the other firm undercut).5 6
Moreover (and this is where I depart from Grttn-Porter's model), I assmne that after 
each period, each firm nx*eives a (noisy) signal about Iris competitor’s pricing behavior in 
that period/1 These signals are iid over time and indei>cndent of the state of demand, and 
can be characterized as follows: In a fraction a* o f all cases where Sj behaved collusively 
(i.e. wiiere pj =  pm), firm S{ understands that its competitor, Sjt did not midercut (i.e. 
Si observes pj =  p7n correctly); however, in a fraction of 1 — a, of these cast«, Si receives 
a wrong signal, indicating that Sj defected (i.e. Si observes some pj < p™ when in fact 
Pj =  pm)- Analogously, in a fraction fS o f all cases where Sj undercuts, Si realizes tins
correctly, whereas in a fraction o f 1 — pi o f these cases, Si gets it wrong and thinks that low'
5This common knowiedge property will be crucial here, because, as we shall see soon, it allows firms to 
coordinate their punishment on profit realizations even though the latter are only privaUly observable.
6Assume for simplicity that there is no direct cost involved for the firms to obtain these signals.
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demand has been realized. By symmetry of the firms, we have a{ =  ctj and ft =  f t . The 
table below summarizes these properties.
\ <  Oi < 1
5 <  A  < 1
f t ’s signal: 
f t  did not defect
Si’s signal: 
f t  defected
f t  did not defect Of 1 ~ Cti
f t  defected 1 - f t A
I further assume that the realization of f t ’s signal is oliservable to ft and vice versa, and 
that tills is common knowledge as well.7 Again, this may seem like a strong assumption given 
that f t ’s prices themselves are not observable for ft , blit it is necessary for the coordination 
of punisliment among Finns.8 Moreover, if a Finn realizes profits IIm/ 2, tills implies that it 
can perfectly infer the other Firm’s behavior and vice versa. Then, it is common knowledge 
that demand was high and both firms cooperated, and so they will ignore their signals.
I will now analyze equilibria with the following strategies: There is a collusive phase and 
a punishment phase. The game starts in the collusive phase. Both finns charge pm until 
one firm makes zero profits and observes a signal indicating defection9 (recall that by the 
above assumptions, this event wrill be observed by both finns). The occurrence o f this event
triggers the punishment phase: both finns will charge c for exactly T  periods. If T  is finite,
' Hence, these signals are more similar to the publicly provided information described in the Introduction 
than to "spying" activities on the firm level.
?Recall that, otherwise, we would have to allow for communication (or some other coordination device) 
between them, which we want to exclude here as we are only interested in the scope for tacit collusion.
9This signal may be the firm's own signal or the competitor's signal. Thus, punishment is triggered if at 
least one firm receives a signal indicating defection.
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then after T  periods both firms will revert to the collusive phase and cliarge pm again until 
the next punislmient phase is triggered.
Note that we can allow for alternative definitions of the event that triggers punishment 
(e.g. ” if exactly one firm receives a signal...” ); in this case the definitions o f a  (equation 
(1.1)) and ¡3 (expiation (1.4)) need to be changed accordingly.10 Observe also that the Green- 
Porter model corresponds to the case where behavior is not conditioned on signals at all, i.c. 
punislmient is always triggered whenever zero profits are realized, even in the ease where 
none o f the firms receive a signal indicating defection.
Now, let the probability that punislunent wall be triggered if demand was low' and nolxxly 
defected be denoted by 1 — a. If the strategy is such that punislmient will be triggered 
whenever at least one; firm receives a signal indicating defection, then 1 — a corresponds to
1 — a =  a* (1 -  Oj) +  (1 — ftt) Qj + (1 — a*) (1 -  Qj) =  1 -  af
and hence
a =  ctiCij =  a f (1.1)
Thus, the expected discounted present value of the collusive phase is:11
v + =  (1 -  Pl) (nm/2 + 6V+) + Pla  (¿y+) + Pi (1 -  a ) (6V~) (1.2)
This equation lias the following interpretation: under collusion, the high-demand state
will be realized with probability 1 — pi, each firm will make profits of IIm/2 in tliis period,
10Note, however, that punishing only when both firms get a negative signal will not allow to sustain 
collusion (just observe that in the case of perfect observability, a firm considering unilateral deviation will 
not face any threat of punishment!)
11 compare equation (1.2) to the analogous one in the Green-Porter model:
P*- =  (1 — pd (1 1 * 7 2  +  6V’ "r) +pi6V~y i.e. there is no chance that, the collusive phase continues once low 
demand lias been realized.
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and the game will be in the collusive phase next period as well; with probability pi, the low 
state of demand will be realized, and both firms make zero profits.
However, in my model the realization of low demand does not automatically trigger 
the punishment phase; instead, with probability a, each firm will receive the correct signal 
indicating that the rival did not undercut, and hence the collusive phase will continue. Still, 
with probability 1 — q , at least one firm will receive the (wrrong) signal that the competitor 
defected, and consequently the punislmient phase starts.
The punislunent phase lasts for T  periods, after wrhich both firms return to collusive 
behavior. During the punishment phase, both firms make zero per-period profits. Hence, 
the expected discounted present value o f the punishment phase is:12
v ~  =  6r V+ (1.3)
Suppose now that one firm defects while the other continues to charge pm. Then, if 
punishment will be triggered with the probability ¡3 that at least one firm receives a signal 
indicating defection, ¡3 is defined by:
¡3 = Attt + A (1 -  t*i) + (1 -  A) (1 -  fti) (1-4)
=  1 -  a,■ +  OLiPi
Now, for collusive behavior to be sustainable in this non-cooperative framework, defection 
must be less profitable than collusion; hence, the following incentive constraint (IC) must
12 note that this is the same as in the Green-Porter model
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12
V + >  (1 -  Pl) U m +  (1 -  /?) ( 6 V + )  +  p (1.5)
The incentive constraint says that the value of collusion (V +) must be higher than the 
value of defection. The latter is composed o f the one-period profit from undercutting (which 
is the entire monopoly profit, IT” , with probability 1 — pi, and zero with probability pi) and 
the value o f next period (which is 6V+ if  the game remains in the collusive phase, and 6V~ 
if punisliment is triggered). If this constraint holds, no firm will have an incentive to defect 
(i.e. undercut the competitor during a collusive phase).
Now, we can rewrite equations (1.2) and (1.3) to obtain:
V + = ( i - p , ) i r y 2
l -  6(1 -  pi T pict) -  ¿r+1 (1 — a) pi
(1.6)
and
V~ =
6T ( 1 - pt) Hm/2
(1.7)1 — <5 (1 — pi +Pfft) — 6T+l (1 — a) Pi 
Rearranging the incentive constraint, (1.5), using equations (1.6) and (1.7), we obtain 
the incentive constraint in terms of parameters ft, /?, <5, and pp
1 +  5 ( 1 - 0 -  2p,a) < 2 6 ( 1 -  pi) +  <5r+1 [(1 -  a ) 2p, -  0\
The analogous condition in the Green-Porter model is:
1 < 2<5 (1 -  p,) +  ST+l (2p, -  1)
(1.8)
(1.9)
1Jcompare again to the Green-Porter model where the incentive constraint reads:
V *  > (1 — p/)!!™ +  lienee, retaliation was certain to occur after any defection, which is no longer
the case in our model cither.
! j! 11 I ' ll [i j ?J>! ?! I.U .., I'!" 1.'
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Hence, our first observation is that the Green-Porter model corresponds exactly to my model 
for parameter Milues a =  0 and ft =  1 , for which equations (1.2) and (1.3) as well as the 
incentive constraint (1 .8) will be exactlj7 equivalent to the Green-Porter framework.
Now, 6Vs program can be stated as:
max V + s.t. the IC (1 .8) holds (1-10)
We see from equation (1.6) that V + is decreasing in T , meaning that the longer the 
punishment pliascs, the smaller the value for Si. Hence, STs program is solved by finding 
the lowest T  that just satisfies the IC, condition (1-8), provided such a T exists. This optimal 
length of punislnnent will be denoted in the following.
Comparison to the Green-Porter model 
The sustainability of collusion
The first question wTe may want to ask is: will tacit collusion be more easy or more 
difficult to sustain in tliis model of partial observability coinjjared to the standard Green- 
Porter model?
3o answer tliis question, I will first compare the parameter restrictions that need to hold 
to guarantee sustainability under the most severe tlireat possible, i.e. given T =  oo. An 
’’ educated guess” would probably be that the better firms can observe each others’ pricing 
behavior, the more likely it is that collusion can be sustained. Hence, it may come as a 
surprise that tills is not always the case, as I will show7 in the following.
ICOMPARISON TO THE GREEN-PORTER MODEL
For T ~  oc, the incentive constraint in the Green-Porter model reduces to:
6 >
2(1 ~Pi)
14
(1.11)
If this inequality is satisfied, then there exists a T,ypt > 0 (finite or infinite) such that collusion 
can be sustained. A  natural restriction on 6, the discount factor, is: 6 < 1. Hence, condition 
(1.11) can only hold for values o f pi satisfying
Pi <  -  y 2
P rop osition  1 Increased observability of pricing behavior allows for tacit collusion to be po­
tentially sustainable even forpi >  i.e. in cases where collusion would have been impossible 
in the Green-Porter framework.
P roof: From the incentive constraint, (1.8), we can derive the counterpart to condition 
(1 .11 ) in our framework:
6 >
2 (1 -  pi) -  1 -1- ¡3 +  2 api (1.12)
For this inequality to be consistent with 6 <  1, we need to impose
Pt < ô
1 P
21 - a (1.13)
Note that if y—  >  1, then condition (1.13) (which is necessary, but not sufficient for sustain­
ability of collusion) is satisfied even for pi >  Hence, collusion in our model is potentially 
sustainable for any value o f pi (not just for pj <  |), provided the associated a is high enough. 
□
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Note also that for the case of a and ¡3 as defined in (1.1) and (1.4), we can never have 
< 1, as this would imply 3l <  1 — a,, which cannot be the case since, by assumption, 
and a, >  1. Thus, all values o f pi that are consistent with collusion in the Grecn- 
Porter model will always be consistent with collusion for our tvpe of strategies as well.
Next, suppose collusion is potentially sustainable in both models. Then, we may wonder 
if the minimum discount factor <5 required to sustain collusion is smaller or liighcr in our 
model than in the Green-Porter framework. Now, we find tliat both cases are possible.
P roposition  2 Even if prices are partially observable, collusion may be more difficult to 
sustain than in Green-Porter's model of complete unobscrvability in the sense that the critical 
discount factor will be higher.
P roof: If the denominator in (1.12) is smaller than the denominator in (1.11), then the 
minimum value o f 6 required to ensure sustainability of collusion is higher in our model than 
in the Green-Porter model, i.e. collusion will be more difficult to sustain. In ¡>articular, we 
have 2(1 — pi) — 1 +  /? +  2api < 2(1 — pi) whenever
Pi < y
11 - P
2 a (1-14)
Note that condition (1.14) is more likely to be satisfied the lower a is.1'1 □
This result qualifies our ” educated guess” made above: increased observability does not 
facilitate tacit collusion in a monotonic way. 14
14Note that this result is in some sense an interesting parallel to Overgaard and Mollgaard (2000): in their 
model, where prices are fully observable by firms but not by consumers, increasing market transparency (i.e. 
observability of prices by consumers) can actually facilitate collusion if the number of firms in the market is 
small (contradicting the conventional consumer protection view that transparency will always be beneficial 
for consumers); in our model, we see that given fully informed consumers, there is a range o f cases where 
increasing observability of prices by firms may in fact make collusion 77107T difficult to sustain.
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Figure (1.1) illustrates Propositions 1 and 2 graphically for the case where punishment 
is triggered if at least one signal indicating defection is observed (Le. a and (3 are defined 
according to equations (1.1) and (1. 1)), and, moreover, we have that a* =  /?,. The x-axis 
shows a ,, the v-axis shows p/. Now, the white area represents the region where collusion is
Figure 1.1: Absolute and Relative Sustainability o f Collusion
not sustainable at all, wliile the hatched area depicts condition (1.13), i.e. the range of values 
of pi that are consistent with collusion. Note that for a non-informative signal (i.e. a t = L), 
the relevant interval is pi 6 [0, , i.e. coincides with what the corresponding interval in the
Green-Porter model is, wliile for any informative signal, tins interval will be larger, meaning 
that the potential for collusion expands as the signal’s accuracy improves. The grey triangle 
in Figure (1-1) illustrates condition (1.14), i.e. the area for which collusion is more difficult 
to sustain in our model than in Green-Porter's model.
Hence, we should expect that whenever, for a given <5, collusion would be sustainable
vtmmmimtKmm
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in Green-Porter but not if strategies are conditioned on the signals, then, for reasons of 
efficiency, firms will prefer to behave a la Green-Porter (rather than, say, a la Bertrand, 
which is of course still a feasible equilibrium as well).35 In such a case, it would be optimal 
for firms to deliberately ignore signals that become available to them for free.
Lemma 3 Let collusion be sustainable under Green-Porter strategies, i.e. condition (1.9) 
is satisfied. Then, the Green-Porter strategies (i.e. start punishment whenever one Jinn 
has zero profits, independently of any signed) arc still feasible equilibria even if signals arc 
present.
P roof: see Appendix A
P roposition  4 If, fo r  a given 6, collusion were sustainable in Green-Porter but not when 
signals arc taken into account, then firms arc better off if they punish whenever one firm has 
zero profits, no matter what the signals indicate about the competitors' behavior.
P roof: If r
___________ 1___________  s >  1
2 (1 -  Pi) -  1 +  P  +  2apt >  ~  2 (1 -  p t)
(which can be the case whenever condition (1.14) is satisfied), then it follows from Proposition 
1 that collusion is sustainable in the Green-Porter framework but not in ours. Thus, behaving 
as in Green-Porter is not only feasible (as shown in Lemma 3), but also clearly more beneficial 
for firms. □ 15
15In section 1. we will show that if both Green-Port-er and conditioning on signals are feasible equilibria, 
then t he latter are clearly superior in terms of payoffs.
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We can therefore conclude that even if signals are rather reliable and strategies sophisti­
cated, firms may not be able to improve oil the expected payoffs that Green-Porter strategies 
would already yield. Tliis last result highlights the fact that the Green-Port e r equilibrium is 
amazingly efficient, considering how little firms know about each other and how severe their 
inference problem therefore is.
Discussion
For an economic interpretation of Proixisition 2, let us reconsider our incentive constraint 
(condition (1.5)): W hen T =  oo (i.e. the length of punishment is infinite), then the value 
o f the punislmient phase is zero (sec equation (1.3)). Hence, the incentive constraint, (1.5), 
reduces to:
V + , > ( i - f t ) i r  +  ( i - / 9 ) ( t f v ' +)
ComjKired to the corresponding IC in the Green-Porter model, i.e.
(1.1S)
V'+ L „  > ( 1 - B ) i r
we see that conditioning punislmient on the signals has two effects on condition (1.15). First 
o f all, observability enters directly on the right-liand side o f the inequality through 1 — /?, 
thus adding a strictly positive temi to the value of defection (imlcss ¡3 — 1). If 1 — ¡3 > 0, 
this means that a firm winch undercuts lias a chance to get away with it (which is not the 
case in the Green-Porter model), and so the temptation to defect increases.
However, the value of collusion, l / f , is now a function of a (compare with equation
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(1.6)). In particular, we haw that
dV +
> 0 for any T  > 0 (1.16)
i.e. the value of collusion is in fact increasing in the degree of observability,16 because the 
probability that ” false alarm” will trigger a price war after a collusive period decreases, 
thus making it less attractive to defect. It depends on the parameter values how these two 
contrary effects o f observability on the incentive constraint will finally play out, and so it is 
not surprising that there are instances where the net effect is one of increased temptation, 
thus making it harder or even impossible to sustain collusion.
Inspection of Figure (1.1) as well as condition (1.12) shows that the less informative the 
signal and the lower the probability o f a demand shock, the higher the critical 6 must be 
(relative to the one in Green-Porter) to sustain collusion, i.e. firms must be more patient 
to take advantage o f the signals. The imjxirtance o f signal accuracy for sustainability has 
already been stressed: accuracy increases both the value o f collusion and the probability of 
punishment after defection, thus relaxing the IC.
It seems more surprising that even if the signal is highly accurate, still collusion may 
be more difficult to sustain if the probability of demand shocks is low. We have seen in 
condition 1.13 that a high pi generally discourages collusion, but relative to Green-Porter, 
a high pi will actually facilitate collusion. The reason is that the benefit of using signals 
derives precisely from being able to tell apart demand shocks from undercutting. Now, if 
such demand shocks are very rare, then the losses due to "false alarm” are not too high
16 Note that this result holds in general, i.e. for any given T >  0, not just for T  =  oo.
COMPARISON TO THE GREEN-PORTER MODEL 20
anyway, and so the IC (1.5) is actually not relaxed fay the positive impact of a on V +, but 
instead tightened by the chance (no matter how small) of getting away with defection.
Length of punishment and value of collusion
Suppose now that collusion is sustainable both under our specification and in the Green- 
Porter framework. Then, it would be interesting to know how the outcome in our model 
compares to the one o f Green-Porter imder the same set of parameters [<5,pj]. In particular, 
we would like to analyze how the optimal length o f punishment evolves as observability 
improves, and how, given the optimal length of punishment, the value of collusion is affected 
by partial observability.
P rop osition  5 The optimal length of punishment is decreasing both in a and in (3. When­
ever collusion is more difficult (more easy) to sustain under partial observability, the corre­
sponding length o f punishment will be greater (smaller) than in the Green-Porter model.
P roo f: see Appendix A
We conclude that in our model, price wars will be less frequent than in the Green-Porter 
model, but depending on the level of observability, they may last longer or shorter.
Figure (1.2) exemplifies the result o f Proposition 5 for the case of a  and (3 as defined 
in (1.1) and (1.4), a* =  $  and parameter values 6 =  0.9 and pi =0.3. The thin horizontal 
fine at T  =  3.088 7 represents the optimal length for the Green-Porter model, whereas the 
thick curve shows the optimal lengths for the various values o f cp. Observe that intersection
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occurs at a* =  =  0.625, i.e. at the level of at where the minimum <5 required to sustain
collusion is exactly the same in our model as in the Green-Porter model. Now, recall that
Figure 1.2: Optimal length of pmiisliment
I have already alluded to the gains of increased oljservability in tenas of value of collusion 
several times (see, e.g., Section 1). So far, however, I only showed that > 0 for some 
T  >  0, sec (1.16). Hence, we still need to analyze liow the value o f collusion as a function 
o f a and ft compares to V + in the Green-Porter model if we take optimal punishment into 
accomit.
P rop osition  G Let colhision be sustainable in both models. Proxnded that the firms use 
optimal punishment under both settings, the firms will be better off in our model than in the 
Green-Porter framework whenever > 1 .
P roof: First, note that V+ (T*) in Green-Porter is (weakly) smaller than V + (T**) in 
( l - p , ) i r / 2  ___________ ( l - p , ) I I m/2___________
1 -  d (1 -  pi) -  M'+'pi -  1 — b (1 -  pi +  pia) — bT" +l (1 -  a) pi
our model:
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can be rearranged to have
ST' < 6 T"  +  a ( l - 6 r " )
Inserting for T** and T* and simplifying, we find that the above inequality reduces to
wliich completes the proof.17 □
Figure (1.3) illustrates this fact for the same parameters that were used in Figure (1 .2 ), 
8 =  0.9 and pi ~  0.3 , using the values o f T** and T* miderlying Figiue (1.2) to compute 
the relevant values o f collusion. Again, the thin horizontal line represents V + for the Green- 
Porter case, whereas the thick curve shows V + for oiu model as a* varies. The values on  
the y-axis are in terms of Hm/2. Note that for a mid 8  as defined by equations (1.1) and
7 
6
X- 5 
4
3 °-5 °'6 degree of observability 09
Figiue 1.3: Value o f Collusion
' Note that this condition is identical to the one derived in Proposition 1. and so all comments regarding 
condition (1.13) apply here as well, in particular that condition (1.13) will be satisfied for every reasonable 
specification of a and >3.
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(1.4), and a* =  A  — p  the values o f collusion in both models will always be exactly the 
same, which means that with a noil-informative signal, firms can never do better than they 
do in the Green-Porter model of complete unobservability. The difference between the two 
curves represents the value o f the signal for the firms.
Welfare Implications
It is evident that, in terms of total and consumer welfare, the equilibria of the Gnxn- 
Porter model are superior to the models of perfect observability, because collusive monojx)ly 
pricing will alternate with periods o f marginal-cost pricing. Hence, if firms hi an oligojxjly 
cannot observe each others’ pricing behavior, tliis is in fact beneficial for consumers.
Nowr, how does our model compare to the Green-Porter model in terms of consumer 
welfare? O f course, in the limiting case of a = ¡3 =  1, wre are in a situation o f perfect 
observability, and all results developed for this case apply. So let’s focus on cases of partial 
observability, i.e. a <  1 and/or ¡3 < 1 .
In Section 1, wre saw' that partial observability allows for collusion to be sustained in cases 
w'hcrc it would not have been sustainable under complete unobservability. Thus, ¡>artial 
observability is ¡xiteiitially harmful to consmners w'hen pi > p 18
For pi <  I showed that, whenever collusion is sustainable imder both types o f strate­
gies, then price warn will Ixi less frequent and firms’ expected profits w'ill be higher if they 
condition their behavior on signals (sex1 section (1)). Tims, in the presence of signals, a iS
iSNote. however, that collusion is less of a problem if pt is close to 1, because then, consumer demand is 
low and firms will make zero profits most of the time anyway, while collusion is an important issue if pi is 
low, meaning that consumer demand and potential welfare losses are high.
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new equilibrium may emerge which dominates both the Crccn-Portcr and the Bertrand 
equilibrium in terms of expected profits, and hence Is detrimental to consiuncr and tota l 
welfare.
Moreover, even if collusion is not sustainable when signals are taken into account, firm s 
may simply ignore the signals, thus attaining the same equilibrium that would have been 
feasible in the absence of signals.
To summarize, even though signals will not necessarily facilitate collusion, it is hard to  
imagine a situation where these signals could lead to a co lla te  of collusion which w ould 
otherwise have arisen.19 Hence, to be on the safe side, the competition policy authority 
should keep observability at the lowest possible level. Then, collusion will lx» most diflicidt 
to sustain (and least profitable) for any value of pi. One way to fight collusion is o f course to  
encourage entry into the industry, as tills will create severe incentive problems for all firms."0
Conclusion
I analyzed a symmetric Bertrand duopoly model with uncertain demand, where one 
firm’s prices are unobservable to its competitors, but firms receive (noisy) public signals
about their com petitor’s pricing behavior. At first sight, it may seem that the better firms 
can observe each others’ pricing behavior, the more likely it ls that tacit collusion can be *1
19Tlie only difficulty that the firms might face (in particular if signals become available which allow for a 
"new“ equilibrium to be sustained) is how to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium (in particular 
if that requires switching from a "historical" to a "new" equilibrium).
“°This is of course true for tacit collusion in general, with or without signals. However, the benefits o f the 
signals considered in this paper decrease dramatically as the number o f firms increases: just observe that- 
generalizing the definition of a (compare to (1.1)) will yield o (n) =  a ” , which rapidly converges to zero as
11 increases (unless o , =  1), implying that false alarm triggering a price war becomes more anil more likely 
the more firms are in the market.
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sustained. Comparing the equilibrium o f our model to the benchmark model o f Green-Porter, 
where pricing behavior is assumed to be completely unobservable, I first found indeed that 
increased observability allows for tacit collusion to be sustainable even if the probability of 
low-demand states is high, i.e. in cases where collusion would have been impossible in the 
Green-Porter framework.
On the other hand (anil this may come as a surprise), if the probability o f negative 
demand shocks is low, there are actually cases where tacit collusion will lie more difficult to 
sustain (in the sense that firms will have to be more patient) than in Green-Porter's model. 
The reason is that hi order to take advantage of the information that becomes available, firms 
need to soften the threat of pimislunent, which may increase the temptation to undercut the 
rival, thus creating severe incentive problems.
Hence, the effects of increased observability on the industry imder consideration are 
ambiguous. My central result is therefore that if, for a given <5, collusion would be sustainable 
hi Green-Porter but not when signals are taken into account, then firms are better off if they 
ignore the signals and punish whenever one firm has zero profits.
If tacit collusion is sustainable in both models, I foimd that the optimal length of pun- 
islnnent (i.e. the length of "price wars” ) is decreasing as observability increases, and will 
be higher (lower) tlian hi the Green-Porter framework if collusion is more difficult (easy) to 
sustain than in Green-Porter's model. In terms of expected profits, the equilibrium imder 
signaling always yields liigher ¡layoffs for the firms. Hence, from a welfare-analytical ¡xiint 
o f view, I conclude that the competition authority should keep observability at the lowest
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possible level to make collusion as difficult to sustain as jxxssible.
As far as empirical support for our model is concerned, it is hard to imagine how to  
derive testable implications and take them to the data, because some of the crucial variables 
in our model are unobservables. If at all, the model may lend itself to experimental analysis.
On the theoretical level, note that our framework was designed to analyze the m ain 
question as directly as possible, and hence it lacks some desirable features that would allow  
to address a broader scojje of issues. Possible extensions o f the model include:
• anah'zing the case where signals are private rather than public; This model specification 
would more appropriately describe what I mentioned in the Remark of the Introduction
as ’’spying on each other” ;
• allowing for such information acquisition to be costly for the firms, where this cost 
may increase with the signal’s degree o f precision, in order to obtain results alxmt the 
optimal level o f ’’market research” that firms will carry out (i.e. endogenize the level 
of observability) and about the impact of entry on these research efforts;
• allows for asymmetry of the quality o f signals between firms, to see if one firm’s signal 
acquisition activity creates positive/negative externalities on the other firm;
• allow' for a larger set of equilibrium strategies, varying in the way firms condition their
behavior on the signals.
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Appendix A: Proofs
P ro o f o f  P rop osition  5: P art 1: To check how T,ypt behaves as a  and (I vary, let’s 
analyze condition (1.8). Recall from the firm’s maximization problem, (1.10), that the 
smallest T  that satisfies (1.8) is the optimal length of punishment. Hence, let (1.8) hold 
with equality so that
1 +  5 ( 1 - / ? -  2Pla) -  25 (1 -  Pl) -  5r+1 [(1 -  a) 2Pl — /?]== 0
defines T<yi>i as a function of ft and ƒ?. Then, after solving for 7lopi explicitly and differentiating 
with respect to ft and ƒ?, \vc obtain (using Pi < \ and (1.13), wiiich insure sustainability of 
collusion in both models)
<97^  5T+1 -  8
dp ~  In (<5) V + ' [(1 -  a) 2Pl -  0\ < °
and
firpopt {ypyf*
— 2pi  ^ < 0
da dP
We see that the higher the probability that punislunent will be avoided if no defection 
occurred (i.e. the liigher ft), and the higher the probability that punislunent will indeed be 
triggered if defection occurred (i.e. the higher /3), the shorter the punislunent phase will be.
Part 2: Denote by T* the optimal length of punislunent in the Green-Porter model (i.e. 
the T  for wiiich condition (1.9) holds with equality), and by T** the corresponding variable 
in our model. Then, wc find that T w* >  T* implies that
^  1 1 - / ?
Pi <  o ---------2 ft
ilfitai if if - j if
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which corresponds exactly to condition (1.14). Recall that whenever condition (1.14) h old s, 
collusion Mill be more diilicnlt to sustain in a model of partial observability than in Green - 
Porter's model. □
P ro o f o f  Lem m a 3: Suppose firm j  follows the Green-Porter strategies even though 
signals are available. Then, we need to check if firm i has an incentive to deviate by con d i­
tioning its behavior on the signals instead.
Now, suppose firm i devised a strategy that differs from j ’s, and let us aualyze the tyi>c 
of deviations that might be profitable for i. Denote the deviating firm’s value o f collusion 
by V{+, its value of defection by and its value of punishment by V~. Then, we ca n  
characterize the possible deviations by the following tliree eases21:
Case (i): W ould firm i ever want to continue cooperation in a situation where j ’s strategy 
requires punishment (e.g. if zero profits were realized but both signals indicate that n o 
defection occurred)? The answer Is no: if firm j  sets pj =  c, then it is rational for firm i to  
set pi =  c as well (even though any Pi >  c would o f course be a best reply as well).
Case (ii): W ould firm i ever want to punish in a situation where j ’s strategy requires 
continuation o f (or return to) cooperation? Again, the answer is no: any pi € (e,pm) would 
yield a strictly higher payoff than pi =  c, i.e.
( l - p O n f e O + ^ r  >Q +  6V r
Moreover, we can conclude from cases (i) and (ii) that V'-  =  ¿T T rA, where T* is the number
21 Note that by the One-Period-Devi at ion Criterion (cf. Tirok. 198S. p. 205). it is sufficknt to show that 
deviating once is not profitable to conclude that no finite or infinite sequence of deviations can ever be 
profitable.
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of periods that firm j  will punish (i.e. the optimal length of punishment for the Green-Porter 
model).
Case (iii): Would firm i ever want to deviate otherwise in a situation where ƒ  s strategy 
requires continuation of cooperation? Clearly, firm ¿’s optimal deviation is to undercut firm 
j  slightly, thus realizing a deviation payoff of V® =  (1 — p/)IIm + SV~. Firm / ’s incentive 
constraint therefore reads:
V  > ( i -  Pi ) i r  + svt-
Inserting for V~ and rearranging yields V*  > y .^ -(1  — p/)ITm. Now, if < F +, i.e. firm 
?’s strategy vields a strictly lower payoff than the Green-Porter type strategy followed by 
firm j  (and still avoidable to firm i), then firm Vs strategy' caimot be a profitable deviation 
(since VJ+ < V 4 implies V'-  < V~ and V{D < VD). Hence, we must liave V* > V +. Hut 
then, notice that we have
K + > v f > T r ] F T T (1 - i>i)n m
where the second inequality now represents the incentive constraint for Green-Porter t)pe 
strategics, which holds by assumption. Hut then, wc must also liave that firm ¿\s IC is 
satisfied, since the right-hand side of the ICs is the same for both types o f strategies.
To conclude, firm i will behave exactly like firm j ,  i.e. there is no circumstance under 
wliich firm i would want to deviate. Hence, by symmetry, the same must be true for firm 
j ,  and so ignoring the signals and behaving a la Green-Porter is still an equilibrium even if 
signals are available. □
“ " " - n i i i i i
Chapter 2
Exclusionary Pricing and Rebates in a.
Network Industry
Introduction
Rebates, i.e. discounts applicable where a customer exceeds a si>ecific(l target for sales 
in a defined ixrriod, liave been suspected by competition authorities of helping dominant 
firms to artificially foreclose business opportunities for their competitors (see Gyselen, 2003). 
However, the econom ic rationale underlying such practices is not .yet well understood.
The pmi>ose o f tliis chapter is to explore the exclusionary ]x>tential of rebate arrange­
ments in the presence of network externalities. We consider an industry composed of an 
incumbent firm and an entrant, both supplying a network good, where the entrant has lower 
marginal cost o f production than the incumbent.
The good is sold to m +  1 different buyers, m identical small buyers and 1 large buyer. 
Buyers’ valuation for the good is increasing in the number o f other buyers buying that same 
good as well (i.e. in the size o f the network). The two networks arc not compatible with 
each other, i.e. network externalities can only arise among customers of the same firm.
For buyers to derive positive utility from consuming a firm’s network gocxl, this network
3 2
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must reach a certain minimum size. We assume that the incumbent disposes of an installed 
base, and so its network has reached this minimum size already, while the entrant’s network 
has size zero at the outset. In order to reach the minimum size, the entrant lias to attract 
the large buyer plus at least one small buyer.
The timing of the game is as follows: First, both the incmnbent and the entrant simulta­
neously announce their (binding) offers; once these offers liave become common knowledge, 
each buyer decides wliich firm to patronize, and how much to buy from this firm.
We consider tliree price regimes: (i) uniform flat prices, (ii) third-degree price discrimina­
tion under two-part tariffs, and (in) rebate schemes (i.c. second-degree price discrimination 
under two-part tariffs). Under the rebate scheme, firms can only discriminate among buyers 
by the quantity they buy, but not by their size or identity.
If firms can only use uniform flat prices, then the game has two equilibria: entry equi­
libria, where the entrant undercuts the incumbent, and all buyers buy from the entrant; and 
miscoordination equilibria, where all firms buy from the incmnlient, although the entrant 
makes a better offer to them. Either of the two equilibria can arise under all parameter 
values. Under third-degree price discrimination with twoqmrt tariffs, the miscoordination 
equilibria continue to exist for all jw am eter values, while the entry equilibrium will only 
exist if the entrant is sufficiently more efficient than the incumbent.
The situation is similar if firms cannot ojxuily discriminate among buyers, i.e. if they 
are restricted to rebate schemes. The central result of this chapter is tliat rebates may 
allow the incmnbent to break entry equilibria where the incumbent could not have done so
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under uniform flat prices. For a wide range of parameter values, only the m iscoordination 
equilibrium survives when rebates can be used. Exclusion is more likely to be feasible if the 
efficiency gap between the two firms is not too wide.
The reason is that rebate schemes, when applied to buyers who differ in size, will be  
a tool o f (de facto) discrimination, even if the schemes as such am uniform. Now, the 
possibility of discriminating between buyers and redistributing rents between them should 
help the entrant challenge the incumbent just as much as it heljw the incumbent defend its 
monopoly position.
However, the incumbent has an installed base that provides its network with the rnini- 
mum size, so it can serve all buyers who want to buy from it, no matter how many (or how 
few) they arc, wiiile the entrant can only serve its buyers if it attracts at the least large buyer 
plus one small buyer. Thus, if the large buyer decides to patronize the incumbent, then the 
small buyers have no other choice than to buy from the incumbent as well, and vice? versa: If 
the small buyers prefer to buy from the incumbent, then the large buyer will be forced to do 
so as well, even if he prefers to buy from the entrant. Now', rebates allow the incumbent to 
play the two groujis o f buyers off against each other, winch prevents them from coordinating 
on the more efficient supplier, and so entry will fail.
We also find that there is a trade-off between maximizing the entrant’s chance’s to enter, 
and minimizing welfare losses (no matter which firm eventually serves the buyers). Discrimi­
natory two-part tariffs raise the highest barriers to entry, but yield the most efficient outcome 
(full efficiency if the entrant serves, lowest-possible inefficiency if the incumbent serves). The
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opposite Is true for linear tariffs (lowest entry barriers, but least efficient outcomes). i
Uniform rebates are somewhere between these two extremes. Note, however, that they
to enter under miiform rebates, then allowing discrim inator two-part tariffs will not yield 
any efficiency gains, but may jeopardize entry.
Our work is closely related to Innes and Sexton (1993, 1991), wiio also analyze the 
anticompetitive jiotential of discriminatory pricing. In their jjajjers, however, there is uncer­
tainty about entry (in particular about the cost of entry and the potential efficiency gains) 
at the time when buyers and incumbent interact. Moreover, the contractual instruments 
available to the agents are very sophisticated, whereas in our study, the strategic variables 
are as parsimonious as possible. Finally, buyers are identical in Innes and Sexton, so that 
there is no role for buyer asyinmctiy as we analyze it in our framework.
Our work is also related to Segal and Whinston (2000), who show the exclusionary
potential of exclusive contracts when the incumbent can discriminate on the comi>ensatory 
offers it makes to buyers. Our study differs from theirs in several respects: (i) in their 
game the incumbent has a strategic advantage in that it is allowed to contract with buyers 
before entry occurs; (ii) if buyers accept the exclusivUy offer o f the incumbent, they commit 
to it and cannot renegotiate it even if entry occurs; (iii) buyers are symmetric and only 
linear pricing is considered. In our paper, instead, (i) the incumbent and the entrant choose 
price schedules simultaneously, (ii) buyers simply observe prices and decide on whom to buy, 
without having to commit to buying from one or the other; (iii) we explore the role o f rebates
are sufficient to achieve full efficiency. In other words, if the entrant is sufficiently efficient
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and quantity discounts in a world where buyers of differing sizes exist. Yet, the mechanisms 
winch toad to exclusion in the two pajx'rs are very similar (both papers present issues o f 
buyers’ miscoordination, and scale economies wliich are created by fixed costs in their model 
are created instead by network effects in ours).
The setup
Consider an industry composed o f two firms, the incumbent ƒ, and an entrant E. The 
incumbent supplies a network good, ami has an installed consumer base of size fij >  0. I  
incurs constant marginal cost cj € (0, 5) for each unit it produces of the network good.
The entrant can supply a competing network good at marginal cost c.£ ~  0, so that 
CjP < cj, i.e. the entrant is more efficient than the inciunbent in supplying the good. E 
has not been active in the market so far, i.e. it has installed base ftp =  0, but it can start 
supplying the good any time; in particular, there is no need to sink any fixed costs of entry 
first.
The good can be sold to m +  1 different buyers, indexed by j  =  1, . . .  , m +  1. 'There are 
m identical small buyer's, and 1 large buyer. Goods acquired by one buyer cannot be resold 
to another buyer, but they can be disposed o f at no cost by the buyer who bought them (in 
ease the latter cannot consume them). Side payments of any kind l>o tween buyers are ruled 
out. Define firm ?’s network size ,s, (where i =  ƒ, E) as
s i = A + q] + • • • + <?r+1
i.e. the firm’s installed base plus its total sales to all ’’new” buyers.
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The large b u rr ’s demand for firm ¿’s network good at unit price p[ > 0 is given by
max {  (1 -  A") ( l  -  pj) , 0 } if s* > s
0 if s» < s
while a typical small buyer’s demand for firm i ’s network good at unit price p\ >  0 is
? ' (p!) = (2.1)
, ,  I max i 1 - P i )  >0} if >  a
<J,? (P?) =  < (2.2)
I 0 if Si <  s
The parameter K  €  (0,1) is an indicator o f the relative weight o f the small buyers in total 
market size: if all buyers buy at the same unit price (i.e. if p\ =  />ƒ), then 1 — K  measures 
the large buyer’s market share, wliile K  measures the market share of the group o f small 
buyers. Assume that 1 — K  > so that if offered the same price, the large buyer’s demand 
is always larger than a typical small buyer’s demand.1
Note that the assumption 1 — K  >  £  implies an upper bound on K , namely
and that total potential market size is fixed at 1,
K <
m
m +  1
m ----- 1- (1 -  K) =  1 .
m
Our demand functions are identical across buyers up to the size factor (1 — K  or £ ) , so 
that a monopolist who could charge discriminatory linear prices would set a uniform unit 
price p* =  f (1 + Cj). Recall that ce =  0, so that p*g =  then, our assumption that cj <  | 
implies that the entrant is never radically more efficient than the incumbent.
1 Later, we will allow firm i's unit prices to  differ across buyers of different size.
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If firm Vs network size st is below the threshold level no buyer (neither large nor small) 
would want to buy firm ¿’s good. We assume that
Pi > §
i.e. the incumbent has already reached the minimum size, while the entrant’s installed base 
is Ve — 0. hi order to ojierate successfully, the entrant will have to attract enough buyers 
to reach s r
K ey A ssu m p tion : In older to reach the minimum size, the: entrant has to serve the 
large buyer plus at least one small buyer:
s >  max {1 — A', I\) (2-3)
Thus, whining the large buyer’s orders is hidisjx'iLsable for the entrant to ojxuate successfully. 
However, neither demand of the large buyer alone, nor demand of all small buyers taken 
together, is sufficient for the entrant to reach the minimum size.
Note that only units wliich are actually consumed by a buyer count towards firm Vs 
network size. The demand fimotions also define the quantities that buyers can at most 
consume, namely 0 if s* < s, and 1 — K  (for the large buyer) or K/m (for the small buyer) 
if S; >  s. We do not allow E to produce units and throw them away (or give them away for 
free to buyers who cannot consume them), in order to reach the minimum size.
We also assume that the tliresliold level s is weakly below the total potential market
size. Thus, if the entrant gets to sell to all m +  1 buyers at marginal cost, then it will reach
“ Note that if the entrant manages to reach the minimum size s, then consumers will consider I's and E 's 
networks as being o f homogenous quality, even if sj ^  S£.
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the minimum size for sure:
s < mq‘E (cE) + q'E (eE) =  1 (2.4)
Note that inequality (2.1) together with ce < cj imply tliat the social planner would 
want the entrant (and not the incumbent) to serve all buyers.
Play occurs in the following sequence:
t =  0: The incumbent and the entrant simultaneously announce their price schemes, 
winch will 1* binding in t =  l .3
t =  1: Each of the m +  1 buyers decides whether to patronize the incumbent or the 
entrant.
As for the price schemes that firms can offer in t =  0, we wrill consider tliree possibilities:
(1) the benclimark case of uniform linear prices (Section 2);
(2) the second benchmark case of third-degree price discrimination under two-part tariffs 
(Section 2); and
(2) the case of central interest, that is second-degree price discrimination under tw'o-part 
tariffs, i.e. uniform quantity discounts or ” rebates” (Section 2).
(Apjjendix B briefly discusses the case of full price discrimination. A possible third 
benclimark is considered in Apjxndix C, namely uniform two-part tariffs, where firms can
offer fixed payments (ruled out in Case (1)), but caimot cliscrimiiiate among buyers, neither 
by their type (Case (2)) nor by the quantity they buy (Case (3 )).)
;jIn other words, firms can commit to make fixed payments at the end of t =  1 (buyers don't have to be 
concerned that firms renege on payments), so we exclude the possibility that firms just make vague promises, 
keeping buyers in the dark about how much they will actually get in the end (though such situations may 
arise in practice, see Gyselen, 2003).
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Let us assume that offers are observable to everyone, e.g. because they have to be posted 
publicly. Then, when the buyers have to decide which firm to buy from, the firms’ offers 
will be common knowledge. In t =  1, buyers decide winch firm to buy from. We will restrict 
attention to the case where a buyer can only buy from one of the two firms, but not from 
both of them simultaneously.
As a first benclimark case, let us consider the situation where firms can only use uniform 
flat prices (but no fixed pavments or unit prices which vary with quantity). In line with the 
work o f Bemheim and Whinston (1998) and Segal and Wliinston (2000), we find that our 
game has two types of pure-strategy Nash equilibria: one where all buyers (or sufficiently 
many) buy from the entrant, and one where all buyers buy from the incumbent.
The following proposition illustrates the simplest of these two types o f equilibria.
P roposition  7 (equilibria under uniform flat prices) If firms can only use uniform flat 
prices, the following two pure-strategy Nash equilibria exist under the continuation equilibria 
as specified (after eliminating all equilibria where firms play weakly dominated strategies): J
(i) Entry equilibrium: j
- if s <  1 -  Cj, E sets pE — Cl, I  sets pI — cj, and all buyers, after observing pE <  [
min {p i , 1 — .?}, buy from E.
- if s >  1 -  Cl, E sets pE =  1 -  5, /  sets pi =  p) (where p) is firm I 's  monopoly price).
Two benchmark price regimes
Uniform linear pricing
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and all buyers, after observing p s  <  min {pi, 1 — s}, buy from E.
(ii) M is coordination equilibrium: I  sets pi =  p) , E  sets pe =  p*E (where p*E is firm 
E  fs monopoly price), and all buyers, after observing pi — Pe <  P*j, cnd up buying from I.
P roof: see Appendix A
Which type of equilibrium will eventually be played depends on the underlying continu­
ation equilibria, i.e. on how buyers coordinate their purchasing decisions after observing the 
firms’ offers4 : If a buyer can rely on all other buyers patronizing E  whenever £ ”s offer is at 
least as good as ƒ ’s, then it is perfectly rational for this buyer to buy from E  as well. Tliis, in 
turn, corresponds exactly to what all other buyers expected Mm to do, and so confirms the 
rationality o f their own supplier choice. Under such a continuation equilibrium, the entry 
equilibrium of Proposition 7 (i) will arise.
If instead each buyer susjiccts all other buyers to patronize I  even when / ’s price Is 
strictly higher tlian £ ”s (as in the miscoordination equilibrium of Projjosition 7 (ii)), then 
no buyer wall want to buy from E: Recall that no individual buyer’s demand Is ever sufficient 
for E's network to reach the minimum size s. Then, being the only buyer to buy from E 
means ending up with a good that lias zero value to that buyer (no matter how cheap it 
is). Hence, as long as buying from I  still gives positive surplus, each bu^er w ill w'ant to buy 
from / ,  which then confirms all other buyers in their decision to buy from I as w'ell.
In some sense, a buyer who buys from I  is always on the safe side: The incumbent’s
network benefits from its installed base, so that 7’s good will always generate strictly jxisitive
4where ’’coordination" describes the collective behavior under individual decision making; we do not allow 
buyers to meet in t =  1 and make a joint decision on which firm to patronize.
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utility to whoever buys it, no matter what the other buyers do. Under such a continuation 
equilibrium, the incumbent can even charge its monopoly price (and will optimally do so) 
without losing the buyers to the entrant.5 These equilibria arc particularly troublesome, 
because they show that a higlily inefficient market outcome can persist even in the presence 
of an efficient com petitor.
The equilibria characterized in Projxisition 7 represent extreme cases, in the sense that 
the underlying continuation equilibria are the most favorable ones for the firm that serves 
the buyers in equilibrium. These equilibria arc by no means the only equilibria that can arise 
in our game.
For instance, there are other equilibria where all buyers do iniscoordinate on the incum­
bent, but the latter can at most charge some price pi < p]. Such an equilibrium can be 
sustained by continuation equilibria where buyers buy from I  as long as pt — Pe <  but 
would switch to E  if the price difference exceeded p j. Likewise, there are entry equilibria 
where the entrant must charge a strictly lower price than Cj (or 1 — s) to induce buyers to 
coordinate on E. For the rest of the chapter, we will focus on those continuation (.quilibria 
which arc the most profitable ones for the firm that eventually semes the buyers.
Finally, there can also be equilibria where both I and E  offer the exact same price, 
and a critical number of buyers patronize E (so that E reaches the minimum size), wliile 
the remaining buyer's buy from I. These equilibria can only be sustained by very specific 
continuation equilibria, and wre will not consider them in the following sections of tliis chapter.
°hi this situation, the entrant is indifferent among all prices pE > 0 it could charge, and might as well 
offer its monopoly price, which weakly dominates all other possible equilibrium prices.
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Third-degree price discrimination
As a second benchmark case, suppose that a supplier i =  / ,  E  can offer contracts o f the
type
We assume that the supplier's can discriminate between one group and the other of 
buyers, but not within each of them (Appendix B briefly discusses this case), and contrary 
to the case o f relates analyzed in Section 2, there is no possibility of personal arbitrage by 
buyers: a large buyer cannot ’pretend1 to be a small one and vice versa.
Buyers seek to maximize total surplus, which is the sum o f net consumer surplus and 
possible lump-sum payments they receive from or have to pay to the firms. Define net 
consumer surplus as follows:
Ti =  PiQi ~  KL with j  =  sJ
where the fixed component U{ could be either positive or negative (if R\ < 0, it is a franchise 
fee, i.e. a payment from the type j  buyer to the firm i; if R{ >  0, it is a slotting allowance,
i.e. a payment from the firm i to the buyer j ) ,  and where p? is the variable component of
the tariff.
CS{ {p{) =  ^ (1 — pi) 9i (pi)
J $ ( ! - * )  (1 -p i )* if Si > s and pj <  1 for j  =  l (2.G)
0 otherwise
(2.7)
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Lem m a 8 (miscoordination under third-degree price discrimination) For all parameter val­
ues, there is an eqiiilibrium where I  sets
p‘, =  p\ =  c,; R‘, =  (1 -  c , f  , R\ =  - 1  (1 -  K ) (1 -  c , f
E makes the analogous offer, pE =  plE =  cE =  0 :R E =  — 2  m ' =  ~~ 5 (1 ~  A '), and all
buyers, after observing that I offers non-negative total surplus, buy from I.
P roof: Buyer j  is indifferent between buying from / ,  and not buying at all: buying 
from ƒ yields total surplus CSj (cj) +  RJj =  0, and not buying at all yields zero surplus as 
well. Buying from E, given that all other buyers buy from I  (so that E would not reach the 
minimum size), would yield 0 +  RE <  0, so buyers strictly prefer to buy from I . Given that 
buyers buy from I as long as CSj (pj) -f- Rj > 0, the incumbent will optimally set price equal 
to marginal cost to generate maximum consumer surplus, and then use the lixed component 
of the tariff to fully extract tliis surplus, thus making maximal profits CSj (c*/) +  mCS'] (c /) .
Now, suppose the entrant deviates by offering a strictly positive payment to the small 
buyers: pE =  plE =  cE =  0 (wlog); R E =  s >  0, and RlE < —mRE <  0. (The analogous 
reasoning applies to an offer where instead the huge buyer would receive R lE > 0 wliile
R% < R‘e <  0.) Under tliis offer, the small buyers will no longer buy from ƒ, as they
will rather accept £  units for free from the entrant to qualify for payment R E. Then, even 
if the large buyer continues to buy from I , so that the entrant will not reach the minimum 
size (and hence the ^  imits remain without value to the small buyers), they will obtain a 
strictly i>ositive surplus: CSE (cE \ sE < s) +  RE ~  0 +  £ >  0.
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However, they will be unable to consume the units they received from E, and so they 
will dispose of their units: Recall that qE =  0 if Se <  s, and that I\ /in <  so 
that no buyer will be able to consume the good if he is the only one to do so. Hence, E's 
network still lias size zero even after E gave E units to each of the small buyers, because 
only units which are actually consumed count towards a firm’s network size. But then, the 
large buyer will not want to switch to E, as he would obtain strictly negative surplus from 
E , CSlE (cE | sE <  s) +  RlE <  0 -  ms <  0.
Thus, the large buyer will continue to buy from / ,  confirming the small buyers’ exjxicta- 
tion that E ys network will remain below- the minimum size (so that disposing of their units 
is the only option left to them). But then, E will not break even: if E  sells at marginal 
cost to the small buyers, E cannot make strictly positive payments to them, unless E  makes 
I>ositive profits on the large buyer.
We can conclude that if buyers are miscoordmated, any feasible alternative ofTer E  can 
make must satisfy R% < 0  and RlE <  0. But such an ofTer will not induce the small buyers 
to leave ƒ unless the large buyer docs so as well, which will never happen precisely because 
buyers are miscoordmated. But then, E might as wrell ofTer pE =  plE =  ce =  0; R9E — 
— i “ , IilE =  —1 (1 — /v), which completes our proof.□
Nowr, w-e wrant to find the conditions under which there is an entry equilibrium of the 
game where firm I  and E  make simultaneous offers Tf,
Suppose there is a candidate equilibrium at which the entrant cliarges:
Pe  =  P*e  ~  ce  =  R ei ^£?i
HU.............................
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where the entrant optimally cliooses to set the variable price equal to its marginal cost so as 
to maximize the rents that arise from the relationships with the buyers (otherwise, surplus 
would be inefficiently lost).
Since the entrant needs both the large buyer and at least one small buyer, tliis candidate 
equilibrium would not survive if the incumbent could make an oiTer that makes either the 
large buyer or the small buyers better olf, so that it becomes a dominant strategy for tliis 
type o f buyer to buy from / ,  no matter what the other buyers do. Let us look at each 
possibility in turn.
The first question is whether the incumbent can profitably induce the large buyer to 
switch. In tins case, the small buyers would be forced to buy from /  as well, even if ƒ’s oiTer 
to them Is much less attractive than E 's offer. The best oiTer 1 can make to the large buyer 
is to extract all the surplus from the small buyers and offer it to the large buyer. Such a 
deviation would take the form:
P’i =  p'l =  cr, lij =  - C S f ( c ) ,  n 1! =  m CSJ(c/).
Therefore, the candidate equilibrium can survive tills deviation only if the entrant leaves the 
large buyer with a larger payoff than the one offered by the incumbent, that is only if:
CS‘e (ce) +  It‘E > CSl,(c,) +m C S s,(c,),
which can be rewritten as:
- I { ’E < CS‘B(cB) -  CS‘,(c ,)  -  mCSj(c,). ( c o n d  1 )
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Second, the incumbent may also induce a deviation o f the small buyers. To this end, it 
could extract all the surplus from the large buyer and offer it to the small buyers. Such a 
deviation would consist of the offer:
p ’i =  p‘, =  c,; R\ =  -C S \ {c ,l  R] =  C 5 j(c,)/m .
In order for the candidate equilibrium to survive this deviation, the entrant must therefore 
make an offer such that:
CS"e (ce ) +  R°e >  CS‘, ( c,)  +  CS\ (c,)/m , 
or:
- R ’e  < CS‘e (cB) -  CSj(c;) -  2 ^ 2 ) .  (cond 2)
Note tliat conditions (cond 1) and (cond 2) must hold simultaneous^. Also note that the 
entrant’s profits must be non-negative: Since, at the candidate equilibrium, the entrant Is 
selling at marginal cost, the following break-even condition must hold:
—R E — mR% >  0. (cond 3)
An entry equilibrium where psE =  plE =  cE =  0; RSE, R lE can therefore survive only if 
conditions (cond 1), (cond 2) and (cond 3) will simultaneously hold. Optimality requires 
firm E to charge the highest possible fee (or to leave the lowest possible allowance) to the 
buyers. Therefore, at the optimum conditions (cond 1) and (cond 2) will be binding. By 
writing (cond 1) and (cond 2) with equality and inserting them in (cond 3) we obtain:
CSlB(cE) +  mCSE{cE) >  2 (CS\{cj) +  m CSs,( c , ) ) .
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In words, entry equilibria can only arise if the total rent generated by the entrant is at least 
twice as high as the total rent generated by the incumbent. We can make use o f the demand 
functions o f the buyers and insert the actual consumer surpluses into the previous inequality, 
w hich can then l)e simplified to
In other words, an entry equilibrimn can exist only if the entrant is sufficiently more efficient 
than the incumbent.
This contrasts sharply with the case of uniform linear tariffs of Section 2, where entry
very small (i.e. ev en if cj —» cE =  0). But discriminatory tvvo-]>art tariffs allow’ the incumbent 
to strategically redistribute rent iicross different types o f buyers in order to exclude the 
entrant from the market.
Finally, the inciunbent’s offer hi such an entry equilibrium (where the incumbent does 
not sell anything) will depend oil how the buyers coordinate on the entrant: If, for instance, 
buyers buy from E whenever £ ”s offer is at least as good as 7’s (analogously to the continu­
ation equilibrium of Proposition 7 (i)), then the incumbent's equilibrimn offer must exactly 
match the entrant’s, e.g. as follows:
equilibria could arise even if the efficiency gap between the entrant and the incumbent was
p] =  Pl, =  er, =  m C S jia ). n\ = CS ‘i(ci)/m
Note that this offer is not actually feasible (if I  sold at marginal cost, it could not afford 
to make strictly jiositive payments to all the buyers). But if I offered less than that, the
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entrant would want to follow suit and reduce its offers as well, thus violating conditions 
(cond 1) and/or (cond 2), and such offers could not be sustained as an equilibrium.
P roposition  9 (entry under third-degree price discrimination) If firms can use two-part 
tariffs and discriminate between large and small buyers (but not among small buyers), then 
the entry equilibrium can only arise if
~  0.2929
and is characterized by
P e  ~  Pe  ~  ce  — R e  — * R e  ~  oziit
v * _  pi _  -  K a  -  g ?  J J . 1 -  A' (1 -  c i ) tP, -  P i - c i , K l - h  , H , ~  m 2
with all buyers buying from the entrant after observing that the entrant's offer is at least as 
good as the incumbent's.
P roof: follows from above, where the expressions for ƒ?£, ƒ?/, and were obtained
by inserting from definition (2.5).D
It is worth studying whether the entrant offers a positive or a negative fixed component 
to the buyers at equilibrium. It is straightforward to note tliat:
RE <  0 iff K  > (1 -  c/ ) 2; and R'e < 0 iff A' < 1 -  (1 -  c ,)2.
We can now illustrate the result in the plane ((I — c /)2, Ar), as i*1 Fig111*6 2.1. I he
t H UlUMUf n h H U WM CTWygffTII ;
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Figure 2.1: Region where the entry equilibrium exists (plain) and does not exist (dotted)
Figure shows the legions where the entry equilibrium exists and characterizes it by showing 
whether at the equilibrium Finn E has to ¡my or not a fixed fee to the buyers. First of all, 
note that for any given admissible level o f K  the more eflicient is firm E  relative to firm I 
(that is, as we move horizontally to the left of the plane) the more likely that we find an 
equilibrium in wliich firm E is able to extract surplus from both the large and the small 
buyers.
Let us now look at the comparative statics on K . For any given value of (1 — C7 ) 2, an 
increase hi K  makes it more likely that firm E charges a positive fee to the small buyers and 
a negative fee to the large buyer, hi particular, note that:
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In other words, when K  >  that is when the small buyers account for most of the
market, the entrant will extract more surplus from them than from the large buyer at equi­
librium.
To understand these results, note that according to our assumptions the entrant needs 
to have purchases from both the small and the large buyer. When K  is small, what the 
incumbent will want to do is to extract as much as possible from the large buyer, whose 
surplus is larger than the aggregate surplus of the small buyers, to induce the small buyers 
to buy from it; when I\ is large, the opposite will occur: the share of the small buyers is the 
largest, and the incumbent will try to extract as much as possible from them to offer it to 
the large buyer. Hence, when K  is small, the entrant will need to make its best offer to the 
small buyers, whereas wiien K  is large, it is the small buyers’ market share wrhicli is largest, 
and therefore it is the large buyer who needs to be induced to buy away from the incumbent.
Rebate schemes (Second-degree price discrimination)
Let us now consider the case wiiere firms cannot make their offers directly depending on 
the type of buyer (large or small), but have to make uniform offers to both types which may 
only depend on the quantity bought by buyer j  =  l , . . . , m  +  l:
Via<fi ~ RiX if 9? > %2\
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The fixed component, RiA or /?,.2, can again l>e either positive or negative/' The difference 
Is that each buyer can now choose ills tariff from tills price menu by birring either below the 
sales target p,i or above the sales target qi%2, where q^ \ <  q^.
It is well-known that such quantity discounts or rebates, when applied to buyers who 
differ in size, will be a tool of (de facto) discrimination, even if the schemes as such are 
uniform. But to acliieve ihscriinination, the tariffs have to be set in a way that induces 
buyers to self-select into the right category, with small buyers voluntarily buying the low 
target, and the large buyer choosing to buy the high target.
First, consider the large buyer j  ~  l, and suppose Ins demand at price pi:i is above the 
threshold, i.e. q\ (pi .2) >  qU 2 (this will be the only relevant case). Then, the large buyer 
can either buy q\ ( p u ) ,  which fields total surplus CS\ {pi:}) +  Rik2 , or he can buy below 
the threshold 1, i.e. q\ =  min [q\ ( p i j ) 1}  at price pu , in which case his net consumer 
surplus can be expressed as
CS\ (pu )
CSl'n(t te , 1 , qu) =  qiA (1 -  p iA -  rjiaI jzk)
if Si >  s and q\ (pu ) < qiA 
if Si >  5 and q\ (p u ) > ip, 1 (2.8)
0 otherwise
Next, consider a typical small buyer j  — s, and suppose liis demand at price p ^  is below 
the threshold, i.e. qf (pi>2) < (again, tins will be the only relevant case). Then, a small 
buyer may either buy qf (pu ), which jields total surplus CS* (pu) + /?*,1, or he can buy the
sales target $ ?2 at price pt:i (i.e. a quantity wliich exceeds his actual demand at tins price). 6
6Results are qualitatively similar if we restrict fixed payments to go from firms to buyers only, while 
ruling out franchise fees ¡mid by buyers to firms.
IIRIIIINHVa
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If Qi,2  >  i.e. if the sales target is above the largest quantity he can consume,
qf (pi = 0 ) =  then the excess units, qi2 — can be disposed of at no cost.' Define
the small buyer’s net consumer surplus of buying gt,2 units s
'
% 2 (1 -  Pi.2 “  %22V) if Si ^  E and 9i,2 < £
£ £  -  Pt,2<?i.2 if Si >  s and gif2 > £  (2‘9)
0 otherwise
We say that firm i ’s offer satisfies the “self-selection condition" if the large buyer prefers 
to buy above the tluxwhold, and the small buyers prefer to buy below the threshold, i.e. if
CS\ (.pi<2) +  Ri:1 > CSl'net (pi.i, qitl) +  Ru (2.10)
and CS- (pu) +  /?*,i > (pi.2, #¿.2) +  ^.2
For any offer that satisfies the self-selection condition, denote by (p;?,
and (pi,2,f?t.2,^ .2) by (p<,/?* ,$ ), for i =  R E .
CSs^ { p L2^ ) ^ l
Lem m a 10 (miscoordinalion under rebates) For all parameter values, there is an (quiltb- 
rium where I sets
' P' fa) = r z M v > ^  ft -  rf (p‘ fa))
1 m V1 1-A'mV
and /u/ft/ extracts consumer surplus from the small buyers, W’/rZ/e leaving some rent to the
large buye,r:
/?; = - C 5 ; (p-;) = -C 5 |  (c) + (c s '" 6'( p5>9j (P;)) + t?5) < 0
* Recall that we excluded reselling of units between buyers (while allowing for free disposal), so the only 
thing a small buyer can do with units he cannot consume is to throw them away.
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E makes the analogous offer with 0 < p% (cE) < pJ (c/), plE =  ce — 0, and all buyers, after 
observing that I offers non-negative total surplus, buy from I.
P roof: see Appendix A
Tliis is the most profitable miscoordination equilibrium under rebates: The incumbent 
will receive positive fixed payments from both types of buyers (recall that we explicitly al­
lowed for fixed payments to go from buyers to firms), and on top of that, I  will earn a 
positive mark-up on the sales to the small buyers. Again, there are alternative miscoordi­
nation equilibria (under different continuation equilibria), where the incumbent would make: 
lower profits, and may even have to make positive payments to one or both types of buyers.
Note that the inciunbent’s profits wall be lower under rebates than under third-degree 
price discrimination: I sells above marginal cost to the small buyers, which reduces their 
consumer surplus (and hence their franchise fee), and I  does not extract the full consumer 
surplus CS\ (c/) from the large buyer. Both features of f ’s equilibrium offer follow directly 
from the introduction of personal arbitrage.
Suppose that I  wanted to replicate the more profitable offer under third-degree price 
discrimination, setting a uniform unit price of p/,i =  P1 . 2  =  c j , and francliiso fees
Ri a =  -C S j  (c;)  if qj <  qi =  qj (c7)
Ri , 2  =  —CS\ (c/) if qj > qi =  qj (c/)
This "first-best” offer dot« not satisfy the self-selection condition, because the large buyer 
would then prefer the small-buyer tariff, i.e. he would buy qj =  qj (c/) and enjoy strictly 
positive net surplus CSl,net (c/, qj (c/)) — CSj (c/) > 0 (although tliis means the large buyer is
« BB
quantitj'-constrained, because q3 (c/) <  q\ (c/)). Thus, arbitrage implies that Ts offer to the 
large buyer mast leave the latter with at least as much rent as buying below the tlircshold 
would yield.
This requirement also explains why the incumbent does not simply charge p] — p\ =  C/ 
to all buyers to extract the full consumer surplus from the small buyers. The intuition is 
as follows. Suppose that I charges cj to both large and small buyers. It can then extract 
CSj (c/) from the small buyers, and mast leave at least CSlnct (cj,qs¡ (c/)) — CSj (cj) to the 
large buyer.
Now', suppose instead that 1 raises the price p) by an i, wliile leaving p\ ~  c¡ unchanged: 
of course, this means efficiency losses, i.e. the additional profits I  makes on sales to the m 
small buyers are lower than the losses in rent that I can extract from them tlirough the fixed 
fee. On the other hand, I  can nowr extract more rent from the large buyer: mider the higher 
p] (and accordingly lower sales target), it is much less attractive for the large buyer to buy 
below’’ the tlircshold.
Thus, no matter how large K  or m y there will always be an c sucli that the losses of 
raising pj (on the small buyers) are more than outweighed by the gains (on the largo buyer), 
and so p] ~  c¡ cannot be optimal.
Next, we want to find the conditions under wliich there is an entry equilibrium of the 
game where firm I and E make simultaneous offers Ti(qj).
Suppose there is a candidate equilibrium at wiiicli the entrant charges:
P e  =  Pe  =  ce  — 0; RlE,
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where the entrant optimally chooses to set the variable price equal to its marginal cost so as 
to maximize the rents that arise from the relationships with the buyers (otherwise, surplus 
would be inefficiently lost). If this offer is to sustain an entry equilibrimn, we must have 
that:
(i) the incmnbent cannot make an offer that makes either the large buyer or the small 
buyers better off, so that it becomes a dominant strategy for this type of buyer to buy from 
I (as in Section 2); mid
(ii) the entrant’s offer satisfies the self-selection condition.
ad (i): Recall that the best offer I can make to the large buyer under tliird-degree price 
discrimination is to extract iill the surplus from the small buyers and offer it to the large 
buyer:
Pi =  pl, =  C R ]  =  -C S fc.,1 1?' = m CSKcl
If tliis offer satisfies the self-selection condition, then it is also the best offer that I can 
make under the rebate scheme. But note that personal m'bitrage may now be a problem: 
In particular, the small buyers may want to mimic the large buyer and buy q\ (c/), as long 
as the extra expenditure on those units above their demand is more than compensated by 
the imyment of R\. In tins case, the incumbent will have to make an alternative offer that 
satisfies the self-selection condition, and such an offer will necessarily generate less than the 
full surplus, CS\(ci) -f m C Sj(cj), for the large buyer.
Likewise, the incumbent’s best offer to the small buyer’s under tliird-degree price dis­
crimination, where I extracts all the surplus from the large buyer and offers it to the small
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buyers:
p) =  p\ =  c/; R\ =  -C S }(c /), R] =  CSl,(ci)/m
Ls no longer feasible if arbitrage is possible. The large buyer will always want to buy below’ the 
threshold and receive a strictly positive payment , rather than buying above the threshold 
and being left with zero rent. Thus, any incentive-compatible offer that redistributes rents 
from the large buyer to the small buyers will provide less total surplus tlian CS'](cf) +  
CSj(ci)/m  to each small buyer.
Again, the entrant’s offers under an entry equilibrium must satisfy the following necessary 
conditions:
c s sE(cE) +  n% > c s , v / “ ') +
CS‘e (ce ) +  R!e >  CSlI(p!l be,t) +  Rljbe,t
— — mR’E >  0
where , Rs^ e‘ tj  denotes / ’s best rebate offer to the small buj’ers (i.e. the offer that
maximizes small buyers’ total surplus while satisfying the self-selection condition), and anal­
ogously, (jfjbes1, denotes / ’s best rebate offer to the large buyer (see Appendix A for
the values which pljbe3t, p3j beaty Rlj besty and Z?J’fce3f will take). Inserting into the break-even 
constraint, vve nowr obtain
CS‘e{ce) +  mCS"E(cE) >  C 5 '(p '/es')  +  i t * *  +  m +  fl}’6“ '] (2.11)
This condition is wreaker than the corresponding condition under third-degree price discrim-
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illation:
CS1e {ce) +  mCS'E(cE) > 2 (CS}(c/) +  mCSffcr))
(We prow in Appendix A that CSlj(pljbest) +  Rlj hest <  CS\{cj) +  mCS*l (cj) and CSj(paf heat) +  
jfs.best ^ -|_ iC 5 j ( c / ) - )  In other words, the entrant is hss likely to be excluded under
rebates than under third-degree price discrimination, 
ad (ii): Consider the candidate equilibrium offer
P% ~  PE ~  CE =  0
n*E = c s af(pfeM) ^ R f esi- c s i :(cE)
RlE =  CS'ffp1^ * 1) +  Rlih(St -  C S lE(cE)
If tills offer satisfies the self-selection condition, then the feasibility condition (2.11) is a 
sufficient condition for the entry equilibrium to exist. But if the candidate offer is not 
incentive-compatible, then the entrant will have to make an alternative offer, winch will 
generate less than the maximal total surplus CSlE(cE) +  m C SE(cE), winch means that the 
feasibility condition tightens.
P roposition  11 (entry under rebates)
(0  If E s joint net surplus is not sufficient to match both 1 ’s best offer to the large buyer 
and I s best offer to the small buyers simultaneously, then no "entry equilibrium'' exists, 
even if buyer's buy from E whenever E 's offer's to each o f them are at least as good as 1 's 
offers.
00 U
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- E fs joint net surplus is sufficient to match both I's best offer to the large buyer and I's 
best offer to the small buyers simultaneously, and
- E's offer satisfies the large buyer's ”self-selection condition' of equation (2.10),
then our game has a pure-strategy equilibrium where all buyers buy from E after observing 
that E's offers to each of them are at least as good as I's offers, ("entry equilibrium"). Such 
an equilibrium can arise even when cj <  1 — y/l/2, i.e. when there would not be an entry 
equilibrium under third-degree price discrimination.
P roof: sec Appendix A
We see that even uniform rebate schemes will allow the incumbent to strategically redis­
tribute rents between different types o f buyers so as to prevent the more efficient entrant from 
serving the buyers. Thus, if ¡xirameters arc such that no entry equilibrium exists even under 
the continuation equilibria specified in Proposition 11 (winch are in favor of the entrant), 
then the miseoon lination equilibrium characterized in Lemma 10 is the only pure-strategy 
equilibrium of our game. Whenever the miscoordination equilibrium is unique, we refer to
f-.
it as '’exclusionary equilibrium**.
If instead parameters are such that the entry equilibrium exists, then our game has 
two pure-strategy equilibria: one where all buyers buy from the entrant, and one where 
they all buy from the incumbent (miscoordination equilibrium). Then, it depends on the 
continuation equilibria which of these two types of equilibria will be played.
There is an interesting general jjattern tliat emerges from both Lemma 10 and Proi>o- 
sition 11: If the self-selection constraint Is not binding for either type of buyer, both large
i
wuuw
and small buyers arc charged the same unit price. If instead the large buyer’s self-selection 
constraint is binding, the firm will raise the price of the small buyers above Cj (wliile p[ =  ct); 
if it is the small buyers’ self-selection constraint that is binding, the linn will lower the large 
buyer’s price below wliile p* ~  c* (unless of course ct =  0, as is the case for the entrant, 
who cannot charge a price below- marginal cost because wre nilcd out negative prices).
hi other words, wiienever pf differs from pl{> we have that p3 > p[\ But that seems like 
a fairly topical feature of real-life price schedules. What is interesting is that this price 
pattern has nothing to do with decreasing marginal cost or the like, but it arises out of the 
self-selection constraint implied by second-degrc'e price discrimination.
Welfare Analysis
We haw shown that under uniform linear prices, the inciunlient cannot prevent entry 
when buyers coordinate on the entrant (no matter howr small the efficiency gap between I 
and E), while rebate schemes can indeed be designed so as to break entry even if the entrant 
is significantly more efficient than the incumbent. "Hie exclusionary potential of tw'o-jxxrt 
tariffs is even greater if these tariffs are allowed to be depend on the type of buyer (not just 
the quantity they buy).
But the price regime does not only affect the likelihood of entry, it also determines the 
distribution of rents among firms and buyers and the size o f possible efficiency losses under 
those equilibria that exist, for a particular type of price regime.
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Table 1 shows the total surplus of large and small buyers, the profits of incumbent and
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entrant, as well as the allocative and productive efficiency loss under each price regime, 
depending on whether the equilibrium has the incumbent or the entrant serve the buyers. 
Note that the fust best allocation has E  serve all bujers at marginal cost ce — 0, winch 
generates total surplus 1/2, so that the welfare loss under any alternative allocation is the 
total surplus generated by the allocation under consideration minus 1/2.
Given that the first-best outcome has the entrant serve the buyers, it is obvious that 
whenever the incumbent serves, the equilibrium will be inefficient, because the incumbent 
produces at a higher marginal cost than the entrant. The resulting efficiency losses will be 
smallest under tliird-degree price discrimination, and largest under uniform linear prices, 
while the)' are in-between under uniform rebates.8
Rill efficiency can only arise if the entrant serves, and if the entrant can use two-part 
tariffs9, where it is irrelevant if these tariffs are discriminatory or uniform. The smallest 
possible welfare loss when I  serves (namely —  ^  ^(1 — c / )2) is exactly equal to the largest
possible welfare loss when E serves. O f course, when E  serves, there is no productive 
inefficiency, so all remaining welfare losses must be allocative.10
?Note that the efficiency losses under third-degree price discrimination also represent the lower bound 
on efficiency losses under any alternative equilibrium (no matter which price regime) where the incumbent 
cannot fully exploit the buyers because the continuation equilibria are less favorable to the incumbent (e.g. 
buyers will only miscoordinate on the incumbent if the latter charges at most pi — cj to all buyers).
9unless 5 = 1 , in which case even linear prices would yield full efficiency (because the entrant would have 
to set price equal to marginal cost: pe  =  1 —5 =  0 )
10Note that the efficiency losses under uniform linear prices also represent the upper bound on efficiency 
losses under any alternative equilibrium (no matter which price regime) where the continuation equilibria 
are less favorable to the entrant (e.g. buyers will only coordinate on the entrant if pe is strictly less than 
min {c j, 1 -  s}).
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Table 1: Buyers’ Surplus, Profits, and Welfare Loss
(a) Buyerfcr Net Total Surplus
Price Regime Small Buyers Large Buyer Total
Linear Prices
ƒ serves ¿ s a - c / ) * | (1 -  K )  (1 -  c ,)2 | (1 -  «/)*
E  serves £ ;m a x { ( l  - c y ) 2 ,s 2} max {(1 - c / ) 2,s2} ~ max {(1 -  c /)2, s2
3rrf-degree PD
I  serves 0 0 0
E  serves £ i ( l  -= / ) * 1 (1 -  «/)* (1 -  «/)*
2ÎMÎ-degree PD
I  serves 0 I<(l-pBf(c,)Ÿ , A' 1 \ 2m V1 rn 1 -K )
K(l-p',{ci))2 / A' 1 
2 rn V ml-/
E  serves < ; H ( 1 - C / ) 2 <  p i  -  ^/)2 < (1 -  c/)2
(b) Finns’ Profits
Price Regime Incumbent Entrant Total
Linear Prices
I serves l a - « / ) * 0 1 (1 -  c ,)2
E  serves 0 ci (1 — c /) or (1 -  ,s) s Cl (1 -  C l )  or (1 -  s);
3rrf-degree PD
I  serves 1 (1 -  c , )2 0 i ( i - « / ) *
E  serves 0 5 — (1 — «/)* 1 -  (1 -  c ,)2
27MÎ-degree PD
ƒ serves e ( i y p £ . < y a £ ) 0
> s - ( l - o ) 2E  serves 0 >  \ -  (1 -  «,)*
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(c) Welfare Loss
Price Regime Allocative Productive Total
Linear Prices
I  serves - i  m a (1 -  C/) - i + i  a  -  c /)2
E  serves 0 * +  m a x { i - | i L *  }
3rd-dcgrcc PD
I  serves _ d2 - c i  (1 -  C/) - l  +  i U - * ) *
E serves 0 0 0
2IW*-degree PD
I  serves (l-A')c? A'(p/(e;))2 2 2 - c i  (1 — K ) (1 — ci) — 0-r/)2 1 2 2
- c i K  (1 -  Pf (cj)) - K  (pj (c/) -  c/)2
E  serves 0 0 0
We can conclude that there is a trade-off between maximizing E's chances to enter, and 
minimizing welfare losses (no matter which firm eventually serves the buyers). Discrimi­
natory two-part tariffs raise the highest barriers to E 's entry, but }ield the most efficient 
outcome (full efficiency if E serves, lowest-possible inefficiency if I  serves). The opposite is 
true for linear tariffs (lowest entry barriers, but least efficient outcomes).
Uniform rebates are somewhere between these two extremes. Note, however, that they 
are sufficient to achieve full efficiency. In other words, if E  is sufficiently efficient to en­
ter under uniform rebates, then allowing discriminatory two-part tariffs will not yield any
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efficiency gains, but may jeopardize A ’s entry.11
On the other hand, banning two-part tariffs altogether will only make sense if the effi­
ciency gap between I  and E is small, so that even uniform rebates represent a serious barrier 
to E's entry. But in this case, the welfare gains that can be expected from £ ’s entry are 
low anyhow. Moreover, having E serve the buyers under linear prices will yield (almost or 
exactly) the same surplus as having I serve the buyers under discriminatory two-part tariffs.
The conclusions are somewhat different if the welfare criterion is buyers’ surplus, not 
social efficiency. We see that if the incumbent serves, both large and small buyers will prefer 
linear prices over any t>pe of two-]>art tariffs. If instead the entrant serves, the small buyers 
will always prefer discriminatory two-part tariffs over uniform rebates, wliile the large buyer 
is indifferent between the two.
If 1 — cj >  s, then both tjpes of buyers strictly prefer two-part tariffs over linear price's. If 
instead 1 — c/ <  s, then the ranking is ambiguous. The small buyers will prefer discriminatory 
two-part tariffs over linear price« iff A' <  (1 — c / /s )2, and the same holds for the large buyer 
iff 1 -  A' < (1 — Ci/s)2.
Concluding remarks
The purpose of this exercise was to demonstrate the exclusionary potential o f rebate 
arrangements in the presence of network externalities. We have shown that two-part tariffs, 
even if required to lx1 non-discriminatory, may allow the incumbent to prevent entry of a
11 Discriminatory two-part tariffs only make sense if one can take for granted that buyers will iniscoordinate 
on the incumbent.
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more efficient firm in cases where that would not have l>ecii possible under tmifomi flat 
prices. The finding is particularly interesting insofar as, in our model, the entrant is in a 
fairly good initial position compared to other papers on exclusionary practices: it does not 
have to pay any fixed cost to start operating in the industry, entrant and incumlx*nt can 
approach buyers simultaneously (i.e. the incumbent lias no first-mover advantage in offering 
contracts to the buyers before the entrant can do so), and the entrant has the same pricing 
instruments at its disposal.
Our analysis Is very preliminary and should be further develop'd in the following d im - 
tions:
0 5
• What if buyers can coordinate their actions among each other?
• What if buyers are allowed to ¡rntronize more than one linn?
• Is our model robust to the large buyer Ixnng sufficient for the entrant to reach the 
minimiun size?
Interesting extensions of our model could be to allow for buyers to comjx*te against each 
other downstream, to see whether the same kind of results as in Fumagalli and Mot ta (2005) 
would arise. Another issue of interest could be to allow for partial (or even full) comi>atibility 
between Ps and P's network, and to introduce compatibility as a strategic choice wiriable.
Finally, note that we should expect very similar results in a model where there are no 
network externalities, but instead buyers have switeliing costs, mid the entrant faces some 
fixed costs of entry. Farrell and Klemperer (forthcoming) have }x)inted out the analogies
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between network externalities and switching costs:
’’Both switelling costs and proprietary network effects arise wiien consumers 
value forms o f compatibility that require otherwise separate purchases to be made 
from the same firm. Switching costs arise if a consumer wants a group, or es­
pecially a series, o f liis own purchases to be comi>atible with one another: this 
creates economies of scojxï among his purchases from a single firm. Network ef­
fects arise when a user wants compatibility with other users (or complementers), 
so that he can interact or trade with them, or use the same complements; tliis 
creates economies of scope between different users’ purchases.
These economies of scope make it unhelpful to isolate a transaction: a buyer’s 
best action depends on other, complementary transactions. When those transac­
tions are in the future, or made simultaneously by others, his expectations about 
them are crucial. When they are in the past, they are history that matters to 
him. History also matters to a firm because established market share is a valu­
able asset: in the case o f switching costs, it represents a stock of individually 
locked-in buyers, wiiile in the case o f network effects an installed base directly 
lets the Grin offer more network benefits and may also boost expectations about 
future sales.” (Farrell and Klemperer (2001): page 1 - Introduction)
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Appendix A : Proofs
P roof o f  Proposition 7 :
(i) Let s <  1 — c/. Then, with all buyers buying from E  at pE =  c/, total demand Is 
mqsE (p e ) +  qlE (p e ) =  1 -  C/ >  5, and so E  will reach the minimum size. Thus, E ’s product 
has the exact same value to the buyers as / ’s, and it sells at the same price, so that buyers 
are indifferent betwfeen / ’s and E ’s offer. I  will not want to deviate either: To attract the 
buyers, I  wrould have to set a price pi < cj, i.e. sell at a loss; and increasing pi above Cj 
wrill not attract any buyers. E  lias no incentive to change anything about its price either: 
increasing pE would imply losing the buyers to / ,  and decreasing pe whl just reduce profits 
(recall that E is not radically more efficient than ƒ, i.e. pE — c/ < p].: , so that E  cannot gain 
from reducing its price Ixiow c/).
Let s > 1 — c/. Then, total demand at p£ =  1 — 5 is mqE (pE) +  qlE (pE) =  1 — pE — s, 
and so E  will just reach the minimum size, while still breaking even (s <  1 and ce — 0 
imply Pe — Ce >  0). E  has no incentive to increase its price, as that w'ould imply falling 
short of the minimum size (followred by a break-down of coordination, Le. all buyers w ould 
buy from /) ,  wiiile charging a price below71 — 5 would only reduce profits . The buyers have 
no incentive to deviate and buy from / ,  because pi > Pe - If I  decreases its price to a value
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pi 6 (1 — $,p*/) or increases it to some pj > pj, I will not be able to attract any buyers, and 
selling at a price at or below 1 -  s (which is strictly smaller than Cj if s > 1 — Cj) would 
imply losses.
Note that we eliminate all equilibria in weakly dominated strategies, where
- if s <  1 -  c j , /  sets pi 6  [0, c/) instead of p/ =  C/, and E  sets pE =  pi, and
- if a >  1 -  c /, /  sets pi G [1 -  S,pJ) or pi > p}, and E  sets pE — 1 -  s.
(ii) SupjKwe that all buyers buy from I. Then, recall that s >  max {1 — K, K } , implying 
that none of the individual buyers alone is sufficient for E to reach the minimmn size. Thus, 
E 's product has zero value for any single buyer, and so no buyer will want to deviate and 
buy from fJ, even though pi > Pe- I  sets pi =  p j, wliich is the most profitable among all 
jukes pj < p} +  p*E under wliich buyers will miscoordinate on the incumbent. Thus, I has 
no incentive to increase or decrease its price. Since buyers will not switch to E  even if the
juice difference between the twro firms is maximal, i.e. even if E charges pE — 0 (so tliat
Pi =  p) +  Pe), E  has no incentive to decrease its price.
We eliminate all equilibria in wreakly dominated strategies, wiiere I  sets pi =  p}, and E 
sets pE ^  p^.Q
P roof of Lem m a 10:
We will first showr that / ’s ecjuilibrium offer coincides with the solution to the following
ju-ofit maximization ju’oblein:
max m (p'J -  c/) q} (pj) +  m ( -R ) )  +  (pi — c/) q\ (;p\) +  (—/?/)
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subject to the large and small buyers1 self-selection constraints, the large and small buyers1
participation constraints, and the break-even constraint:
(i) G'.S'i ( /, ')  +  R‘ >  CS1-" '  (p); q] (pj)) +  m
(ii) CSj (pi) + Rj  > CS°-"" (pi)) +  R\
(iii) CS1, i f 1, ) +  R\ >  0
(iv) c s f  (p)) +  /?; > o
(v) m (p) -  c,) qj (pj!) +  (p\ -  c ,)  q\ (p1,) > mJf, +  R ‘,
Now, at the oi>tiimun, constraints (i) and (iv) will lx; binding, thus determining R\ and
R). Tills, in turn, implies that p\ =  c/ (which, given p j, maximizes the rent that I can 
extract from the large buyer).
Therefore, the incumbent’s problem reduces to choosing the right p}. The resulting
maximization problem is convex in p], and solves for
s.opl _  O  +  m (1 _  T3/7 m)
Pl 1 +  m i 1 ”  7377m)
Our assumption that c / <  1 implies pj,opt 6 (c/, 1).
The large buyer’s participation constraint (iii) will be oversatisfied under this solution: 
Given that constraints (i) and (iv) hold with equality, we have
C s] (a )  +  R\ =  CSlnet (psi ,yp\qB, (Pr f)) -  c s i (p ’O
But the right-hand side of tliis equality is strictly positive because
(p Y Qi (P/) )  >  CSSJ (pj) for all p)
which implies that CS) (c/) + Rlj°vi > 0.
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The small buyers’ self-selection condition (ii) holds as well: Suppose a small buyer con­
siders buying the large buyer’s sales target, q\ =  q\ (c/), at price c/. Then, tins buyer would 
enjoy net consumer surplus CSj (c/) from consuming the first g| (c/) units, and negative 
surplus on all the remaining units q\ -  qsL (c j) (\\Tiich have to be bought at price c/, but have 
a value less than c; to the small buyer). Thus, the small buyer’s net consumer surplus from 
consuming q\ =  q\ (c /) will be strictly lower than CSj (c/). However, the small buyer will 
have to pay R1^  (instead of Rj =  — CSj (pj'<**)), where i?iyopi <  —CS* (c/). Thus, a small 
buyer buying the large buyer’s threshold would end up with a strictly negative net total 
surplus, and so he will prefer to buy the small buyers’ threshold g| =  gj (p*/opf).
Finally, I ’s break-even constraint (v) reduces to
m [psj ' -  c /) qsj (pj,0pi) + 0 >  mRJ +  R\
wliidi holds because both large and small buyers will pay strictly positive fees to the incum­
bent (7?J < 0 and R\ <  0).
Hence, the incumbent’s equilibrium offer
P/ =  P/,opt > c/, p\ ~  Cjj qSj =  q'J (pj07* ) , g} =  q\ (c /)
Rsj =  ~C S] ( p ^ )  , R\ =  CSl'wt {p)™*, q\ (p?***)) +  R] -  CS\ (c/)
is the most profitable among all feasible offers, and so I  will not have any incentive to deviate.
Given that buyers miscoordinate on the incumbent no matter which offer the entrant 
make's, the entrant is indifferent between all feasible offers (the reasoning is analogous to the 
Proof of Lemma 8). Eliminating all equilibria where E plays weakly dominated strategies,
___ _________
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E will just soh'e the analogous optimization problem anal^ed above, wliich yields
8. Opt
Pe
Pe
A h - - L , E \
m V 1 — A m /  . ».apt
T +  ±  a  _  —J— <  p'“ ml 1 J-K m )
Pe°f ' >  0, p‘E =  cB =  0 <  p‘h  9b., =  Qe (p%°p>) , 9BJ =  9Ìr (cb)
-C S ’E (p£**), H‘e = C S (pg**, (p^ ')) + -  CS‘E (ce )
But given that all buyers buy from I , no individual buyer will want to deviate and buy 
from /?, and so all buyers will end up buying from / .□
P roof o f P roposition  11:
(i) We argued in Lemma 10 that miscoordination equilibria exist for all i>arameter values 
imder the appropriate continuation equilibria. We will now show that entry equilibria will 
only exist for certain parameter values, even imder those continuation equilibria that are 
” favorable” to the entrant.
Analogously to Proposition 9, a necessary condition for existence of an entry equilibrium 
is that I can neither match E ys offer to the large buyer nor £/’s offer to the small buyers.
The best offer that I  can make to the small buyers solves
max CS] (pj) +  ir,
subject to the large and small buyers’ self-selection constraints, the large and small buyers’ 
participation constraints, and the break-even constraint:
i!7TTTfTiYrT7!TTTTm vm fivvppvvtm
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( i )  C S }  {p',) + R‘, >  CSlnet (p°,,qj (pj)) + R°,
(Ü) c s ;  (pj) + r ; >  c s *■- (pi,q1,  (?})) + r 1,
( in )  C S }  ( r i )  +  / ? }  >  0
(iv) C S) (pf) +  R} > 0
(v) m (p‘i -  a )  qj (pj) +  (p‘j -  C]) q\ (p\) > mR} + R}
Now, at the optimum, constraints (i) and (v) will be binding, thus determining R\ and
II] , and that p\ =  cj (which, given p] , maximizes the rent tliat I  can extract from the large 
buyer).
Thus, / ’s reduced problem is convex in p], and solves for
8 Mat _  m+T ( l  +  c i  +  m ~  2 C ^ 7 7 m ) )  ~~ m
Pl “  _J_  (2 + - 2- ( l - -  J-m+1 V* m \ 2 1—A m / /  m
where p]rbesf 6 (c/, 1). The small buyers’ self-selection condition (ii) reduces to
CS} (Cl) -  CSl’"cl (p’Ikes',qï ( p f “ ' ) )  > CS‘ M  (c,,qi (c,)) -  CS]f ( p p ’ 1)
winch holds for all p] >  c/. The participation constraints (iii) and (iv) are over-satisfied at 
the solution:
- ■ C S) (p',MM)  +  i i f “ ' >  0 and CS1, (c,) +  H1/*3' > 0.
Note that this solution will necessarily jield  lower total surplus for the small buyers than 
the corresponding offer under third-degree price discrimination, wiiere each buyer receives
CS*,(c,) +  C S\(c,)/ ,n.
The incumbent’s best offer to the large buyer solves the analogous program:
max CS} (p;) +  i?r 
{vhv'rXI^}  ^ J
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subject to the large and small buyers’ self-selection constraints, the large and small buyers’
participation constraints, and the break-even constraint:
(i) CS} $ )  +  Rl, > CSt,net (p},4i (p i)) +  R)
(ii) CSj (p j) +  R) > CSa,net (P'„  qi (p i)) +  R\
(iii) CS\ (p\) +  R ‘, >  0
(iv) C S f(p l) +  R }>  0
(v) m (pj -  ci) q) (p]j +  (p‘, -  ci) q\ (p'; ) >  mR°, +  R‘,
This problem has four different solutions:
C ase  1: 0 <  A' <  =  A'* (c /,  m )
Only constraints (iv) and (v) are binding, all other constraints are oversatisfied. 1 can 
extract the full net consumer surplus from the small buyers and transfer it to the large bu3fcr 
without violating the small buyers’ self-selection constraint (ii):
ms.best /,6esf „  -  J  / \Pi — p } =  Cj, qj =  qI (c/)
R f ‘a< =  -C S )  ( c , ) , R )bMt =  m CS) (c,)
C " ” 2 ’ k - (C „,n ) < K  < |W|,  -  K -  f a . ,„ )
Constraints (ii), (iv), and (v) are binding, while all other constraints are over-satisfied. 
The solution reads
„s.beat l.best * 1 1  A  1 / ,  \‘2\p , =  c „ p ,  = l - - _ _ r _ ( l  +  m ( l - c , ) )
n )Msl =  - c ’s ; ( c l ) , i ? ,/ ^ '  =  - i - + p f es' ( ' i - p ' M ( i - / v )
2 m V /
where A' >  IC  (cr, m) implies that p1/ 1**' <  c /, and AT < A** (c/,m) implies p)1" '  >  0. 
Case 3 : A'** ( c , , m) < K  <  =  A*** (c ,, m)
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Constraints (ii) and (v) are binding, wliile all other constraints are over-satisfied. The 
solution reads
s,be3f
P i
j ^ s , b e s t
l testch Pi ~ m +  1 ci
m + 1  \2 m 2 m l} m +  l J )
1 K  
m +  1 2 ci (2 -  c/)
Case 4: K*** (cj,m ) < K  <
Tliis case is analogous to Case 3, i.e. constraints (ii) and (v) are binding, but now the 
small buyers are fairly large qj fpl/be3t) <  and so the solution reads:
s,best
Pi =  C , ,p ^ ' =  ^f ( l - K ) - l - ±
3,best _ J _  » - c , f ß - K ) ( - i U , n  a í r «
m + 1  V ( f  (i -  A') — 1 — ¿;) \A m 2 K
1 A' .
9 C2ê ?7l
A l.best
1 1
2 jn + T ( i  -  ci)!
A '- (1 -  K f
K  ( ?  i1 ”  K) -  1 -
Tliis problem is not convex in pl} ; the second-order condition requires ^  (1 — A") — 1 — T < 0; 
however, K  > A'***(c/,m) implies that the second-order condition is satisfied and that 
plibest > 0.
(There is another solution where ps/be3t =  cIy p )best =  0, Rljbeat =  — A / besi = 
— CS] (cj). Tliis offer is feasible iff K  >  cj/ ( ~  +  c/ +  \ (1 — c7)2). But tliis solution Is 
just a local maximum; it fields less total surplus for the large buyer than the solutions of 
case 3 and 4, which are the alternative solutions for the relevant range o f K ).
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below marginal cost (thus incurring losses), and the large buyer’s total net surplus Mill be 
lower than under the ’’ first best” oiler, where it is CS\ (c/) +  mCSj (c/).
Now, if the total net surplus that E  can generate, CSlF (cE) -\-mCSE (c£ ), is smaller than
always match either E's offer to the large buyer, or E 's offer to the small buyers, imphing 
that there is no entry equilibrium in pure strategies.
The corresponding ’’minimum efficiency” condition reads:
which completes the proof.
(ii) We argued in Lemma 10 that our game always has an equilibrium where all buyers 
buy from I  under the appropriate coordination equilibria. /
For an entry equilibrium to exist, E 's offer must satisfy the following conditions:
- it matches 7’s best offer to both the large and the small buyers;
- it satisfies the huge and small buyers’ self-selection condition;
- E  reaches the minimum size; and
- E  breaks even.
A lore formally, E  has to solve the following program:
the sum of ƒ’s best offer to the large buyer and / ’s best offer to the small buyers, then I  can
CS‘E (cB) +  mCS% (cE) >  CS‘ ( p'i*“ *) , ryl.best .+  Rj A m ( c s i  (pA ' )  +
subject to:
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(i) CS'E (pfc) + R\, > cs\  ( p '6“ ')  +  Ft1? '«
(¡i) cs%  (P‘E) + ¡ i’B > c s ?  (Pf e" )  +
(in) CS^ (pij) + i?'B > CS*-«* (p}.: , q% (p»E)) +  R’e
(iv) CS’B (p%) +  Rh >  CS™> (pfE, </E (P'£)) +  /?'B
(v) <7f (/4) + m(&  (Pb) -  5
(vi) m (pj. -  c£ ) qsE (/>y +  (plE -  cE) qlE (plE) > mUsE +  RlE
Case 1: Let the total surplus generated by E  be larger than the sum of ƒ’s Ix^ st oifer 
to the large and small buyers:
CSlE (cB) +  mCSg (cE) > CS‘, (ƒ>'/•"“' )  +  R‘, lesl +  m (cSj  ( p f “ ' )  +  R]J,,a'\
and let the large buyer’s self-selection condition be satisfied under the ” first-best” solution 
(defined below):
C’ .S'J (p 1^ )  +  Rlhrat -  ( c s ]  ( p f es' )  +  R ? " " )  > CS‘™> (cE, qE (c£)) -  CSl; (cE) 
Then, the solution to £ ’s problem is (’’first-best” solution):
Pe =  Pe =  ce =  0
R% =  CSl, ( p ,ibesl)  +  Rli iM,- C S ,E (cE)
R% =  CS°, ( p f " ' )  + R]-1" “' ~ C S ’E (cE)
Under tliis solution, constraints (i) and (ii) are satisfied (they hold with equality) by 
construction of ƒ?£■ and Ee • Constraint (iii) holds by assumption. Constiaint (v) holds b\ 
condition (2. 1):
mq% (cE) +  qlE (ce) =  1 > s
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Constraint (vi) reduces to
CSlE (c.e ) +  mCS‘B(cE) >  CS1, ( p f “ ‘ )  +  i?'/1*'" +  m (C S ] ( p f e” )  +  
wliicli is satisfied by assumption.
We will now argue that if constraints (i) and (ii) are satisfied with strict equality and 
plE =  cE =  0, then constraint (iv) is satisfied as well, i.e. the small buyers’ self-selection 
constraint Is redundant: First o f all,
CS3b (cb) +  /?.£ =  CS] (p /',M')  +  l i f “ '
bv strict equality of (ii), and
CS] ( p f  +  / ? f “ ' >  CS] (c,) +
by optiimility of £ (c/, 1) among all other feasible pairs (p'J, R/)t and in ¡^ articular the 
I>air (ƒ■/, Rs}'bcM^ , where
I i f ea' =  max {-C S ,*  (c,) ,C S s-ncl (p '/''" ',g i (p '/fSt) )  +  / i f “ ' -  C7.S'J ( c , ) }
is the fixed payment that the small buyers have to make to I under / ’s best offer to the large 
buyer. Then, by definition of we have
CS] (e,) +  >  CSSMet fp '/,M\ q\ (p i,-i‘" ' ) )  +
i.e. Ps best offer to the large buyer satisfies the small buyers’ self-selection condition. Finally, 
we need to show that
C S ’-"'1 (p^“ ',g', (p',6" ' ) )  + > c s s-ml (cbw'b M )  + n ‘ê
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Since constraint (i) holds with equality, we have that Rlj ii9t — Rl* — CSlE (cE)  — CS) 
so that the above inequality can be rearranged to read
CS’ '™* (p'/“ ',?' ( # “»)) - c s - » *  (cE,q'E(cE)) + ( c s ‘E (cE) -  CS1, (*“ "•)) > 0
If q\ (p)heM'\ >  we can insert for the consumer surplus terms from equations (2.6)
and (2.9) and reduce the inequality to pljhest > ce =  0, which is always true. If instead 
q) inserting the appropriate tenns fields
which holds as well, because the LIIS is strictly larger than —, wliile the RIIS is strictly 
smaller than Thus, we can conclude that the small buyers’ self-selection condition is 
implied to hold mider our candidate solution:
CS% (cE) + R%* > CSs'net (ce J e (ce )) +  ^
The candidate solution satisfies all constraints (i) to (vi), and psE =  plE =  ce =  0 maximizes 
consumer surplus, and hence the total surplus that E  can appropriate.
Finally, recall that we argued above that CS) (p ljhcst^  +  R)'best < CS)(ci) +  m CS)(cj)y 
and that m ( c S j  +  R3f best^  <  CSlj(ci) +  m CSj(cj). Thus, the candidate entry
equilibrium will aiise whenever
CS‘E (cE) + mCSsE (cE) > CS1, (p'/te’') + if'/6" '  + m ( c S j  (pf“ ') +
Comparing this inequality to the corresponding condition under tliird degree pric e discrimi­
nation:
CS‘e (ce ) +  mCSE(cE) > 2 (CS‘,(c,) +  m CSj(c,))
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we see tliat
CSl] +  m (C S ; (p) +  I i )be"') <  2 (C 5}(e,) +  m CS](c,))
and so entry is feasible even for values of cj <  1 — y/l/2, where it would not have been 
possible under tliird-degree price discrimination (see Proposition 9).
Case 2 : The ’’ first-best” solution is not feasible because the large buyer’s self-selection 
condition is violated under tliis solution. Then, the ’’ second-best” solution is:
i*
P e
Pe
ce =  0
m cE +  1 -  K 1m 1—A'
m +  1 — A~ I m 1—A'
> ce — 0
It}’  =
■ff'r*E ~~
c s ’, + i f t *  -  c s ’E (p j) 
c s Lml (PS. *  (p%)) +  i?s  -  0 %  (cB)
provided that constraints (i), (v), and (vi) are satisfkxl under this solution. Constraints 
(ii) and (iii) are binding. We will now argue that constraint (iv) is implied to hold under 
the ’’second-best,” solution as well: Inserting the solution values into constraint (iv), the 
inequality reads:
cs% (pg) > C S ( c E. q'E (CB)) + (C S ’ ’“ :' (p%, <fE (pi*)) -  C.sl, (<-,,))
Inserting for the consumer surplus terms from equations (2.G), (2.7), (2.8) and (2.9), the 
inequality reduces to
1 — A '>  - ( 1 — PS)*m
wliich holds by the assumption that 1 — 7\ >
APPENDIX B: THE CASE OF FULL DISCRIMINATION AMONG BUYERS 81
Case 3: The ” second-best” solution is not feasible either because constraint (i) Is vi­
olated under this solution. Then, constraints (i), (ii), and (iii) determine the ” third-best” 
solution:
<J*Ve = cE = 0
Ve
=  1 _ i
¡2 ~  J N i 1 -  K- K - F (c s \  [?' )m
1% =  CSI ( p f ) | + v ? f “ ' -C S i• (vse)
Re =  c s l, (p fest) i+  Hi -C S ‘B(ce)
provided that constraints (v) and (vi) are satisfied under this solution. Since constraint (i) 
holds with strict equality, we can apply the same reasoning developed in Case 1 to argue 
that constraint (iv) is implied to be satisfied under the "tliird-best” solution as well. If the 
” third-best” solution violates either constraint (vi) or (v), then entry is not feasible.□
Appendix B: The case of full discrimination among buyers
We will now show that if the incmnbent can even discriminate among the small buyers, 
not just between them and the large buyer, the efficiency barrier to entry will be even 
higher than under third-degree price discrimination. Consider a candidate equilibrium where 
all buyers buy from the entrant. W liat can the incmnlxuit do to break tins candidate 
equilibrhun?
(1) as lxTore: I can offer the total surplus to the large buyer so as to entice liim away
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from the entrant.
w‘, =  w‘, =  cr, Ff =  CS‘,{ci), F\ =  -mCSj(cr).
(2) I  can offer the total surplus to a critical number o f small buyers sucli that the 
entrant just fails to reach the minimum size: Denote the minimum number o f small buyers 
the entrant needs by mg- It is defined as mE € {1 , . . .  , m} such that the demand generated 
by the large buyer plus iue small buyers is sufficient to reach the minimum size
(1 -  K ) +  mE~~ >  s in
while losing one small buyer would mean that the entrant cannot reach the minimum size
( 1 -  K )  +  ("* E - < 5
Then, if I can discriminate between the small buyers, I  can concentrate the entire surplus 
on a number m j o f small buyers such that the number of buyers remaining with the entrant 
just falls short o f mg:
m — mj <  iue and m — (mi — 1) >  m#
Suppose the entrant’s offers to the small buyers differ in some way (that’s possible, because 
we allow both firms to discriminate among the small buyers). Then, let us rank the small 
buyers from 1 to m  by the total surplus they receive from the entrant, starting with the one 
who is worst off (wlog, we can set wsE =  wlE =  cE)\
C S lE(cE) — FE < CSe{ ce) ~  ¿ e — * ■ * — CSe (ce ) ~ Fg
mmmm
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Then, the incumbent will want to address the first inj buyers, i.e. the ones with rank 
j  =  { 1, . , .  , m /} , and make an offer to them that beats the entrant’s offer to each o f them. 
Tliis will be possible iff the sum of total surpluses of the first mj buyers is (strictly or weakly) 
smaller than the total surplus that the incumbent can offer, i.e. iff
™i
Y , CS}e (ce ) - F 3e < CSl,(c,) +  mCS’,(c,) (2.12)
j=l
Thus, to prevent such ’’poaching” of small buyers, the entrant must offer at least 
CS\{ci) +  mCSs} (ci) to the first mi buyers (the ones he treats ’’worst” ). As it turns out 
(proof below'), the cheapest way to achieve this is to offer the same total smplus to all the 
small buyers, namely
CS%(cE) -  1'j, =  ~  (C S ‘,(c ,) +  mCS’ (c.i)) for all j  =  1, . . .  ,m
In this way, any subgroup of small buyers of size mi 1ms total surplus CSj(cj) +  mCSf(ci), 
i.e. condition (2.12) just fails to hold for all possible subgroups of small buyers of size m/.
But for the entrant to break even, it must be sufficiently efficient to be able to make 
such offers where neither the large buyer nor the small buyers are ’’assailable” , i.e.
CSlE(cE) +  mCSE(cE) >  CS‘,(c ,)  +  m CS,'(c/) +  (CSl,(c,) +  mCS3,(c ,) )
=  b  +  ^ j )  (C S }(c,) +  m CSH a))
Since nij G { ! , . . .  , m), we have that 1 +  ^  > 2, i.e. the entrant’s feasibility constraint has 
tightened compared to the case where firms cannot discriminate among small buyer's.
C laim : Suppose that / ’s offer would have to be strictly better than E ’s to induce buyers 
to switch. Let mj < in. Consider all ¡xxvsible offers that E can make to the small buyers
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such that the following condition is satisfied for all possible subgroups of small buyers of size
mj\
rnj
Y  CS3E(cE) - F ]e >  CS}(c/) +  m C S^c,)
j = 1
i.e. sucli that I  cannot prevent E 7s entry by poacliing m / small buyers. Then, the cheapest 
among all these offers is the one wrhere
CSje (ce) — Fe ~  (C'Sjfc/) +  m CS](ci)) for all j  =  1 , . . .  ,m
P roo f: Suppose instead that E  makes some discriminatory offer. Rank all the small 
buyers by the total surplus they receive under E 7s offer, starting with the buyer wiio is worst 
off. The offer wre consider must satisfy
mj
Y  C S i(cE) -  F 3E >  CS}(c,) +  m CSH a)
3=1
for the first mj buyers. Since offers are discriminatory, there must be at least one buyer, call 
him whose total surplus is strictly belovr ~  (CS\{ci) +  7nCSf(c/)), i.e.
CSje (ce ) - F £ < - L  (CS‘,{c ,)  +  m C Sl(c,))
(if every small buyer had at least Aj (C*S'}(c/) + m C 5 ;(c / ) ) ,  and some (or all) buyers had 
strictly more than that, tliis offer cannot be cheai>er than the uniform offer wiiere each buyer 
gets exactly A- (CS\(ci) + m C S i(ci))). Since
mj
Y C S U ce) - F 3e >  CS‘[(ci) +  m C Sj(ci),
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buyer j* must be in the group of the ’’poorest” small buyers, j  =  { 1 , . . .  , m /}, and at least 
one other buyer in tliis group (buyer mj for sure, and maybe others) must have strictly more
(otherwise, their total surpluses could not sum up to CS\{cj) +  mCSj(ci)). Moreover, all
well (by the very nature of the ranking, all buyers j  =  {m j +  1 , . . .  , m} must have at least 
as much as buyer m /, and by the assumption that mi < m, there is at least one such buyer).
But then, there is at least one subgroup of small buyers of size im such that their total 
surpluses sum up to strictly more than CS\{ci) +  rnCS](cj): Consider the subgroup of the 
poorest buyers, j  — ( 1 , . . .  , in /}, anti replace buyer 1 by buyer ?n/ + 1. We know' that buyer 
1 has total surplus CS'e (ce ) -  F£ < J - (CS‘,(c ,) +  m C S ^ c,)) (either f  =  1, or f  >  1, SO 
that buyer 1 has weakly less total surplus than buyer than ji*), while buyer m/ +  1 has total
than -¿j (CS\{ci) +  7nC S/(c j)), i.e.
buyers with rank higher than mj must have strictly' more than ^  (CS\(ci) +  m CSj(cj)) as
surplus C\S£,+1(cu) -  F™'+1 > ^  (CS}(cj) +  7nC F|(c/)). Thus, w^e have tliat
(C S p + '(cE) -  F\’ITT) ƒ +  1E ) -  (C S pfcs) -  f e ) =  A > 0
and so the sum of total surpluses of group j  =  +
tnj \
£  CSUcs ) -  F i  -  (CS'e(ce ) -  Fh) +  ( C ^ \ c E) -  F £ l+')
>  CSlj(c j) +  m CSj(c,) +  A
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Thus, the discriminatory offer under consideration must be strictly more expensive for 
E than the uniform offer
C S i(c E) -  l i  =  —  (C 5 ;(c /) +  mCS’,(c ,))  for all j  =  1 ........mƒ
where no subgroup of size rrij can ever have strictly more total surplus than CSl} (ci) +  
m C S ;(c/)£ ]
Appendix C: Uniform two-part tariffs
Let firms i =  ƒ, E  use tariffs of the following form:
Ti =  Piqf -  Ri
i.e. firms caim ot tliscriminate among buyers, neither by type nor by the quantity they buy, 
but they can charge two-part tariffs.
Miscoordination Equilibria
C ase 1 : I  sells to  all buyers
Suppose buyers are miscoordinated (buy from I  whenever I offers 11011-negative surplus), 
and the incumbent wants to sell to all o f them (not just to the large buyer). Then, the 
incumbent’s problem reads:
max (pi -  c i) (1 -  p{) -  (m +  1) ƒ?/
{p i M j}
subject to the small and large buyer’s participation constraints (PC):
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(i) ~  (1 — p i ) 2 +  R i  > 0
(ü) | ( 1 -  K )  (1 -  P;)2 +  i?; > 0
Note that 1 -  K  >  ^  implies that the large buyer’s PC wall always be satisfied when 
the small buyer’s PC holds, so that only constraint (i) can be binding.
Hence, at any optimum where I  sells to all buyers, we must haw
Note that p) > c /, i.c. the inciunbent will charge a price above marginal cost. This 
implies efficiency losses, and reduces the rent that I  can extract from the small buyers. 
But these losses are more than compensated by the profits I  makes on the sales to the 
large buyer, wiicre I  earns a positive markup on each unit sold (in particular on the imits 
exceeding qj (p/)).
Case 2 : I sells to  the large buyer only
The incumbent may find it more profitable to sell to the large buyer only. In tliis case, 
I will optimally set
Then, the inciunbent will fully extract the large buyer’s surplus, while the small buyers will 
not want to buy at all (because that would leave them with negative surplus).
Inserting into the objective function and solving for the optimal unit price, we obtain
*
Pi =
Pi  =  ci; Ri =  ~  (1 -  K )  (1 -  c/)2
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W hen will it be optimal to sell to the large buyer only, rather than to all buyers?
1 ( 1 -  K) (1 -  C,)2 >  (P;  -  Cf) (1 -  p*) -  (m  +  1) E}
Tliis inequality can be reduced to 
K
:  s  ( s t t + o  -  -  * ■  < 0 5
Thus, it will be worthwhile to sell to the large buyer only whenever the latter is fairly large 
compared to the group of small buyers.
Entry Equilibria
Following our reasoning developed for the case of discriminatory twoqmrt tariffs, the 
incumbent can break entry by concentrating rent on the small buyers (thus forcing the large 
buyer to buy from I  as well) or rice versa. Let us start with the best offer I  can make to 
the small buyers.
F s  b est offer to  the sm all buyers
I will have to solve the following problem:
max (1 — p i)2 +  R j 
{piM  2 m v
subject to the break-even constraint and the large buyer’s participation constraint (PC):
(i) (pi — cj) (1 — pi) -  (m  +  1) Rt >  0
(ii) I (1 -  K)  (1 -  pi)2 +  R i >  0
Note that the large buyer’s PC will never be binding: if (1 — Pi)2 +  Ri > 0  (which 
will certainly hold at the optimum), then 1 -  K  > £  implies that the large buyer’s PC must
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be satisfied as well. The break-even constraint will hold with strict equality, wThich fields
^ r  =  ^ T (p r - c , ) ( i - p n
Then, our problem solves for the optimal unit price as
* 1 + c j - ^ Kns =  m
i j  2 - m±1I<m
which is exactly the same pj as in Case 1 o f Miscoordination.
To the topical small buyer, this offer gives total surplus o f
r i i 2 ’ 1 IK '
[2 -  ^ k \ m +  1 2 mc s u p * n + R r  =
P s  best offer to  the large buyer
Ps best offer to the large buyer will depend on parameter values. I has to solve
max 5 (1 -  K ) (1 -  p i f  +  Ih
subject to the break-even constraint and the small buyers’ participation constraint (PC):
(i) (pi -  ci) (1 ~ p i)  -  (m +  1) Ri >  0
( a )  I f  ( l - p ; ) 2 +  i ? , > 0
Case 1: K  > max
Then, the break-even constraint will be binding at the optimum, wiiile the small buyers’ 
PC will be oversat is fied. We can solve the problem analogously to the one before to obtain 
Solution II:
Pli - 1 -2 - w » 3  - i - r  *  ~ s f i W -»> c ■- -?>
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The second-order condition requires that 2 — (m H-1) (1 — K ) > 0, which is equivalent to
If K  >  max - T" j  } ,  then the SOC is always satisfied.
Now, for pj* to be non-negative, i.e. plf  >  0, we must liave
m +  1
whicli is again implied by our lower bounds on A'. Hence, p!/  £ (0, c/).
Finally, for the small buyers’ PC to hold under this solution, we can rearrange constraint
(ii) to obtain
K  >
m 2m 
m +  1 2 in +  1
which will of course hold under the lower bounds assumed for K.
Note that max { ^  whenever K  >  2eo ..L m+1 ’ m+1 h n + \  J m+1 — m+1
C ase 2:
If K  <  max { ¿ + i } > this means that solution II either violates the small 
buyers’ PC, or the non-negativity of plf .  Let K  >  so that the non-negativity constraint 
Ls stronger tlian the small buyers’ PC. Then, the best offer that I can make to the large 
buyer is one where p\* =  0 and the small buyers’ PC (ii) is binding, provided that this is 
feasible, i.e. the break-even constraint (i) is not violated. Solution 12 Ls characterized by
I K
2 mpl;  =  0 and ƒ# (2.14)
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Solution 12 trivially satisfies both the small buyers1 PC and the non-negativity of ƒ//. 
For the incumbent to break even under this solution, we must haw
1 I\(0 -  cj) +  (m + 1) > 0
2 m
which reduces to
K  >
2 me / 
in -h 1
This condition corresponds to the lower bound on K  imposed for Case 2. Note that solution 
II always yields higher payoff for the large buyer than solution 12; thus, if K is sniliciently 
large to admit both solutions, I  will always choose II.
C aseS : K  < mm
If K  <  then m ax{ * = * ,  *  < *»«»
implies that
(i) solution II would violate the small buyers’ PC (and may or may not satisfy the 
non-negativity constraint on plf ) ,  and
(ii) solution 12 would imply losses for L
Hence, the only feasible solution is the one where lx»th the small buwrs’ P (' and the 
break-even constraint are binding. These two constraints will then fully determine p\‘ and 
Rj o f Solution  13 as:
2c^ ( : n +_ l)^ and lA;
1 2 -  (m + 1) £  - rn
1 - c / 2
1 _  ZLLlfc 1 2m n
(2.ir,)
Note that our parameter restriction, A' <  —ff, implies that pj* € (O.q ), mid that  ^l ’.~~1 p
MPRuonemm
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1 (so that the large buyer’s total surplus under solution 13 is smaller than under solution
12).
The following table summarizes the maximum total payoff that I  can offer to the large 
buyer, C S ‘ (p '/) +  /? '/:
I ’s b est o ffe r  to  large buyer
sol’n applies if LB’s payoff
11 K  ^  im y i m~r* m 2m 1
r 12
r 1 1 (^  /-Hil\ __ mo«. [ +1 , m+12m41 j 2—(m+l)(i —/\ ) Lm-fl 2 V f\
12 ?:nri < K  < m~Cjm+1 — m+1
13 r,''  ^ _r 2mrj m 2m 1R ^  mm l m + 1 ! m + 1 2m+l J R i  k  £ )  d ä *j™
E’s b est o ffe r
Recall that for a pime-strategy entry equilibrium to exist, the following conditions mast 
be satisfied:
- the entrant matches both Ts best offer to the small buyers and / ’s best offer to the 
large buyer;
- the entrant breaks even; and
- the entrant generates enough demand to reach the minimum size.12 
'Thus, £”s problem is:
max (pE — ce) (1 -  Pe ) ~  +  1) Re
{peJìe)
subject to:
12This implies, of course, that E  must serve all buyers, i.e. serving only the large buyer will never be an 
option for E  (even if it is for I under a miscoordination equilibrium).
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(i) (1 -  Pe)2 +  Re > CSƒ (p f )  +  nr
(ii) i  (1 -  K) (1 -  PE)'2 +  i?E > CS1, (■ [/,-) + i?i*
(iii) (pE -  ce) (1 -  pE) -  (m + 1 ) R e > 0
(iv) 1 -  pe >  s
Let us first study under which conditions entry is possible if condition (iv) is not binding, 
i.e. the minimum size Is low enough for the entrant to haw some degrees o f freedom in setting 
Pe -
In this case, at least one of the two participation constraints, (i) and (ii), must be binding. 
As it turns out, the small buyers’ PC will always be binding, while the large buyer’s IC may 
or may not be binding.13
Case 1: Consider a solution where the small buyers’ particijiation constraint (i) is 
binding, while the large buyer’s PC (ii) is ovcrsatlsfied. Then, (i) determines E's fixed 
pajonent as
R\: =  CS• (pT) +  RT -  “  (i -  Pe) 2
Inserting into the objective function and solving for the optimal pe , we obtain S olu tion  E l
P e
r e
1 +  Ce - m+1
2 — ~ l Km
1 -  Cl 2 ' 1 1 K
9 _  "H-i ƒ . m m + 1 2 in
l1 A'
2 m U - ^ A T
(2.16)
( 2 . 1 7 )
winch is analogous to / ’s optimal offer mider the Case 1 miscoordination equilibrimn.
1 Jln other words, there is no solution whore (ii) is binding and (i) is oversatisfied.
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The optimal unit price will generate enough demand if
l - l 4  = 2 -  e +IKm
-  >  s >  max {A ', 1 — A }
A necessary condition for tills inequality to hold is that 1 — p*E > max {K , 1 — A '}, which 
can be rearranged to have
A' > m 1+  d -m + 1 2 m T ï )  + ( 0  = IC
This condition corresponds exactly to the condition under which the incumbent will sell to all 
buyers (rather than just to the large buyer) under the miscoordination equilibria discussed 
in Section 2.
We still have to verify whether the large buyer’s PC (ii) holds under this solution:
(i) Let K  >  max { 2^ , ^ 5^ } ,  so that
CS\ (p ?) +  RÏ =
1 -  c-i
2 — (?n +  1) (1 — A')
2 r
1 - h i - * )m  -f 1 2
Then,  ^(1 -  K )  (1 — pE)2 +  Re > CS\ (plj*) +  Rlj* reduces to
2 -  (m +  1) (1 ~ K ) >  (1 -  c/)2 ^2 -  i t )
Since K  >  whenever solution II applies, tills inequality can be simplified to
1 >  ( l - C , ) ( l  +  ^\ m
whicli is always true, 
(ii) Let '¿mej ^  r.' - m—cjm \ 1 — ^ m+1 , so that solution 12 applies, and hence
C S p p ' / ) + / ? ' / =  l ( l - A '
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Then, | (1 — K ) (1 — pE}2 + RE >  CS\ (plj )  +  ƒ?,* reduces to
Tliis inequality may or may not be satisfied (it will fail to hold if c/ —> 0 and K  —> 0). 
(in) Let I\ < min {y -y f, so solution 13 applies, and hence
Again, this inequality may or may not be satisfied (it will fail to hold if cj —► 0 and K  —► 0).
Recall that if 1 — p*E > max {A ', 1 — A"} is violated, then p*E cannot possibly generate 
enough demand for the entrant to reach the minimum size. Now, if either II or 12 applies, 
and solution El satisfies the large buyer’s PC, it will also satisfy 1 — p*E >  max {A ', 1 — A'}. 
If instead 13 applies, then 1 — p*E >  max { A', 1 — A"} is not implied by the large buyer’s PC, 
but constitutes an additional constraint on the applicability of solution E l.
Case 2: Suppose the large buyer’s PC fails to hold imder solution E l, i.e. either 12 
applies and condition (2.18) is violated, or 13 applies and condition (2.19) is violated. Then, 
both the large and small buyers’ PC must be binding, which will fully determine pE and Re 
of Solution E2:
Then, I (1 — K ) (1 — p E)2 + Re >  CSlj (p\*) +  Rlf  reduces to
(2.19)
1 - W2
( c s '  O f t )  +  E,-) -  (csf  (p j* )  +  / i f )
(2 .2 0 )
K
irE = ( c s )  Oft) + /?/*) -  ( c s l, oft) + /?',*) —
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where CS\ (pz/ ) +  Rlf  depends on whether 12 or 13 applies.
O f course, solution El will be more profitable than E2, so that the entrant will want to 
apply E l whenever possible, and will apply E2 only if necessary.
Note that p*E >  0 is equivalent to
\ ( i  -  *  -  £ )  >  ( e s i  (p'Z) +  R f)  -  ( c s j  (p f)  +  R f)
winch is always satisfied because CS\ (p\*) -f Rlj* =  | ( l  — K  -  A ) under 12 and CS\ {p\*) F 
R1} < \ { l -  K  -  F)  under 13, while CS] (p?) +  f ? f  > 0.
Again, tins solution can only apply if pE generates enough demand for the entrant to 
reach the minimum size, i.e. if
1 — p*E >  s >  max {K , 1 — A"}
(we will come back to this later).
W ill the entrant break even?
After determining the incumbent’s best offers to both large and small buyers, as wrell as 
the entrant’s best offer when E  lias to match /\s best offers, let us nowr turn to the question 
whether the entrant will break even under these offers.
Suppose solution E l applies. Then, inserting
V e  =
K b  =
1 +  A'm f l_ ______ in
2 _  !0i i /vm
r i
2 1 I K '—
\ 
k<*iCl m F  1 2 m
I K2 m V 2 — 2 i± i./ym
(2.21)
( 2 .2 2 )
into the entrant’s break-even constraint,
(Pe  — c e ) (1 — Pe ) — {?n  +  1) R e  >  0
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we can reduce this inequality to
( 1 -C /)2 < 1
which is always satisfied.
Thus, we can conclude that if El applies, the entrant will always break even, no matter 
what J’s best offer to the large buyer is (i.e. no matter if II, 12, or 13 applies).
Next, supixjse that the entrant has to apply E2. Then, we have to distinguish the 
following cases:
(i) Let < K  < so that solution 12 applies:
CS\ (pi*) +  R<' =  \ ( l  -  K -  F j  
Then, the entrant’s break-even constraint can be simplified to
! _  K  -  ! i  v  ( i  -  1  ( 2 _  1 1 -  (1 -  Cf)* ^  >
in
ci)
(2 _
,  1 A  -  (1 -  p m  +  1) (1 -  A ')) (2 - / f s g 1)
>n +  1 l  (2 -
As it turns out, the condition
1 — Pe >  max { K , 1 — K }
(which is necessary for E to reach the minimum size) is satisfied whenever the break-cn en 
constraint holds.
(ii) Let A' < min — r ^ } ,  so that solution 13 applies:
k \ r 1 - c ,
c s ‘, (p‘n  + /?',* = \ ( i  -  K  -  è )
n 2
!  _  *±1 K
HI
lili
ilUMtttitiiiiititititiWi
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Then, the entrant’s break-even constraint can be simplified to
v____________ m / V  V_____________m  7 ?n 4 1 <
( 2 ( i - ^ - S - s r r 7  +  | ( i - A ') )2
Recall that if 1 — p*E > max { K, 1 — A"} Ls violated, then pE caimot possibly generate 
enough demand for tlie entrant to reach the minimum size. We argued that if 12 applies, and 
solution E2 satisfies the break-even constraint, it will also satisfy 1 —p*E >  max { K , 1 — A '} . If 
instead 18 applies, then 1 —p*E >  max {A '. 1 — A'} is not implied by the break-even constraint, 
but constitutes an additional constraint on the applicability of solution E2. Note that tliis 
constraint can only be binding for values o f K  below K*.
W h at if  constraint (iv) is b in d in g?
Case 1: Let the minimum size be as low as possible, i.e. s =  max {A", 1 -  K }  +£. Then, 
we argued alxwe that
(i) under solution El, the entrant’s optimal unit price will violate 1 — pE > 5 whenever 
1 — p*E <  max{A\ 1 — A '}, wliicli we could simplify to K  <  I\*\
(ii) imder solution E2 and 12, the optimal unit price will always satisfy 1 — p*E > 5;
(ui) under solution E2 and 13, condition 1 — p*E >  5 represents an additional constraint, 
winch can only be binding for values of K  below A'*.
Thus, in either case, 1— p*E >  s can only be binding when A' < 0.5, so that max { A', 1 — A'} = 
1 — A', and therefore
s =  1 — K  +  £
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Now, let the entrant charge
p*E =  1 -  s =  K  -  £
i.e. the liighest possible price that generates enough demand for E  to reach the minimum 
size. Then, the entrant will break even if its rebate la m en ts satisfy:
Where solution E3 violates the break-even constraint, the two PCs can never hold simulta­
neously. Where solution E3 violates 1 — pE > s but satisfies the break-even constraint, the 
large buyer’s PC will always hold imder p*E =  l — s. Thus, it will be the small buyer’s PC 
that determines feasibility of our candidate solution.
Case 2 : If s =  1 , the entrant has no choice but to set pE =  0 (marginal cost pricing) 
to generate enough demand: l — pE — 1 =  s. The break-even constraint implies that the 
entrant camiot make any positive p atien ts to the buyers, i.e. R e <  0.
Then, entry will be feasible if:
Under this offer, the small and large buyer’s PC will be satisfied if
>  c %  (rf*) +  RF and2 m
>  cs'i (?',*) +  it'i
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If solution II applies, then both the large and small b u rrs ’ PC will be satisfied under 
(Pe =  R e =  0); thus, if K  >  max {^ = ^ , J^- } ,  entry is alwaj's feasible.
If either solution 12 or 13 applies, the large buyer’s PC is always satisfied under (pe — Re — 0
c s \  (?';) + r 1;  < 1 ( l  - 1< -  < i  (1  -  k )
so that the small buyers’ PC will determine whether entry is feasible or not.
Conclusion
We can conclude that entry will never be feasible in the following cases:
so that solution 12 applies, and the entrant cannot play solution(i) If <  K  <  ^
El because condition (2.18) is violated:
( ! - * ' - £ )  ((2( 1 - e / )  <
s h  (2 -  W
nor can the entrant play E2, because the break-even constraint fails to hold
\ - k - Km l - l ( 2 - m +4 V in ci )
< (= h  -  3 ( !  -  * ) ) ’
or
(2 _
< ( l - y - £) (1 - c, f  - J -  (iz  l 1- ! ! " +*> d -^))12 -JT O )
V m ) y m +  1 ^ (2 - A ' 2£ i)  ,/
(ii) K  <  min { t - , ^ i },  so that solution 13 applies, and the entrant cannot play
solution E l because condition (2.19) is \iolated
(1 -C l )  >  -
2 ( i - A ' - ^ ) - d n  +  ^
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nor can the entrant play E2, because the break-even constraint fails to hold
(1 -  c,)* >
(2 (1 -  A - - ^ )  -  55^1 +  I  (1 -  A '))*
or
(iii) K  <  min { ^ f . } » so t-liat solution 13 applies, and the entrant cannot play
either solution E l or E2 because constraint (iv) ls binding (1 — p*E < $ =  1 -  K  +  5), and 
the offer which satisfies constraint (iv)
P*E = l - s  =  K - s
Re <  — h r  (K  -  -;) (1 -  K  +  s)in +  1
does not satisfy the small buyer’s PC:
5  m {1~ K  + 6)2 +  R ’e <
r i - c /  12 1 IK '
2-!!±±A 'L rn -1 in + 1 2 m
Figure 2.2 illustrates this region in the (c/, K) plane, with (1 — c/)2 on the x-axis and 
K  on the y-axis. Above the black diagonal line (where I\ >  Solution 12 applies,
while Ix'low that line, 1 will play solution 13. Solution E2 applies below the other black line, 
where solution El is no longer feasible because the large buyer’s PC? is violated. The black 
dotted line represents (1 — c/)2 =  to the right of this line, there are no entry equilibria 
under tliird-degree price discrimination. Entry will never be jx>ssible in the lower right-hand 
com er, everywhere below the red line. Entry is always feasible above the green line, and may 
be feasible in the region between the green and red line provided the minimum threshold s
is low' enough.
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Figure 2.2: F ilin ' will never be possible below the m l line, and is alwaiTs possible above the 
green line.
Note that a large part of the parameter space where entry would be impossible under 
tliird-degree price discrimination does belong to the region where entry is (or may be) feasible 
under uniform two-part tariffs (this is the region to the right of the dotted line and above 
the red line). On the other hand, there is a small region to the left of the dotted line where 
entry cannot occur imdcr uniform two-part tariffs (namely below the red line), but would be 
possible under third-degree price discrimination.
In other words, there is no clear-cut answer as to which pricing regime is more exclu­
sionary than the other: if the incumbent is rather efficient and the large buyer is relatively 
small, discriminatory tariffs can be exclusionary while uniform tariffs are not. On the other 
hand, if the incumbent is very inefficient and the large buyer is very large, discriininatorv
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tariffs Mill allow for entry when uniform tariffs do not.
Welfare Analysis
The following table shows the large and small buyers’ surplus, firms’ profits, and welfare 
loss under all possible scenarios discussed alwve.
Compared to the cases of tliird- and second-degree discrimination, the most remarkable 
finding is that full efficiency camiot even be obtained when the entrant serves, because the 
entrant’s price will ahvays be p*E > c% =  0 (with the exception of the very special case of 
s =  1). The reason is that price equal to marginal cost can never be profit-maxiinizing if 
the firm must charge imiform tariffs: it ahvays pays to increase the price by an £, because 
a positive mark-up allows the firm to appropriate more of the large buyer’s rent, which will 
more than compensate the loss on the small buyers.
Thus, the main conclusion is that to acliieve full efficiency, some discrimination must l>o 
possible (recall that second-degree price discrimination was already sufficient, no need for 
third-degree PD). Tliis result is not surprising in the light o f the well-known welfare effects 
o f price discrimination in general.
Moreover, note that the buyers’ surplus when E  serves is determined by the best offer 
that I  can make to the buyers. Thus, the better the offers that the incumbent can make 
(and these offers will be the better, the more I can discriminate), the mom rent will end up 
in the hands of buyers wiien E  serves. In other words, even if the standard of comparison is 
buyer surplus (rather than total welfare), there is a case to lx1 made for discrimination.
APPENDIX C: UNIFORM TWO-PART TARIFFS 104
T able 1: Welfare under Uniform Two-Part Tariffs
(a) Buyers’ Net Total Surplus 
Small Buyers Large Buyer
I  serves LB
I  serves ail
E  serves (E l) ( -L -  _\m+l
E serves (E2, 12) (_ i_  _\m+l
E  serves (Ë2, 13) ( - Î - -Vm+1
0
0
(b) Firms’ Profits
0
I ( i - ä- - ä) ( ^ ) 2 
(*-*&■ «)
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I  serves all 
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(c) Welfare Loss
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Chapter 3
The Underground Economy Across 
Countries: Evading Taxes, or Evading
Competition?
Introduction
The underground (or shadow) economy is broadly defined as economic activities which 
are concealed from public authorities to avoid the payment of taxes and social security 
contributions, and to avoid compliance with certain legal standards (e.g. lalx>r market 
regulations, trade licenses). Unrcported activities are a universal feature of economic life, and 
assume considerable proportions even in the industrialized world, where they are estimated 
to range between 8 and as much as 28 percent of official GDP.1
It has been observed that the size of the underground economy (as a fraction of overall 
economic activity) varies considerably across countries, winch has motivated an extensive 
literature investigating the causes of this particular form of regulation failure: The burden
JSee Schneider/Enste (2000) for estimates of the size of the underground economy in numerous countries 
and a critical discussion of the various measurement methods.
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of taxes and social security contributions, excessive market regulation, as well as ineffective 
law enforcement and corruption, have been discussed at length to explain cross-country 
variations (see Schneider/Enste (2000), Johnson et al (1998), Lemieux et al (1991)).
W hile acknowledging that all of these factors do play an important role in determining 
the size of the underground economy, there are good reasons to believe that tliis list is n ot 
exhaustive. In particular, these factors do not explain the substantial variations in the share 
of the underground economy that have been observed not only across countries, but even 
within a single country, i.e. within the same legal and institutional framework. A w ell- 
documented example is the South o f Italy, where the share of the underground economy is 
twice the national average (De Rita/Canmsi (2003)).2
To explain such variations across regions within the same country, it lias been argued 
that regions differ in the sectoral composit ion o f their local industries, and that some sectors 
(e.g. constniction, retail trade, household services) offer better opportunities to evade taxes 
than others (Kesselmann (1989)). Yet, empirical evidence suggests that even within the 
same sector, shadow-economic activity in the South of Italy is more pervasive than in the 
North (see Scarlato (2001)). Thus, the indus try-composition argument cannot fully account 
for the inter-regional pattern observed in Italy.
In this chapter, I present a novel rational for the variations in the share of the under­
ground economy which can explain both inter-regional and inter-sectoral differences and will 
shed new light on cross-country evidence: the intensity o f market competition among firms.
2If anything, Italian labor and tax legislation provides proinotive exemptions for tlie South. As far as 
the rigour of law enforcement is concerned, there is no reason to believe that South-Italian bureaucrats are 
uniformly more corrupt than their North-Italian counterparts (see Del Monte/Papagni, 2001)
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The reasoning is as follows: A firm which operates in the underground economy can buy 
its inputs, in particular labor, at a lower price (by avoiding payroll taxes, not complying with 
safety and health standards, etc.), thereby reducing its variable cost relative to a firm in the 
official economy. The underground firm can pass on its savings to consumers, which will 
reduce market prices, and as a result its competitors’ profits fall. Thus, the official firm is 
put at a coinixititive disad\Tmtage, and may have to choose between operating underground 
as well, or going out o f business. The keener is competition, the higher is the pressure to 
reduce costs, and the more likely are undergroimd activities to spread in the industry.
TMs reasoning has some parallels in Shleifer’s (2001) argument that competition may 
promote imetliical behavior (e.g. child labor, corruption, etc.). However, the tradcvoif I 
consider here is not one between cost savings and the firm owner’s private utility of ethical 
behavior, but the trade-off between cost savings and the threat of detection. While in my 
model firm owners do not take any moral considerations into account, they face a risk of 
being detected and fined by the tax authority, a feature that plays no role in Slileifer’s (2001) 
argument.
To my knowledge, there is only one paper that relates the shadow economy to market 
comi>etition, namely Goldbcrg/Pavcnik (2003). Tins pajx'r asks whether we should expect 
the informal sector hi developing countries to expand hi response to trade liberalization 
programs (i.e. to an increase in foreign competition on domestic markets). However, in 
their model all firms behave as price takers, and so there is no room for strategic interaction 
among firms which is crucial in my set-up.
INTRODUCTION
In the model proposed in this chapter, the term competition refers to market power, 
with the source o f market power being product differentiation. Product differentiation is a 
primitive of the model (i.e. I do not consider the possibility of firms choosing their position 
in product space, or choosing to collude, or any other form of endogenous determination o f 
competition), and I wall claim that more intense competition (in the sense that products are 
closer substitutes, and so market power is lower) implies a larger underground sector.
Anecdotes support the view that the underground economy may expand in response to  
keener competition. For example, the head o f the Austrian Federal Guild of the Construction 
Industry (Bmidesinnmigsineister des Baugewcrbes), Mr. Joliannes Lahofer, explains the high 
incidence of shadow economic activity in his industry by recent changes in the way public 
building contracts are assigned, referring in particular to the introduction o f compulsory 
tenders, and the obligation to assign the contract to the lowest-pricc bid. (article in ” Kurier” 
of October 4, 2004)
These new regulations prevent local authorities from discriminating against certain firms 
(and favoring others) for reasons not related to the price offered, and forces them to take 
all interested construction firms into account when offering a building contract. Applying 
the concept o f comj)etilion used in tliis chapter, we can say that the new laws rendered the 
construction industry more competitive by imposing full substitutability of all firms from the 
point o f view o f the (institutional) buyer. The ensuing increase in shadow-economic, activity 
in the construction industry is therefore consistent with the line of reasoning laid out above, 
which suggested precisely that outcome.
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The chapter proceeds as follows: In Section 3 ,1 present a simple oligopoly model where 
each firm first decide« whether to enter and whether to operate in the official or underground 
economy; then, competition in the product market takes place. In the product market, each 
firm chooses the price1 for its output, and competition will be called "intense” if consumers 
perceive the firms1 products as close substitutes, i.e. if the rivals’ price choices have a large 
impact on each firm’s own demand.
My main result will be that firms operating in a more competitive industry will be more 
likely to operate in the underground economy. The reason is that competition reduces profit 
margins in the official sector faster than in the underground sector, thus inducing firms to 
switch to the underground sector. Tliis formalizes the argmnent loosely stated above, namely 
that competition will increase the temptation to go underground.
Finally, Section 3 presents cross-country evidence on the imj>act of entry and competition 
characteristics on the size of the underground economy in various OECD, transition and de­
veloping coiuitries. Wliile the reliability of data on the underground sector is a controversial 
issue, my regression results indicate that more intense competition is indeed correlated with a 
liigher incidence o f shadow-economic activity, thus lending support to my model predictions.
The Model
Description of the Game
I will consider two tj-jxis o f agents: firms and the tiix authority. Their behavior and 
decisions are characterized as follow«.
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T he F inns
Suppose there is a (very large) pool o f potential linns in a specific industry. These firms 
are ex-ante perfectly identical, and play the following two-stage game:
Stage 1 : Each firm decides (simultaneously with all other firms) whether to enter the 
official economy, or to enter the underground economy, or to stay out.3 If the firm stays out, 
its outside option yields payoff zero.
The choice between the official and the underground economy is irreversible, and I model 
it as one betwreen twro different ” production technologies” , which are characterized as follows:
(i) Production costs: If firm i operates in the official economy, its total production cost 
as function of its output g* is
C0 (çî) =  CoQi +  Ce (3.1)
while the total production cost of a firm j  operating in the underground economy is
Cu (Çj) — cuQj (3.2)
Denote by C e >  0 the entry-regulation cost (red tape) o f the official firm, which has to 
be sunk at stage 1 in order to enter the official economy. Let Ce he smaller than monopoly 
profits of an official firm, so that the industry is viable Assume for simplicity that there is 
no other fixed cost o f entry in either sector. *I
3Note that I treat the decision to operate in the underground economy as an "all-or-nothing" choice, i.e.
I do not allow for a single firm to "split" its operations between the official and the underground sector. One 
may think o f these operations as regarding a single (and indivisible) project or activity rather than a "firm" 
in the broad sense, as the “ firms" in this model will only be active for one period (namely stage 2 of the 
game), after which the game is over and everybody shuts down.
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The term cQ € (0,1) denotes (constant) marginal production cost of the official firm, 
while cu < cQ represents marginal cost when operating in the underground economy. The 
wedge between cQ and cu can have different sources: if the firm operates in the underground 
economy, it can avoid pajToll taxes for its workers, can defy environmental or other regu­
lations which increase the cost o f production, and avoid the administrative costs associated 
with tax compliance itself (like keeping records, registering workers with the social security 
authority etc.).
(ii) Auditing: every firm will be audited by the tax authority with a probability a  (wiiere 
a is common knowiedge among all firms). If audited, an agent operating in the underground 
economy will be detected with certainty and has to pay a fine F ; for an agent wiio operates 
in the official economy, the audit will remain without consequences, i.e. I assume that the 
tax authority never makes mistakes (see section 3 for a discussion of the tax authority and 
the properties of a  and F).
Stage 2 : Given that at stage 1, a total number n of firms entered the industry, out 
o f winch a share 1 — // firms decided to operate in the official economy (while // operate in 
the underground economy), at stage 2 the firms will simultaneously choose prices. Then, 
markets clear, and profits are realized; the tax authority audits a fraction a  o f all firms, and 
the underground firms that fire caught will be convicted to pay the fine F  > 0.
Competition among the firms Is imperfect in the sense that goods are horizontally dif­
ferentiated, and each firm product’s one variety.
Consumers’ valuation for a variety does not depend on how tliis variety was produced,
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i.e. whether it was produced in the official or in the underground economy: consumers may 
not be able to verify how the good was produced, or if they know, they do not perceive iuiy
where pi is the price chosen by linn z, is the vector o f competitors’ prices (p\, . . .  , pt^\, pi+l.
and n is the total munlxr of firms operating in the market.
The parameter 7  > 0, which will lx1, crucial to the analysis, measures the (symmetric) 
degree of sul>stitutability (and hence the intensity of competition) between any two varieties 
i and j ;  if 7 =  0, the two mrieties are completely independent (hence each firm behaves as a 
monopolist facing demand qt (pt) =   ^(1 — pi)), if 7 is large, the two varieties arc ¡X'rcciveri 
as close substitutes (and hence competition between the two firms will be very fierce).
This demand function is linearly decreasing in own price, linearly increasing in the aver­
age price level (i.e. competitors’ prices), and normalized by n, the total nmnber of varieties 
in the industry. This function has the advantage o f being algebraically convenient, and al­
lows us to capture ’’ competition” (in the sense of sensitivity of own demand to rivals’ price1«) 
in a single, exogenous, ]>arameter.
Among the sj>ecial properties of these demand functions (3.3), note that the aggregate
4 Note that this assumption also implies that consumers do not face any risk of consuming goods produced 
in the underground economy, i.e. I exclude the possibility of joint legal responsibility of consumer and 
producer once a firm in the underground economy is caught.
(vertical) quality difference between goods in the official and the underground sector.4
Specifically, consmner demand for variety i, <#, is characterized by
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demand
n 1 n
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does not depend on the degree o f substitution among the products, 7 , and that in the case 
of price sjuunetry, i.e. pz =  p for ¿ill i =  1 , . . .  , n, aggregate demand does not change with 
the number of products n existing in the industry.5
T h e T ax A uthority
I make the following assumptions:
The tax authority can only intervene at the end o f stage 2 o f the game (i.e. after firms 
produced and sold their output), but not at stage l .6 7 At stage 2 of the game, the tax 
authority cannot directly observe the prices charged (and the quantities sold) by the firms 
on the final good market.'
The tax authority can enforce full jia^ment of the fine, i.e. no i>artial or total default Is 
possible. This implies that: (i) firms must have sufficient assets to cover the fine8, and (ii) 
the tax authority can seize all assets o f the underground firms it detects9.
Both the audit probability a and the fine F  are exogenous from the point o f view of a
5For a discussion o f the derivation and properties of this demand function, see Shubik/Levitan (1980) 
and Motta (2003).
6Recall that firms entering the official sector pay entry regulation cost Cg. Thus, their number and 
identity becomes immediately observable to the tax authority. Underground firms, however, cannot be 
distinguished from non-entering firms, untill they become active, i.e. produce (and sell) a strictly positive 
quantity at stage 2.
7 As we will see later, the prices charged by underground firms will differ systematically from those of 
official firms; thus, if the tax authority could observe these prices, it could easily identify the underground 
firms, and the detection probability would have to be 1.
?This will be the case if firms have revenues from activities outside of the industry considered in this 
model, or if the fine is (partially) non-pecuniary (e.g. prison sentences, reputational penalties).
9This assumption may not always be satisfied in practice, where underground firms may just shut down 
their premises and "disappear" when they are caught.
THE MODEL 114
single firm. This assumption implies that:
(i) The audit probability a  does not vary with a firm’s output; in particular, an under­
ground firm is not more likely to attract the tax authority’s attention because it produces 
more.
(ii) F  is independent of the incriminated firm’s output and profits, i.e. the fine is the 
same for all firms, no matter what the amount of taxes evaded is.
However, I allow the expected fine, q F, to vary with the aggregate share o f underground 
firms in the industry, fi. In particular, assume that a F  (/¿.) is some continuous function of 
fi. I do not make any assumptions about the exact shape o f aF  (¡x) (it may be constant, 
increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic in fi) and about the determinants of the tax au­
thority’s behavior (such as resource or informational constraints, revenue targets, etc.) that 
could give rise to such a function.10
Solution of the Game
I will now identify the subgame-i>erfect pur e-strategy equilibria o f the game described 
above.
Equilibrium  in  the P roduct M arket (stage 2)
Moving baclavards, let us first solve for the equilibrium of the price-choice stage. Given 
that at stage 1 , a total number n o f firms entered the market, out o f w-hich n (1 -  //) firms
10\Ve will see below that the properties o f a F  (fi) are decisive for the type of equilibria that can arise in 
this game.
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decided to operate in the official economy (while np operate in the underground economy), 
a firm i which decided to operate in the official economy will maximize its gross profits as 
follows:
max { (pi -  c,}) q{ (pi, p -i) }
Pi
(3.4)
while a firm j  that opted for the underground economy has to solve
max {{Pj-Cu)qj(Pj-P-i)}
Pi
(3.5)
where (pl)p^i) and qj (p p P -j) are defined as in equation (3.3)11.
Let us impose symmetry among the n (1 -  p) films wliicli ojjerate in the official economy
(i.e. all firms in this sector charge the same price, pQ) and among the np firms that oj>erate 
in the underground economy (which will all charge pu). Thus,
n
^2 Pi =  n (! -  p) Po +  "/'TV
1 = 1
I solve for p* and p*u (the equilibrium prices charged by the topical firm in the official 
and underground economy, respectively) to obtain:
, _  (2 +  27  -  j )  (1 +  V  (1 +  r -  g )) +  (cu -  c„) T (1 +  7 ~ j )  l‘  (j)
P A ' , ) ~  (2+ 27- J )  (2 + 7 - 5 )   ^ ^
and
ri [»■ rt -  (2 + 27 ~ ; )  (1 + °* !* + 1 ~ - j! ^ <l;" ~ 11 + 7 ~ 0  ~ 1,1 (3.7)
(2  +  2 7 - . ) ( 2  +  T “ ^)
11 Note that at this stage. i.e. conditional on having opted for the underground sector, the threat of 
detection has no influence on the firm's behavior anymore. This is due to the assumption that a F  is 
independent of qi {p) ,p _ i ), implying that second-stage (price) choices will be unaffected by the expected 
fine.
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Now, the first-order conditions imply that the equilibrium quantities sold by each linn
are
9,* (»■ /')  =  max | 1  (pi -  c„) (l + 7 -  ,o| (3.8)
and
ql (n./x) =  max j i  (p* -  c.u) ( l  +  7  -  T j  ,o j (3.9)
so that gross profits hi the price-choice equilibrium aie
n „(n ,/i) =
i  (PÔ -  Co)* (1 +  7  -  Ï )  if 9Ô > 0 
0 if 90 =  0
(3.10)
and
n „ (/!,/;) =
£ ( p: - cu)2 (1 + 7 -  i )  if 9; > 0
(3.11)
0 ¡ f 9;  =  o
The following Lemma liiglilights some of the properties of the product market equilib
nimi:
Lem m a 12 In equilibrium, firms operating in the underground economy:
(i) charge a lower price than firms in the official economy, i.c. p*u <Po
(ii) have higher mark-ups than firms in the official economy, i.e. p*u — cu > Pi -  
(Hi) make larger gross profits than official firms, i.e. IIU > II0
P ro o f: see Appendix A
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Note that these price and profit effects described in Lemma 12 are entirely driven by 
the fact that underground firms produce at a lower marginal cost than official firms. The 
resulting cost advantage is partly passed on to consumers (through lower prices), partly 
retained by the underground firms (through higher markups).
Equilibrium  at the Entry-Stage o f  the G am e (stage 1)
At stage 2 of the game, firms take the total mimber o f firms in the industry, n, and 
the number of firms in the underground economy, up, as given. Hence, equilibrium prices, 
Po (ft, p) and Pu (ft, p), as well as gross profits, n o (n, pi) and 11« (n, p), are all functions of n 
and p. Both n and m  wall be determined simultaneously at stage 1 of the game.
When deciding whether to enter the official or the underground economy (or to stay 
out), firms will correctly antieijmte the equilibrium of the second stage of the game. T h e y  
will also take into account the fixed entry-regulation cost, CT, that has to be paid when 
entering the official economy, and hold it against the risk o f being detected and fined when 
entering the underground economy12.
Any equilibrium o f the first stage will have to satisfy the following conditions:
• (free entry) None of the inactive firms could make strictly positive net profits by en­
tering the industry;
• (breaking even) None of the active firms makes losses (i.e. none of them would strictly 
prefer to remain inactive);
12Note that both Cg  and qF (ju) are sunk at stage 2. and therefore do not matter for the price choice.
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• (free sector choice) None of the firms active in one sector could make liigher net profits 
by switching to the other sector.
More formally, we can define the subgame-perfect, pur e-strategy equilibria o f the first 
stage of the game as a pair (p*, n*) such that13:
(i) ’’Coexistence Equilibria” : If firms will be active in both the official and the under­
ground sector o f the industry, i.e. if ffi e  (0, 1), then (fx*,n*) must solve
n0 (ft, n , ') C g  ntt (fi, ii, •) — a F  (ft) = 0
(ii) ’’ Pure Official Equilibria” : If all active firms operate in the official sector, and no 
firm is active in the underground economy, i.e. =  0, then (//* =  0,n*) must solve
n u (f i, n; •) — a F  (ft) <  n o (fi, n; •) — C e  =  0
(iii) ’’ Pure Underground Equilibria” : If all active firms o]>erate in the underground sector, 
and no firm is active in the official economy, i.e. //* =  1 , then (¡T = 1, n*) must solve
II0 (fi, n; *) -  C e  < Hu (fi, n; •) -  a F  ( fi ) =  0
Wliich of these equilibria will actually arise depends on how the threat of detection plays 
out against the higher marginal cost and entry cost of operating in the official economy.
P roposition  13 The game described above
(i) has at least one subgamc-pcrfect pure-strategy equilibrium (this may be a coexistence
equilibrium, or a pure official or pure underground equilibriwn);
13To simplify the analysis. I will treat both n and lift as real numbers, even though they are of course 
constrained to be positive integers. Thus, the equilibria described and analyzed in the following are in fact 
just quasi-equilibria.
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(ii) may have multiple equilibria (both pure equilibria, or multiple coexistence equilibria, 
or any combination o f pure and coexistence equilibria).
P roof: see Appendix A
Intuitively, if the expected fine is very liigh, firms may be fully deterred from entering the 
underground economy, and we will only see official firms operating. Conversely, if enforce­
ment is close to inexistent, then all firms will operate underground. If, instead, the expected 
fine is somewhere in-betwreen, so tliat not all firms will wrant to be in the same sector, we 
obtain coexistence equilibria.
C om parative Statics
Recall that our objective wras to evaluate the impact o f intensity of competition, repre­
sented by parameter 7 , on the size o f the underground economy. For this purpose, let us 
restrict attention to the coexistence equilibria, that is equilibria where firms are active in 
both the official and the underground sector of the industry'.
Thus, let aF  (fi) be such that there exists at least one pair (//*, n*), where fi* 6E (0,1) 
and n* > 1, solving the equilibrium conditions
II* (//, n; 7 , ■) -  CE =  IIU (//, n; 7 , ■) -  a F  (//) =  0
Starting from such an equilibrium, suppose we let the competition parameter 7  wiry 
slightly'. Then, tliis change will affect the firms’ gross profits in both sectors (gross profits 
will decrease if 7 increases), and so our equilibrium conditions wrill no longer be satisfied 
at the initial solution (ft*, n*). Thus, /1 and n will have to adapt accordingly to allow' the
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industry to settle at a new equilibrium. Proposition 14 tells us in which direction tins change 
in /i will go.
P rop osition  14 If the coexistence equilibrium is stable, then the equilibrium share of firms 
operating in the underground economy, p*, is increasing with respect to the intensity of 
competition 7 . In other words, as the industry becomes more competitive, firms will be more 
likely to operate in the underground economy.
P roo f: see Appendix A
4 1 I
Discussion !
The result derived above relies on two key features o f the model:
(i) Operating in the underground economy allows firms to produce at lower marginal 
cost than firms in the official sector;
(ii) Finns’ product-market (i.e. price) choices can be separated from the entry and 
sector choices (sequential decision making) and from all considerations regarding the risk of 
detection (the expected fine is independent of an underground firm’s price or profits)
W hen deciding wliicli sector to enter, firms face a trade-off: in the official sector, they 
make lower gross profits tlian underground firms, and have to pay the entry-regulation cost; 
in the underground economy, however, they face the risk o f detection and punishment.
If, in equilibrium, firms are active in both the official and the underground economy, then j 
the share of firms in either sector will exactly balance this trade-off. Now, as competition I 
becomes more intense, markups in both sectors of the industry will drop, but markups in the |
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official sector will drop faster, thus shifting the balance in favor o f the underground economy.
This result is robust to several modifications of the setup:
- allowing for product market competition in quantities instead of prices
- introducing (flat) taxation o f official Anns’ profits; this creates additional incentives for 
firms to go underground
- introducing additional fixed cost (physical setup costs) in both sectors on top of the 
entry-regulation cost that firms have to pay to enter the official economy
- allowing the detection probability a to depend on these physical setup costs (to incor­
porate the idea that the larger the facilities required for production, the more ’’ visible” a firm 
will be, and the more difficult it will find it to hide its operations from the tax authority)
- i>aramctcrizing market size (where market size is captured by the intercept of the 
demand function, and was set to 1 in the analysis above)
- allowing for different functional forms of the demand function (note that both the 
existence of equilibria and the comparative statics rely on the continuity of gross profits in 
all parameter's, and the signs of the corresponding partial derivatives, not on the specific 
functional form assumed for demand)
Some of the assiunptions in the model may seem strong and deserve a more thorough 
discussion:
(i) Recall that in this model, the term competition refers to a firms’ ability to price above 
marginal cost. Tliis Is not the only sense in which tins term can l>e used; ’’ competition” may 
refer to both market structure and market outcome. As for market structure, we may tliink of
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competition as being restricted by the presence of entry barriers (in particular administrative 
barriers like trade licenses), which reduce the number o f firms that can enter the (official) 
industry, and which may entice entrepreneurs into ” bypassing” them by offering their goods 
or sendees without the required permits. Thus, if we equate low competition with liigh 
entry banders, we should exjxict low competition t,o be associated with a liigh incidence of 
shadow-economic activity.
However, it Is important to distinguish between the entry asjxxd and linns1 Ixdiavior in 
the market after entry. Once entry decisions have been made, firms may compete fiercely in 
the sense that they charge prices close to marginal cost, or they may enjoy market power, 
that is they may lx* able to raise prices well above marginal cost without losing all their 
buyer’s to their competitors.
(ii) The assumption that the fine F  is independent o f the incriminated firm’s output and 
profits may seem unrealistic, because, in practice, enforcement authorities tend to tailor the 
pmilslunent ” to fit the crime” . For instance, tax authorities may set fine« according to an 
estimate of the amoiuit of taxes evaded.
Yet, the scope for variable fines may be limited for several reasons. First, to make an 
estimate of taxes evaded, the firms’s profits would have to be verifiable, winch may not 
always be the ease.14 Second, apart from evicting taxes, avoiding compliance with labor and 
environmental laws may be an important motivation for operating undergromid. Yet, this 
damage is more difficult to quantify and to translate into monetary terms, and so fixed-fee
14Recall the assumption that prices and quantities are not directly observable by the tax authority: it 
could be the case that even after investigating an underground firm and finding the evidence necessary for 
conviction, the firm's output and profits remain non-verifiable (though potentially observable).
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punishments are more likely applied to these types of infringements.
(iii) Another feature of the model that may raise concerns is the ’’all-or-nothing” nature 
of the sector choice. In practice, there are many' firms that split their operations between 
the two sectors, a decision that cannot arise in the model considered so far.
However, a simple illustration will show that my model prediction holds good even in 
a very different setting, where I allow for both types of operations within the same firm: 
Consider a perfectly competitive industry, where each firm behaves as a price taker. Each 
firm chooses the total output q it wants to sell at the going market price. Each unit of output 
can be produced in one of two ways: either ’’officially'” , i.e. using declared inputs, in which 
case marginal cost is some convex function c0 (g); or ’’underground” , i.e. using undeclared 
inputs, which is associated with convex marginal cost cu (q).
Interpret c'0 (q) >  0 as an inherent property' of the production technology', which may' 
be due to short-run capacity' constraints, while c'u (q) >  dQ (9) reflects the combined effect of 
the technological constraints and the threat of detection and punishment, which I assume to 
be increasing in the underground output. Let cu (q — 0) < cu (q =  0), so that, for very' low 
levels of output, producing ’’underground” is unambiguously more profitable for the firm.
Suppose that the two marginal cost curves intersect at some output level, call it q* >  0, 
so that for all q > q*, the benefits of underground production (payToll tax evasion etc.) are 
outweighed by' the increasing risk of detection. Then, the firm’s short-run supply' curve is 
the lower envelope o f these two marginal-cost functions, that is, the firm will produce p u t of 
its output (up to q*) using undeclared inputs, and any' q exceeding q* using declared inputs.
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In equilibrium, our firm will produce the q that solves
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p =  C' (q) where Cf (q) =
cu (q) for q < q*
 ^ cQ(q) Iorq>q*
Suppose that initially the equilibrium price was high enough to induce the firm to produce 
more than t/*, i.e. to have some positive official output. Next, assume that there is a 
negative shock to the equilibrium price, i.e. the price falls to p' < p. Tliis could be the result 
of a drastic cut in tariffs winch allowed more efficient foreign firms access to the domestic 
market, or some other exogenous event that makes the environment for domestic firms more 
"competitive” .
Then, the firm will reduce its output to the level which solves pf =  C  (q). Note that the 
first units of output that will be "crowded out” are the officially produced ones; only when 
output falls even below q* will the firm start reducing its underground o]orations as well. 
In either case, the ratio of underground to official output will increase, and if all firms are 
symmetric, then the industry-wide underground economy will have grown in size.
Empirical Evidence 
Description of the Data
In the following, I will perform a cross-country analysis using a panel that covers 18 
countries (OECD, transition and developing countries) for the years 1995 to 2000.lD The 15
15The countries are: Argentina, Australia. Austria, Belgium. Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada. Chile. 
China, Colombia. Costa Rica, Czech Republic. Denmark. Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece. Hong 
Kong. Hungary. India, Indonesia. Ireland. Israel. Italy, Japan, Korea (Re]).), Malaysia. Mexico. Netherlands. 
New Zealand, Norway. Peru, Philippines, Poland. Portugal, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovakia. Spain. 
Sweden, Switzerland. Thailand. Ukraine. UK, USA, and Venezuela.
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underlying data were drawn from several sources: the "Global Competitiveness Report” 
(GCR), which is published annually7 by7 the World Economic Forum; Sclmeider’s (2002a, 
2002b, 2003) estimates of the underground economy as percentage of official GDP; and the 
World Bank’s "W orld Development Indicators” , "Doing Business" and "Labor Regulation” 
databases. ' J :
The measures o f most variables contained in the Global Competitiveness Report are 
based on the results o f the Executive Opinion Survey7, which asks some 4,000 top and middle 
managers in the surveyed countries for a personal assessment o f the variables of interest.1-' 
Each respondent assigned an integer from 1 to 7 to each of the questions contained hi the 
survey7, and the Global Competitiveness Report reports the avt rage response for each variable 
and country; unfortunately7, I do not have access to the distribution of responses underlying 
the computation o f the average.
The two measures for the size of the underground economy7 used in the following deserve 
some more discussion. In terms of the model of Section 3, these measures are meant to proxy7 
/i*, the equilibrium share of firms hi the underground economy717. Of course, the very7 nature 
of the subject matter makes it difficult to quantify7 it. There are two major approaches 
to measuring the underground economy7: the "indirect” approach, wiiich relies on national 
account statistics to infer the approximate size of the shadow7 economy7, and the "direct" *1
16Note that the managers’ assessments may not be representative for the opinion held by the general public 
in their country; however, for the purposes o f our analysis, what I am interested in is precisely the perception 
of firm-level decision-makers, as they are the ones who choose whether or not their firm will operate in the 
underground economy.
11 Note, however, that the indicator ’’ size o f the underground economy as percentage of official GDP* does 
not exactly correspond to //*, which represents the relative number of firms in the underground sector, not 
their relative output.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 12G
approach, which is based on information obtained through interviews.
(a) C urrency-D em and A pproach
The data series in Schneider (2002a, 2002b, 2003) are o f the ’’ indirect” type, i.e. they are 
estimates of the size of the underground economy as share o f official GDP using the currency- 
demand approach. Unfortunately, they are only available for 3 out of the six periods covered 
by the GCR (namely 1995, 1998 and 2000); moreover, for the year 1998, this data set only 
covers the OECD countries (i.e. 21 out of the full set of 48 countries).
(b ) E lectricity  Approach
To complement the analysis, I will therefore repeat all estimations using a different 
measure o f the underground economy, based on the so-called ’’physical input” method (or 
Kaufmann-Kaliberda method). To measure overall (official and unofficial) economic activity, 
Kaufmann and Kahberda (199G) assume that electricity consumption is the single best phys­
ical indicator o f overall economic activity. With the electricity-GDP elasticity usually being 
close to one, the difference between the growth of official GDP and the growth of electricity 
consumption can be attributed to the growth of the shadow economy. (Source of GDP and 
electricity consumption data: World Bank World Development Indicators)
While tins measure of the underground economy is certainly less sophisticated than the 
currency-demand measure, it has two main advantages:
(i) data are available for all six periods covered by the GCR, and
(ii) the measure is directly derived from consumption of a physical input, and so we do 
not have to worry about interactions between the variables used to construct the currency-
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demand estimates18 and the explanatory variables used in the regressions, which are ex­
plained below.
Table 1 summarizes the variables used in the following analysis, the data sources, and 
the model parameters that these measures should capture. For a more detailed description 
of the individual measures, see Appendix B. 15*
15These variables are: ratio of cash holdings to current and deposit accounts, weighted average tax rate,
proportion of wages and salaries in national income, interest paid on savings deposits, and per-capita income.
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Table 1: List o f Variable Names, Sources, and Model 
Parameters That These Variables Correspond to
Variable Name Source Model
Underground Economy:
1. currency-demand approach Schneider (2002, 2003) fl*
2. electricity approach own calculations T*
Low corruption GCR a F Q i )
Labor regulation WrB "Labor Regulation" C0 C<u
Payroll tax rate GCR C-o
Income tax rate WB WDI control
Corporate tax rate WB WDI control
VAT WB WDI control
Cost of Start-up WB "Doing Business" C e
Local Competition GCR 7
GCR =  Global Competitiveness Report, WB =  World Bank, 
WDI =  World Development Indicators
Table 1A in Appendix B presents summary statistics o f the raw data described above, 
while Table IB in Appendix B reports the correlation coefficients of all tnriables.
Now, recall that my model explained the equilibrium share of firms in the undcrgromid 
economy, u*, as a fimction of marginal costs cQ and cu, red-tape cost Ce , rigor o f enforcement,
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qF (/z), and intensity of competition 7 . In particular, Proposition 14 predicts that the size 
of the underground economy should be increasing in the intensity of 7 .
In what follows, I will examine if tliis relationship identified in my model Is confirmed 
or rejected by cross-country analysis. A  caveat is in order: the theoretical unit o f interest 
Is the individual firm operating in a specific industry, while the available data report the 
variables o f interest (in particular the share of the underground economy and the intensity 
of competition) at the country-level, aggregating over all industries. Thus, rny empirical 
anal's is should be viewed as exploratory analysis motivated by theory, rather than an actual 
test of my model.
Regression Results
I will estimate the following regression:
U N D ECY =  Pq +  PX  -I- PiC O M P  +  s
where the dependent variable, U N D E C Y , is ’’underground economy” , fio is a constant, 
X  is the vector o f controls (” low corruption” , ’’ labor regulation” , "payroll tax ” in- 
coine/corporate tax %” , ” VAT” , ’’cost o f start-up” ), C O M P  Is ’’competition” , and 5  is the 
error term. ’
Note that two of these variables, namely ’’ labor regulation” and ’’ cost of start-up” , are 
only available for one year. Yet, as these two series measure structural characteristics which 
are not likely to change a lot over a time span of 6 years, they were included as constants 
in the estimations. This means that the standard panel-analysis techniques, like fixed and
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random effects analysis, cannot be applied appropriately to the data set, because the country- 
fixed effects will already be picked up by these two other variables; thus, I will restrict myself 
to performing pooled least squares regressions on the stacked data set.
Now, recall from Section 3 that there are good reasons to believe that a country’s tax 
rates are to some extent endogenous, i.e. correlated with the error terms of its size o f 
the underground economy: If tax rates are increased in resixmse to an expansion of shadow' 
economic activity, then the causality between tax rates and the underground economy would 
be reversed, and our coefficient estimates would be inconsistent, (see Jolinson ct al (1998)).
In order to  avoid inconsistent estimation of the parameters of interest, I will therefore 
use a two-stage instnunental variable procedure. At the first stage, I predict each country’s 
tax rates by their instruments, and then use these predicted values as regressors in our final 
regression. To do this, I assign to each country i one neighboring country j ,  wiiose tax rates 
will be used as instruments for Vs tax rates.
Table 2 in Appendix B reports the results of this first-stage regression of tax rates on 
their instruments (including a country-specific constant).
With the R2 o f these regressions ranging from 0.53 to 0.95, they yield reasonably good 
predictions for the endogenous tax rates. Moreover, it seems unlikely that one country’s tax 
rate ¡x)licies could be influenced by changes in the size of a neighboring country’s underground 
economy. Thus, the neighboring country’s tax rates qualify as instruments for the endogenous 
regressors.
Now, we can turn to the second stage of the regression analysis: the following table show's
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the results o f two different OLS regressions on the stacked data, where I first perform an OLS 
regression on the estimates for the underground economy derived from the currency-demand 
approach, and then an analogous OLS regression with the dependent variable resulting from 
the electricity approach calculations. I obtain the following results, where the terms in 
brackets are significance levels:
Table 3: Second-Stage OLS Regression Results
Sample: 1995 -2000 (6 years)
OLS I: Dep. Var.: "Underground Economy” (currency-demand approach) 
OLS II: Dep. Var.: "Underground Economy” (electricity approach)
OLS I OLS II
constant 22.95 (0.0039) 38.95 (0.0000)
low corruption -4.35 (0.0003) -5.32 (0.0000)
labor regulation 12.01 (0.0000) 12.02 (0.0000)
payroll tax % IV -0.26 (0.0017) -0.34 (0.0000)
income tax % IV -0.23 (0.0535) 0.002 (0.9738)
corporate tax % IV -0.24 (0.1776) -0.34 ( 0.0021)
VAT % IV 0.49 (0.0067) 0.25 (0.0400)
Cost of Start-up {% GNI) -0.06 (0.0298) -0.08 (0.0000)
Competition 3.96 (0.00U) 1.80 (0.0118)
country-years 102 248
Adjusted i?2 0.48 0.53
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First of all, we see that the most important explanatory variables are labor regulation, 
corruption, and the intensity o f competition. The estimated coefficients of these three vari­
ables display the expected signs and are highly significant under both specifications. Tins 
indicates that good governance and rigorous enforcement play an important role in keeping 
the underground sector small. Likewise, a highly regulated labor market seems to encourage 
the expansion o f the underground economy.
We also see that a one-point increase in the competition index will lead to an increase 
in the size of the underground economy of 1.8 to 4 percentage points. Recall tliat ttiis is 
cousistent with the predictions of my model from Section 3, where we concluded that more 
intense competition leads to a larger underground sector.
Finalty, it is striking that the variables that one would expect to explain most of the 
variation in the dependent variable actually have little explanatory power: the coefficients 
on ’’ cost of starting a new business” and the various tax rates are small in size, partly 
insignificant, and most of the time even display counterintuitive signs.
Robustness
As a fust step, let us check if the results are robust to the introduction of regional 
dummies (1 dummies, one for OECD countries, Central and Eastern Euroi>e, Latin America, 
and Asia). As reported in Appendix C, Table 4, the coefficients on the variables of interest 
do not change sign and remain significant if they were so in the base specification. Also 19
19The insignificance of t he tax-rate variables may seem particularly surprising. The result is also robust to 
including squared tax rates (which would account for concave effects o f the tax rates). Yet, the insignificance 
of the tax rates is in line with the findings of FYiedman et al (1999) and Johnson et al (1998).
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note that the coefficients on the regional dummies are almost always significant as well, and 
that Latin America and Asia tend to have somewhat higher point estimates than OECD and
CEE countries.
This last result could point to heterogeneity among the countries in the sample with 
respect to the way that the explanatory factors influence their underground economy. To 
address this question, the sample was split into four sub-samples (OECD countries, Central 
and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia) and a separate regression was run for each 
o f the countries in tins group.
The results (not reported here) are broadly consistent with the ones obtained from the 
base specification, but most coefficients are no longer significant, in particular for the Latin 
American and Asian sub-sample, while they remain liighly significant for the OECD sample 
(with smaller point estimates, though). This is probably due to the fact that there are very 
few data points for CEE, Latin America and Asia once I treat them as separate samples, 
and so the estimates become imprecise.
As a next step, the regressions reported in Table 3 were re-estimated dropping one 
variable at a time so as to check that the specification is robust (results not reported here). 
As it turns out, coefficient estimates never change sign and ;ilwa)s remain significant if they 
were so in the base specification, with one exception: i f ’’ low corruption” is dropped, then the 
coefficient on ’’ competition” will become insignificant, and even negative when underground 
economy is being measured by the electricity-variable.
Therefore, it might be insightful to re-run the regressions exchanging one variable at a
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time by a different measure for that very same variable, as far as such alternative measures 
are available20. Now, when substituting ” low corruption” by the Corruptions Perception 
Index (published annually by ’’ Transparency International” ) or the governance measures of 
the W orld Bank’s ’’Governance Indicator” database (’’ perceptions of corruption” and ’’ rule 
of law” ), we see again that the coefficient on ’’ competition” turns negative and insignificant 
(results not reported here).
Yet, when substituting ’’ competition” by ’’average tarifT rate” (as a measure of the pres­
ence o f foreign competition curbing market power of domestic firms), then the sensitivity 
to the measure of corruption vanishes. Thus, the problem may be due to the fact that the 
measure for ’’ competition” is flawed: there could be an endogeneity problem due to survey 
respondents who indicated that ’’competition” is high because the imdergroiuid sector in 
tliis industry Is liigh, and competition from this sector is perceived as particularly tough.
Thus, the base regression was repeated, but tliis time instrumenting for ’’ competition” 
by ’’ fuel, ores, and metal exports” (as a measure of natural domestic rents, which should 
be negatively correlated with ’’competition” ), ’’ average tarifT rate” (as before), ’’ effectiveness 
of antitrust policies” (which should immediately affect local competition), and the log of 
jiopulation (as a measure o f domestic market size).
As Table 5a shows, all regressors o f the first-stage regression are significant and have 
the expected sign. Then, Table 5b shows the second-stage regression, where ” competition”
was instrumented for. We see that the coefficient on ’’ competition” is still positive and
20For instance, replacing "labor regulation" by the corresponding measures provided by the World Bank's 
■'Doing Business” database (Conditions of Employment Index, Flexibility of Hiring/Firing Index) does not 
change the results, nor does the replacement of "cost o f starting a new business" by the corresponding 
variable contained in the GCR (results not reported here).
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significant, though somewhat smaller than in the base regression of Table 3.
To summarize, once I instrument for the key regressor, the results presented in Table 
3 seem to be robust to various changes in specification, like introducing regional dummies, 
splitting the sample into sub-samples, and dropping or replacing explanatory variables.
Conclusion
The purpose o f this diapter is to study a novel rational for the variations in the share of 
the underground economy which sheds new light on cross-country evidence: the intensity of 
market competition among firms.
To address tliis issue, I first developed a simple oligojxfiy model of price competition 
with differentiated goods to analyze equilibrium outcomes o f this decision. In this model, 
the individual firm can freely choose whether to enter the official or the underground sector, 
and the intensity o f competition in the industry is captured by a single parameter that 
represents the homogeneity of product varieties.
I argued that when deciding which sector to enter, firms face a trade-ofT: in the official 
sector, they make lower gross profits than underground firms, and have to pay the entry- 
regulation cost; in the underground economy, however, they face the risk of detection and 
punishment. If, in equilibrium, firms are active in both the official and the underground 
economy, then the share of firms in either sector will exactly balance this trade-ofT.
My main result Is that as the industry becomes more competitive (in the sense that 
the firms’ product varieties become closer substitutes), the firms will be more likely to
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operate in the underground economy. We saw that competition reduces profit margins in 
the official sector faster than in the underground sector, thus increasing the temptation to 
go underground.
In the following, I performed a cross-country analysis using a panel that covers 48 coun­
tries (OECD, transition and developing countries) from 1995 to 2000. Pooled least squares 
regressions show that ease-of-entry and tax rates are not the only forces beliind the emer­
gence o f the underground economy (in fact, their contribution is much weaker than one 
would expect).
Instead, good  governance as well as labor market regulation seem to have the largest 
explanatory power. Moreover, the regression results indicate that more intense competition 
is indeed correlated with a higher incidence of shadow-economic activity, i.c. the empirical 
findings corroborate my model predictions.
Several issues are raised by this chapter that deserve further investigation: One key 
element of the model is the tax authority’s behavior, which is taken as given in my model 
without looking into its determinants. Another issue to investigate are the welfare effects of J 
underground activity. On the one hand, underground firms evade taxes and fail to comply I
i
with labor and environmental regulations, thus generating considerable social costs. On the 
other hand, their presence exerts downward pressure on the prices charged by official firms, 
winch benefits consumers. I would need to make precise assumptions on the weights of these
effects in the social welfare function to draw firm conclusions.
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Appendix A: Proofs
P roof o f  L em m a 12:
(i) Subtracting p*u (n ,p) from p*0 (n ,p ) we obtain: p*Q -  p*u =  > °-
(ii) Starting from 0 < n (1 +  7) which holds by assumption, expand both sides o f the 
inequality to have p* — p* < cG — cuy where p*0 — p* Ls as in (i), then rearrange to obtain
Pu-Cu>P*o~C0.
(iii) This follows immediately from (ii): gross profits are determined by squared markups, 
and p j — Cu > p*0 — c0 for all parameter values. □
P roof o f  Proposition 13:
(i) For a ’’ pine official equilibrium” to exist, we must have:
U0 (p =  0, n; •) =  Ce* Call the n that solves this equation na. (Such an n0 will always 
exist, as I assumed viability o f the industry, i.e. II0 (p = 0, n =  1 ; •) > Ce -) Then, evaluate 
the underground firm’s net profit at (p =  0, r?0); if IIU (p =  0, n0\ ■) ~ aF  (p =  0) < 0, there 
exists a ’’pure official equilibrium” , with (p*,n*) =  (0. n0).
For a ’’ pure underground equilibrium” to exist, wre must have:
n u (p =  1, n; -) — a F  (p =  1) =  0. Call the n that solves this equation nu. Then, evaluate 
the official firm’s net profit at (p — 1 ,n u); if U 0(p — l,n u) — C# < 0, there exists a ’’pure 
underground equilibrium” , with (p*,n*) =  (1,nu).
Now, suppose that neither a ’’pure official equilibrium” nor a ’’ pure underground equilib­
rium” exist, Le. IIU (p =  0, n0; •) — a F  (p  =  0) > 0 and n o (p =  1, 7iu) — Ce >  0. (If no nu >  1 
exists that solves 11« (p =  l,n ; •) -  a F  (p =  1) =  0, assume that II0 (p =  l,n ) — Ce >  0
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holds for n =  l , which implies strengthening the viability assumption.) Then, note that 
n o is strictly decreasing in n; thus, there must be an n >  tiu, call it n ls that solves 
IT (fi =  1 , 7i ) — C e — 0. Since IIU is decreasing in n as well, and rii > nu, an underground fir­
m’s profits evaluated at (fi =  1 , tij) must be negative, i.e. n u (fi =  1, n\ \ •) — a F  (fi =  1) < 0.
Next, consider all pairs (//, n) that set official firms’ net profits equal to zero. Since IT 
is strictly and continuously decreasing in both fi and n, there will be a unique ti for each 
value of fi e  [0, 1] such that official firms’ profits are exactly equal to zero. In other words, 
II0 (/¿, n) — Ce =  0 defines an implicit function n (fi) that is continuously decreasing in fi.
Likewise, IIU is continuous in (fi, n  ( f i ) )  as defined above, and will therefore take on any 
value between IIU (fi =  0, n0; ■) and IIU (fi ~  l,n i; *) as we let fi nm from 0 to 1 . Recall that 
at (fi — 0, n0), the underground firm’s gross profits arc strictly larger than a F  (ft =  0), while 
at (fi =  1 , Tii), the underground firm’s net profits are strictly smaller than a F  (fi =  1). By 
continuity o f a F  ( f i )  in f i , a F  (fi) will take on all values between a F  (fi =  0) and a F  (fi =  1) 
as we let fi nm  from 0 to 1. Hence, there must be at least one fi 6 (0 ,1) such that IIU (/x, n (//)) 
and a F  ( fi ) intersect. Denote this value by fi*, and denote n (fi*) by n*.
Then, at (fi*,n*), we have Uu(fi*,n*) -  a F  (fi*) — 0, and by constniction of n(fi)t 
we also have U0 (fi*,n*) — Ce =  0. Therefore, we found a pair ( f i* ,n * )  that satisfies the 
equilibrium conditions for a coexistence equilibrium, which proves that if neither of the two 
pure equilibria exists, there must be at least one coexistence equilibrium.
(ii) Note first that the conditions for existence of a ’’pure official equilibrium” and of a 
’’pure underground equilibrium” may be satisfied simultaneously, i.e. a F  (fi) and Ce nmy
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be such that both IIU (fi =  0, n0; •) -  a F  (fi =  0) < 0 and II* (/z =  1, n j  - C E < 0 hold.
Moreover, no matter if the two pure equilibria exist or not (or only one of them exists), 
there is nothing that prevents nu (/i,n  (/u)) as defined above from intersecting more than 
once with ex F  (/i) as /i runs from 0 to 1. To see this, recall that I have not imposed any 
restrictions on the shape of aF(/z) (other than continuity in fi); now, while IIU (//, n (/¿)) 
can be shown to be monotonically increasing in /i, aF  (/z) need not be monotonie in /i, thus 
allowing for more than one intersection with IIU (//, n (//)). In fact, the number of coexistence 
equilibria can be arbitrarily large: define a  F  (fi) to be exactly equal to IIU (/i, n (/i)) for some 
or all // on the interval [0,1] to obtain infinitely many coexistence equilibria.□
P ro o f o f  P rop osition  14:
Let (/z*, n* ) be a coexistence equilibrium, so tliat n o (//*, n* ; 7 ) - C E = 0 and IIU (/z% n* ; 7 ) -  
q F (//*) = 0 both hold. Then, we can take the total differential of both equations at solution 
(//*, n*) to have:
Note that if dfi and dn represent adjustments of fi and n to a new equilibrium, following
a change in 7, we must liave
d{n0( - ) - C E} = 0 and
d {nu(-) — aF  (/z*)} =  0
These two equations allow us to solve for i.e. the change in the equilibrium share of
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firms in the tinder ground economy relative to the change in the competition ixirametcr 7, 
which yields:
y  (•)
d l
<2ILi.2LLi _  fliiti
O n  0"; O n  O ',_________
(  <HLl _  2ik _  BU<‘
O f i Of.I J O n  O n  O ft
Now, to evaluate the sign of this expression, first note that the following in« qualities 
apply: both the official and the imdergrotmd linn’s gross profits are decreasing in //, n and 
7; the underground firm’s profits drop faster than the official film’s profits when ft or n
increases, wliile the opposite is true for an increase in 7:
o n a(.) n fflU -)
dll ’ On ' O j
<  0
a n , (•)
Oft
an. (•)
Ofi
7
1 +  7 -  2n -  C„) -  (/'■„ -  (!„)] > 0
because 2  ^ ( l  +  7 -  l )  > 0, ^  ^  < 0, and (pi -  e„) -  (p‘u -  c„) < 0 by Lemma 12.
a iM Q
d n
+ -Ln2 (1+7_? )  [o>:-*)*-oc-«.)*]> o
because 2± (l +  7  -  J) > 0 , (p i -  c„) -  (p* -  c .) § £  > 0 l>y Lemma 12 and
( - ¿ )  i 1 +  7 “  *?) < 0 , and (pj -  c„)4 -  (p* -  c„)4 < 0 by Lcnuna 12.
O n > 0,
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an„(-) _ onu(-) _ t) 1
fh f D'i n
(onjo/i -  OaF/fyi)  ^ on.,/tyt
On,Jr>n <  ~!)U.,/On
'Hie left-hand side of tills inequality Is equivalent to the [dn/dfi] < 0 that solww 
d  {n u (•) — a ƒ’ (//* )} =  0 when 7 is kept constant, i.e., [dn/dfi\u identifies the line in the 
(//, n) space along which the underground linn’s profits are unchanged. The right-hand sick' 
o f the inequality is the com ’sponding [dn/d(i]o < 0 that solves d {fh  (■) — C e)  =  0 when 7 
is kept coils taut.
Note that the equilibrium ])air (//*, /j*) is the intersection of the two lines [dn/dfi\u and 
[dn/dfi\tJ. Now, if [dn/dft]u < \dn/dft]p, then tills implies that anywhere on the [dn/dfi]ti line 
to the right of //*, i.e. where > /d , the underground firms would make negative profits, thus 
inducing them to leave the underground sector until fi is back to its equilibrium value. (If the 
underground firms were instead to make jxxsitive profits, further entry into the underground 
sector would occur, until the industry settles at a new, pure underground, equilibrium).
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Likewise, anywhere on the [dn/dfi]Q line to the left o f //*, i.e. where /i <  //*, the under­
ground linns would make positive profits, thus inducing more firms to enter the underground 
sector until ¡ 1  is back to its equilibrium value.
In other words, if [dnjdfi\u < [dn/dfi]0l this means that the coexistence equilibrium 
is stable (the industry will revert to this equilibrium after a small perturbation, 
rather than moving to an entirely different equilibrium); then, the denominator o f will 
be strictly positive as well, and this implies that > 0, as stated in the Proposition.□
Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics and First-Stage Regressions
Let us first describe the remaining variables tliat enter the regression analysis in more 
detail:
(a) Low  corru ption
Source: GCIt. The underlying question is: ’’ Irregular, additional payments connected 
with import mid export permits, business licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, po­
lice protection, or loan applications are very rare (l=strongly disagree, 7=stronglyr agree)” . 
This variable is a measure for good governance, and should therefore capture the rigor of 
enforcement represented by the expected fine a F  (/i) in the model.
(b ) L a b or regulation
Source: ’’ Employment Laws Index” from the World Bank’s ’’ Labor Regulation” data­
base. The employment lawrs index covers tliree areas: alternative employment contracts, 
conchtions of employment, and employment protection. The employment laws index takes
APPENDIX 1): DESC VIP HYP STATISTICS AND Flit ST-STAG F REGRESSIONS 117
slu t's  lx1 tween () suid 3, where the sul>-iiidiees on alternative employment contracts, condi­
tions of employment, and employment protection each take values Ix'tween 0 and 1. Higher 
values mean more regulation. Tliis variable, mi index o f lalxir market flexibility, should 
measure the extent of government regulations that may increase the c:ost of production for 
those finns that comply with them, and Ls thus a proxy of the ” non-tax cost ad\*antage” of 
finiLs that fail to comply with them (lxeause they operate in the imderground economy). In 
terms of the mcxlel, tins \nriable shoulil partly refk'ct r„ — ru.
(c) Tax rates
I will use tax rate's for four different tyjxts of taxes: jviyroll tax, income tax, coqxiratc 
tax, and VAT."1
( c l )  Payroll tax rates (sum o f employer and em ployee), % o f earnings
Source: OCR (wliich quotes from the Social Security Administration's reix»rt "Sochil 
Security Programs Throughout the World” ). This variable is a proxy for the cost advantage 
o f hiring ’Tmofficiar lalxjr, and will therefore represent c„ — cu in teims of the mcxlel.
(c2) Highest marginal tax rate, individual rate (% )
Source: World Hank, "World Development Indicators” . Tins variable should control for 
the taxation of income/profits earned by the self-employed and owners of small firms (not 
present in the mcxlel).
(c3 ) Highest marginal tax rate, corporate rate (% )
Source: World Hank, "World Development Indicators” . Tliis tria b le  should control for
- 1 Xot e that t he tax rat( is a somewhat incomplete measure of tlie act ual tax burden, as it docs not account 
for differences in the definition of the tax base across countries.
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the taxation of income/profits earned by corporations (not present in the model).
(c4) Value added tax rate
Source: World Bank, ’’World Development Indicators” . This variable should capture the 
tax burden on final sales (not incorporated in the model).
(d) New Business
Source: World Bank, ’’Doing Business” database. The data series measures the cost 
of starting a new business in percent of GNI per capita. This variable should capture the 
presence o f barriers to entry, in particular administrative barriers etc., thus representing Cg 
(red-tape barriers to entry) in the model.
(e) Local Com petition
Source: GCR. The underhung question is: ’’ Competition in local markets Is intense 
and market shares fluctuate constantly (l=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree1,)” . This vari­
able should capture the intensity o f competition between firms in the local industry, thus 
representing 7 in terms of the model.
Table 1A presents summary statistics of the stacked data underlying the regression analy­
sis, wliile Table IB reports the corresponding correlation coefficients.
I Mira 4W 4ÌÉBM M *
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Table 1A: The Data - Summary Statistics
slacked data
Min. Max. Mean Std. I)ev.
Underground Economy:
1. currency-demand approach (UE1) 7.8 C0.1 23.22 12.83
2. electricity approach (UE2) 7.5 08.0 22.2 13.08
Low corruption (LCorr) 1.37 0.01 1.80 1.55
Labor regulation (Lit) 0.81 2.35 1.53 0,15
Payroll tax rate (PT) 0.00 01.00 27,11 15.80
Income tax rate (IT) 0.00 00.00 31,11 13.80
Corporate tax rate (CT) 15.00 55.00 31.03 0.03
VAT (VAT) 0.00 31.00 15.78 0,52
Cost of Start-up (CS) 0,1 200 10.52 10.05
Local Competition (LComp) 1.0G 0.50 1.38 1.31
For an explanation of the abbreviations used in Table IB, see Table 1A above.
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Table IB: Correlations
UE2 LCorr LR PT IT CT VAT CS LComp
UE1 0.98 -0.47 0.55 0.04 -0.33 -0.28 0.07 0.07 -0.17
UE2 -0.55 0.52 -0,02 -0.28 -0.27 0.00 0.05 -0.23
LCorr -0.52 -0.17 0.37 -0.03 0.05 -0.37 0.52
LR 0.49 -0.05 0.02 0.21 0.06 -0.16
PT 0.27 0.26 0.53 -0.24 0.01
IT 0.23 0.40 -0.19 0.41
CT 0.09 0.02 0.05
VAT -0.20 -0.06
cs -0.13
Table 2 shows the results of the first-stage regressions, where each country’s tax rates
are predicted by the corresponding tax rate of a neighboring country (plus a country-fixed 
effect).
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Table 2: First-Stage Regression Results for Tax Rates
Sample: 109.*3 - 2000 (6 years)
payroll tax
Dependent Variable 
income tax corporate tax VAT
payroll tax rate* 0.0577 (0,38)
income tax rate;* 0.75 (0.00)
corporate tax rate* 0.09 (0.17)
VAT rate* 0.01 (0.53)
coi i nt ry- yea rs 262 26-1 277 272
#  of country dummies 52 56 56 58
adjusted R 2 0.91 0.65 0.53 0.95
— Neighboring country's
Appendix C: Robustness Checks
Table 1 shows the results of performing the same regressions as in Section 3, but including 
four regional dummies, where each country was assigned to either the OECD, the Central 
and Eastern Eurojx'an (CEE) countries, Latin America, or Asia.
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Table 4: OLS Regression including regional dummies
Sample: 1995 -2000 (6 years)
OLS I: Dep. Var.: ’’ Underground Economy” (currency-demand approach) 
OLS II: Dep. Var.: ’’ Underground Economy” (electricity approach)
OLS I OLS II
low corruption -2.49 (0.0624) -4.76 (0.0000)
labor regulation 11.26 (0.0000) 11.23 (0.0000)
payroll tax % IV -0.23 (0.0068) -0.31 (0.0000)
income tax % IV -0.16 (0.1845) 0.04 (0.6003)
corporate tax % IV 0.01 (0.9596) -0.25 (0.0442)
VAT % IV 0.51 (0.0090) 0.25 (0.0586)
Cost of Start-up (% GNI) -0.06 (0.0377) -0.07 (0.0000)
Competition 2.59 (0.0405) 1.45 (0.0521)
OECD 6.58 (0.5301) 33.14 (0.0000)
CEE 11.83 (0.2542) 33.43 (0.0000)
Latin America 16.30 (0.0900) 37.76 (0.0000)
Asia 14.40 (0.0833) 35.41 (0.0000)
country-years 102 248
Adjusted 0.51 0.53
Table 5a shows the first-stage regression o f "com petition” on "fuel, ores, 
exports” , "average tariff rate” , "effectiveness of antitrust policies” , the log o f  p o j ^ T l
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and country dummies.
I Vi
Table 5a: First-Stage Regression Results for "compflition"
Sample: 1995 - 2000 (6 years) 
Dependent Variable: Competition
fuel, ores, and metal exports -0.02 (0.0872)
average tariff rate -0.03 (0.0019)
antitrust policies 1.30 (0.0000)
log of population 13.78 (0.0000)
country-years 303
#  of country dummies 50
adjusted i?2 0.08
Table 5b presents the results of performing the same regressions as in Section -1, but
instrmnenting for ’’competition” by the regressors of Table 5a.
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Table 5b: OLS Regressions - ”competition * instrumented
Sample: 1995 -2000 (6 years)
OLS I: Dep. Var.: ’"Underground Economy” (currency-demand approach) 
OLS II: Dep. Var.: ” Underground Economy" (electricity approach)
OLS I OLS II
constant 20.23 (0.0223) 38.51 (0.0000)
low corruption -2.96 (0.0093) -5.00 (0.0000)
labor regulation 12.93 (0.0000) 11.83 (0.0000)
payroll tax % IV -0.25 (0.0039) -0.33 (0.0000)
income tax %  IV -0.19 (0.1363) -0.01 (0.8784)
corporate tax %  IV -0.26 (0.1632) 0.34 (0.0029)
VAT % IV 0.46 (0.0206) 0.25 (0.0438)
Cost of Start-up {% GNI) -0.05 (0.0830) -0.07 (0.0000)
Competition IV 2.59 (0.0600) 1.58 (0.0892)
country-years 97 239
Adjusted i?2 0.41 0.50
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